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The purpose of this study was to analyze the development of 
modern nationalism by the Kazakhs of northern Central Asia at this 
time. The Russian empire conquered and colonized Kazakhstan in 
the 1800s. The Kazakhs were traditional pastoral nomads. They had 
developed a unique "nomad nationalism,11 a powerful self-identity as 
"free riders of the Steppe." Russian rule imposed modernization on 
the Kazakhs. By the late nineteenth century, Kazakh nomadism was 
declining rapidly. A small Kazakh educated elite arose due to the 
introduction of modern education. As the Kazakh nomad masses grew 
more desperate, the intellectuals sought to prevent the complete 
destruction of Kazakh culture. Russian colonization flooded the 
Steppe. 
The Kazakh intellectuals were compelled to develop rapidly. Just 
as they were coalescing, the educated elite was confronted by the 
turmoil of Russia1s revolutionary era. Between 1900 and 1920, the 
Kazakh intellectuals transformed from social reformists to democratic 
nationalists to revolutionaries. That transformation, and the 
dynamic relations between the Kazakh secular intellectuals, religious 
reformists, and traditional leadership, against the background of the 
Russian revolutions, is one theme of this study; the goal is to 
provide perspective on modernization of nomads, as well as to 
contrast modern and nomad nationalism. 
This study is based on exhaustive research into English-language 
sources. Russian and Kazakh sources in translation were utilized 
extensively as well. The intention was to synthesize the scholarly 
findings in this field. The bibliography is intended as a detailed 
research tool in the study of pastoral nomads, particularly the 
Kazakhs, modernization, and nationalism. 
The transliteration system is based on that of the Library of 
Congress, modified to achieve consistency due to the peculiar 
history of Kazakh orthography. All dates to 1917 are Old Style, 
thirteen days behind the modern calendar; New Style chronology 
begins with 1918. 
This study of Kazakh nationalism in the revolutionary era 
provides useful perspective regarding pastoral nomadism in the 
modern world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern Kazakh nationalism arose in the latter 1800s, from the 
consolidation of tsarist rule, intense Russian colonization, and the 
influence of modern education and Western ideas. The Russians crushed 
armed resistance by the nomadic Kazakhs by the mid-1800s. Kazakh society 
was gripped by the forces of modernization. Kazakh thinkers were 
enveloped by Russian cultural developments and their world became 
ordered by Russian definitions. There arose naturally two clashing 
perspectives between bitter anti-Russian hostility and the desire for 
the opportunities of westernization. 
Thus, from the outset, the Kazakh intelligentsia was split between 
those who opposed all Russian, thereby Western, socioeconomic changes, 
who are characterized as "traditionalists," and those who sought to 
advance the Kazakh nation via Russian, that is, Western, progress, who 
are termed "westernizers." 
By the early twentieth century, this dichotomy developed into 
opposition between traditionalist nationalists and progressive 
westernists. A third element was Islam, itself split between reformists 
and conservatives, and the related pan-Turkist idealists. The Kazakh 
intellectual leaders were divided by perspective but all shared deeply 
1 
2 
the goal of a modern Kazakh nation, Qazaqjylyq. These first Kazakh 
nationalists were few in number but very significant politically. In the 
dozen years prior to World War I, they matured swiftly in their 
nationalism. By the time of the Russian revolutions, the Kazakh 
intellectual leaders were divided between westernists who included 
class-struggle in their outlook and nationalists distressed by the 
ethnocultural struggle between Kazakh nomad and Russian colonist. 
Yet another fracture-line appeared in this period, that between the 
Kazakhs of the northern steppe and those of the southern desert-mountain 
region. The northern Kazakhs were much more experienced with the Russian 
invaders. The southern Kazakhs were enmeshed in the sedentary culture of 
Turkestan. The northern Kazakhs tended to be more nationalistic and 
Russified, while the southern Kazakhs were much more anti-Russian and 
pan-Islamic. In cruder form, these characteristics applied to the 
general population as well as the educated elite. 
During the revolutions, the Kazakh intelligentsia fragmented along 
these major faults and therefore they never presented a united front, but 
rather a complex amorphousness. The great majority of Kazakhs were barely 
aware of the ideological struggle in their desperate battle to survive 
the wrenching blows of modernization upon their nomadic culture and 
economy. The intellectuals were divided by too many variant forces — 
inter-tribal rivalries, religious attitudes, class-consciousness, 
regionalism, educational differences — that they shifted from camp to 
camp during the civil war in response to the complicated dynamics of 
Russians versus natives, Whites versus Reds, liberals versus extremists, 
3 
pan-Turkists versus national autonomists versus federalists, and, not 
least, nomads versus sedentes. In the end, those Kazakh intellectuals 
who resisted the Soviet triumph were destroyed, while those who 
compromised with the Bolsheviks for their people's sake were eliminated 
when their stewardship was no longer needed. Independent Kazakh 
nationalism flowered and withered within a single lifetime. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Free Horsemen of the Steppe 
Are your livestock and your soul still healthy? 
— Traditional Kazakh greeting. 
The Kazakhs were one of the last great nomadic peoples of the modern 
age. Pastoral nomadism evolved in relation to its natural environment, 
in contrast with the civilized pattern of conquering the land. Sedentary 
societies thus relegate nomads to the primitive world, desiring to save 
them by settling them. Pastoral nomads detest civilization with a 
. 2  
fervent belief in the spiritual supremacy of nomadism. These opposing 
prejudices have always colored the historical interactions of nomads with 
the civilized world, and even more so the study of nomads by scholars. 
The student of nomadism must seek to appreciate, as much as possible, the 
deep attachment of the nomad to his lifestyle. One begins with the bases 
of Kazakh life: their land and their traditional culture. 
The modern Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan covers more than 
one million square miles, measuring two thousand miles east to west and 
3 
one thousand miles north to south. Roughly the size of the American 
West or western Europe, it sprawls between China and Europe, stretching 
from the 55th to the 40th parallels. It is the domain of the Steppe. 
4  
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The physical boundaries of the Kazakh domain were the Volga River 
and Caspian Sea, on the west, the Siberian taiga to the north, the 
Turanian desert lowlands of the south, and on the east, the uprearing 
mountain systems of the Tien Shans and Altais. Within this area one 
discerns three broad vegetative zones and five physiographic provinces. 
The severe continental climate of inner Asia dominates Kazakhstan and 
largely determines its soil-regions. The northern third is covered with 
Siberian taiga, wooded steppe (on black-earth soils), and feather-grass 
steppe (on chestnut soils), the middle third is semi-desert scrub 
grasses and the saksaul tree (on chestnut and brown soils), and the 
southern third is true desert (clay, sand, stony brown soils). Alpine 
4 
vegetation occurs only on the eastern and south-eastern margins. 
The northern plains form the first topographic region. Because of 
i t s  f e r t i l e  s o i l s ,  t h e  R u s s i a n s  c a m e  t o  c a l l  i t  " t h e  V i r g i n  L a n d s . T h e  
central part of Kazakhstan is formed by an uplands region larger than 
Texas or Britain and France combined. It is a picturesque land of rugged 
hills and tablelands, rolling grass, numerous lakes and small, 
intermittent streams, and low, isolated, pineclad mountains. Varying in 
elevation from one to four thousand feet, it is the eroded remnant of an 
extensive mountain system, and is enormously wealthy in nonferrous 
minerals. Perhaps the historic heartland of central Eurasia's nomads, 
it has borne many names: Desht-i-Kipchak by early Arab writers, Kirghiz 
Steppe by Western cartographers after the tsarist style, the "Low Hills" 
or "folded country" or "undulating plain" by Soviet geographers, and 
Sary-Arka by the Kazakhs themselves.^ 
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The western lowlands are the desert plains rising northward from 
the desolate Caspian into the Uralian uplands, from which descend the 
Volga and Ural rivers. These lowlands merge into the vast southern 
deserts which sweep from the Ust-Urt, between the Caspian and Aral seas, 
to the sands of the Kyzyl-Kum, embracing the Syr Darya river, to the 
Bet Pak Dala, "Steppe of Misfortune," west of Lake Balkhash, and the 
deserts of Dzungaria between the Altais and Tien Shan, giving onto the 
Gobi wastes. 
The highland systems of the south—the Tien Shan and Pamir Knot 
beyond—and of the east—the Altai and others—are vast. They nourish 
the major rivers of Central Asia, the Syr and Amu Daryas, and the Hi 
River, which descends from the Tien Shan with numerous other streams to 
fall into Lake Balkhash. On the fertile piedmont soils of this region 
arose the extremely ancient sedentary cultures, the so-called oasis 
civilization of (western or Russian) Turkestan. The great deserts 
separate the northern nomads from the southern sedentes, both physically 
and culturally. However, the Ili basin is situated both between the 
steppe and mountains, and athwart the ancient east-west passages in the 
Altai-Tien Shan barrier. Because of its fertility it attracted farmers 
and towns, but its location attracted migrating nomad tribes and marching 
armies. This region was very important to the Kazakhs, who called it 
Dzheti Su (Jetisu), or Seven Rivers; the Russians translated this into 
g 
Semirechye. 
It is apparent that Kazakhstan is the central sector of the Steppe, 
which stretches from the plains of Hungary to Manchuria. This vast, 
7 
semi-arid, isolated wilderness created and nurtured pastoral nomadism. 
Civilization first appeared in Central Asia some five thousand years ago, 
9 
on the southwest border with Iran. Pastoralism arose a few millenia 
later, and pastoral nomadism itself only developed some time between 
2000 and 1000 B.C.^ The origins of nomadism are still disputed, but 
the obvious pre-requisite was the development of animal husbandry and 
particularly the domestication of the horse. The most likely scenarios 
(for nomadism probably developed independently in several areas) involved 
sedentary herdsmen exploiting the vast pastures of the Steppe until some 
catalyst urged them to abandon their settled villages for the mobile life 
of the stepnik.^ Once it appeared, the pastoral nomadic culture swept the 
Steppe with a distinctive lifestyle and spiritual character which, in its 
broadest form, has dominated the grasslands throughout history, until the 
modern day. Specific customs varied, but not the environmental realities 
(or "subsistence factors") of their nomadic life. The Scythians are more 
like the Kazakhs than unlike; even the Cossacks were transformed by the 
12 
Steppe. 
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The nomads lived entirely on their herds. Pasture, water, and 
shelter were their basic necessities. Despite the vastness of the 
Steppe, grass was sparse and seasonal, water scarce or absent, and 
shelter on the treeless plains was found only in stream-valleys. Drought 
and blizzards were catastrophic. Most dreadful was the dzhut, in Kazakh, 
the thaw which melts the snow and the freeze which ices the grass. 
14 
Entire herds, and the people who lived by them, were wiped out. 
Pastoral nomadic migration implies neither footloose wandering nor 
8 
"voortrekking." Herding large numbers of grazing animals upon whom one's 
existence absolutely depends is a crucial calculation of the benefits of 
new pasture versus the debilities of exhaustion and weight-loss, storms, 
predators, and wastelands. The Steppe could provide only so much 
pasturage, it had a very finite and fluctuating carrying capacity, and 
this had to be parcelled out in large areas to small groups. Dramatic 
notions of mobs of nomads thundering over the plains like a flood are 
thus purely romantic. The stark exigencies of natural environment always 
precluded great numbers or density of nomadic herdsmen; the extensive 
nature of their lifestyle accounts for much in the pastoral nomadic 
economy, culture, and psychology. 
During the summer, the nomads divided into small family groups 
which scattered the herds over the available pasturage. In winter, the 
groups gathered into extended family-communities which settled in one 
(usually) traditional locale for the long season. Their herds consisted 
of horses, sheep, goats, and camels. Horned cattle were poorly fit for 
nomadic living, and were insignificant in the "pure" nomad economy. 
The Kazakhs were horsemen par excellence. They never used horses as 
draft animals (though they sometimes rode cattle), whereas the relatively 
few "snow" camels they had were strictly beasts of burden. Oxen (and 
yaks) hauled the heavy, two-wheeled carts which carried the nomads' home 
and possessions when moving from camp to camp. The nomad dwelling was 
the ingenious yurt (Russian kibitka, Kazakh ui), wind-proof, dry, 
portable, yet comfortable and even elegant in simplicity. This conical-
roofed, round-walled felt tent symbolizes the entwined practicality and 
9 
artistry that distiungish nomad culture. The Kazakh nomads1 basic 
foodstuff was milk: they milked all their animals, making various milk 
products, including cheeses; a staple was kumiss, fermented mare's milk. 
Meat and vegetable products, the latter acquired from the non-nomadic 
world typically, were important but secondary.^ The men wore trousers, 
boots, heavy shirts, made of leather, felt, and skins. The women wore 
long, many-layered skirts and headpieces often described by Western 
observers as looking like the headdress of nuns. They acquired metals, 
textiles, and grains from settled peoples, through trading and raiding, 
while itinerant craftsmen lived among the herdsmen making artifacts to 
nomad tastes. 
The differences between civilized folk and nomads in terms of 
character and spirituality are many and well-known. The stress here is 
that while the townsman has been separated by his culture from the 
natural world, thereby becoming "advanced," the nomad (like other 
"primitive" peoples) remains awed by the mysteries of life and calloused 
by its hardships. The spiritual quality of nomadic life is the most 
important feature of it, to the nomad, yet it is the least tangible, to 
the modern mind. 
The intense love of their land and animals permeates Kazakh nomadic 
16 
culture, and is most apparent in their oral art. It is difficult to 
quantify spirit, a major dilemma for the student of non-Western 
nationalism trying to separate primitive faith from modern ideology. 
The nature of Kazakh identity particularly reveals this problem, with its 
fusion of nomadic culture and historical molding, the latter process to 
10 
be described next. 
To overlook the nature of the pastoral nomadic character is 
misleading; a similar flaw of "anti-primitivism" is often found in the 
study of American Indians, particularly the mounted hunter-nomads of the 
Great Plains. The essence of nomadic life is mobility, kin/communal 
mutual aid in a "frontier" milieu, and aggressiveness. The first creates 
a powerful notion of freedom, the second one of egalitarianism, and the 
last has captured the historical imagination of the civilized world, as 
the following scholarly comments testify. 
Nomad life required a more robust physique than that of 
the sedentary oasis-dweller. It also demanded a more independent 
mind which might, in times of crisis, be called upon to make 
swift judgements and take the initiative in a way scarcely 
conceivable to the cultivator bound to the ceaseless routine of 
the farming calendar. In the struggle for pastures, in inter­
tribal warfare and in pursuance of the blood-feud the nomad 
naturally developed aggressive instincts which, taken with his 
need for the products of sedentary society, often led him to 
prey upon his settled neighbors. ... He invariably held in 
contempt the settled population of the oases. . . . The 
historian who regards pastoral nomadism as an inferior 
activity to agriculture is likely to be misled in his reading of 
the Central Asian past since he will certainly fail to 
appreciate the immense prestige (based primarily upon superior 
military prowess) which the nomad has' usually enjoyed among the 
oasis-dwellers.^ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Kazakhstan and the Tsars 
The Kazakhs evolved from the Turkic and Mongol nomads of the central 
Eurasian steppes who chose the free life of nomadry over the comfort of 
civilization.* Chingiz (Genghis) Khan, upon conquering Central Asia, 
tore asunder the tribal groupings of the steppes and rearranged them for 
2 
military purposes. The Chmgizid dynasties which inherited the vast 
conquests of the 1200s had disintegrated into "hordes," tribes, and 
clans by the 1400s. (Despite modern parlance, "horde" actually implied 
"government.") 
The White Horde, a remnant of the Golden Horde, in Central Asia, 
had broken up, partly due to the pressure of Muscovite expansion into 
the European steppes. One group of Moslem Turks formed the Uzbek 
Khanate, which established hegemony over Central Asia under several 
strong leaders. However, many nomads resented Uzbek domination or 
preferred the free Steppe to civilization (or both). When the Uzbeks 
moved south to rule over the oases-states (called Mawaraunnahr), those 
tribes and bands preferring the steppe life returned to the northern 
grasslands. 
These nomads—individuals, families, parts of clans and tribes, 
adventurers and indigenous remnants—came to call themselves and to be 
12 
called "Kazakhs." A Turkic word of disputed etymology, kazak (qazaq) 
referred from early times to those who defied imposed authority to live 
free on the Steppe—freebooters, raiders, rebels, mercenaries, and those 
3 
who defied their hereditary leaders. The Russians adopted the term 
for their own unruly frontiersmen, the Kazaks—Anglicized as "Cossacks." 
Though the name was originally functional or descriptive, that is, 
"the free riders," it quickly and imperceptibly became a national 
appellation. The Kazakhs are often described as traditionally tribal; 
in fact, there were Kazakh tribes, some left from indigenous peoples and 
some self-formed in the turmoil of the medieval era, but cutting across 
the various tribal and subtribal identities was the all-encompassing 
4 
notion of "Kazakhness," or Qazaqjylyq. Within the pre-modern, nomadic 
milieu, this notion of over-arching unity was institutionalized by 
the mechanism of geneology: non-Kazakhs became Kazakhs by geneological 
adoption, often done blatantly, with the goal being to unite all the 
Kazakh persons and kin-lines into descendants of the mythical Alash, 
literally the "father" of his country."* Thus, the clans, families, and 
tribes of Kazakhstan were constantly modifying elaborate geneologies 
linking themselves all to eponymous ancestors, so that by the time the 
nineteenth-century ethnographers reached them, the Kazakhs formed a 
distinct nation. 
The origins of this nation were political, not ethnic. By the 
1500s, the Kazakhs constituted a single people with a single language, 
a definite territory, and a common economy. As they expanded from the 
core area of Semirechye into the vast Desht-i-Kipchak, growing in both 
13 
numbers and territory, they developed a typical medieval Eurasian 
nomadic khanate state.^ 
Soviet historians, working within the theoretical framework of 
primitive - patriarchal - feudal-capitalist-socialist stages, have long 
grappled with the categorization of Kazakh society and economy. The 
elimination of the traditional Kazakh leadership after the Civil War was 
justified by their feudal nature, and by extension, the Khanate was 
typical "nomad feudalism."^ The lack of truly "feudal" characteristics 
frustrates this scheme. The Kazakhs owned their herds privately, for 
instance, while the land (pasture) was owned communally. Kin and 
communal mutual aid customs which provided community support for the 
poor and misfortunate were not serf-master or exploiter-producer 
g 
relations, though portrayed as such in Soviet literature. 
Two fine Soviet scholars of the modern era are S. E. Tolybekov, a 
9 
Kazakh historian, and A. M. Khazanov, expert on pastoral nomadism. 
Their delicate compromise describes nomadic culture as "transitional 
patriarchal-feudal." This grants Kazakh culture its traditional basis 
while maintaining class-exploitation; it also criticizes nomadic 
socioeconomy as basically stagnant or oscillatory. 
The great majority in Kazakh nomadic society were neither rich nor 
poor, even in pastoral terms of herd-size, the likely result of the 
precarious nature of their steppe-life, when drought and dzhuts were 
constant levellers. Life revolved around the community of mobile 
camps, the auls, extended only somewhat by greater clan and tribal 
relations.^ Authority at this level resided in the aksakal, "white 
14 
beard," and the bii, later formerly a judge. The Kazakh "masses" were 
called kara suiuk, "black bone." 
Dwelling amongst them, undistinguished in lifestyle save for the 
whiteness of their yurts, were the _ak suiuk, the "white bone." Their 
blood was "noble" in that they were descended from Chingis Khan. They 
only were eligible for election—by the biis—to be khan or "sub-khan" 
(sultan). The biis were chosen by the aksakals to represent the auls. 
The wealthy strata, who included both white bone and black bone, were 
called bais, "rich." To be a wealthy nomad was a position more of 
responsibility than privilege, for not only did the bai have larger 
herds but also he helped support poor relatives and others, such as the 
baigush, hired hands. The goal of the poor nomad was to have his own 
herd, which hiring out provided; the dreaded alternative was to have no 
animals and be forced to settle down to grow crops. 
During the 1500s, as the Kazakh Khanate expanded, three "hordes" 
emerged. Orda referred to the court or retinue of a prince or khan. 
The Kazakhs used a different term, zhuz (juz), literally "hundred, a 
great many."^ Its use implies an essentially military connotation. 
The Hordes represented a practical, even strategic occupation of the 
vast steppe. The Ulu Zhuz (Elder or Great Horde) occupied Semirechye 
and the southern deserts, the Orta Zhuz (Middle Horde) migrated from the 
Aral area across the central uplands to the northern plains, and the 
Kishshi Zhuz (Little Horde) dwelt in the western lowlands. Each of 
these territories represented three natural "orbits" of seasonal 
migration within the physiography of Kazakhstan. The division by zhuz 
15 
merely institutionalized the Kazakh adaptation to environment, and given 
the legacy of Chingisid authority, the result was three political-
iftilitary unions within the Kazakh (proto)nation. 
Each horde was nominally led by a khan; exceptionally strong military 
leaders, notably Kasym (1509-18), Tauke ( 1680-1«? 18), and Kenesary Kasymov 
(1840s) united the hordes under one khan, but otherwise each horde's 
khan ruled separately. The Kazakhs were notoriously independent, as 
evidenced by their very origins, and individuals, auls, even clans 
might leave one horde's orbit for another, to escape oppressive 
leaders or find stronger, richer ones, as well as to escape rivalries and 
find better pastures. This essential attitude towards authority caused 
Russian bureaucrats much grief. This seeming instability of Kazakh 
society is difficult for the sedentary to grasp, but within the frontier 
or wilderness context and given the atomistic nature of seasonal pastoral 
migration, it was perfectly reasonable. Kazakhs rustled and raided other 
Kazakhs a great deal, violence and usurpation of pasture mitigated by 
the authority of the aksakals, biis, and khans; they did not, however, 
wage war between the hordes. A Kazakh considered all Kazakhs his kin. 
The Khanate flourished in the 1500s and early 1600s. Its neighbors 
were weak or occupied elsewhere; the great shift in the Oriental trade to 
European shipping had left Central Asia immensely isolated. The Kazakhs 
conquered some of the major towns of northern Syr Darya, exposing them to 
Turkestani influence. This, as well as the growth of trade with the 
settled states, helped create wealthy, powerful Kazakhs with interests 
12  
other than the simple prestige-oriented nomad values. 
16 
Calamity crashed upon the Kazakhs in the mid-1600s. Mongol nomads 
of the Oirot nation called Dzhungars (Jungars), to the east of the Great 
Horde, had threatened Central Asia before, toppling the Uzbek khanate in 
the 1450s in the troubled period of Kazakh origins. In 1620, the non-
Dzhungar Oirots called Torguts fled Dzhungaria, cutting a bloody swathe 
through Kazakhstan to occupy the lower Volga steppe. From 1650 to 1700, 
the Dzhungar armies ravaged Central Asia repeatedly, attacking nomads 
and oases alike. After briefly turning eastward to battle the rising 
Manchu power of China, the Dzhungars turned west again in deadly earnest. 
The Kazakhs called the troublous times of the Dzhungar wars the 
13 
"Great Disaster," aktaban shubirindi. The Dzhungars waged seven major 
wars on the Kazakhs from 1698 to 1757. They seized Semirechye, some of 
the Syr Darya region, and most of the eastern segment of the central 
uplands and northern plains. In this period, the Russians inaugurated 
the so-called Ishim line, fortresses between Siberia and the war-torn 
14 
Steppe. In 1723, the Dzhungars devastated the beleaguered Kazakhs 
gathered in the old heartland of the Chu-Talas region of Semirechye, 
which proved the ebb in the history of the Khanate. 
The Dzhungar threat led numerous Kazakh leaders to seek Russian 
help. Although the tsarist empire provided no help, in fact, various 
leading Kazakhs swore oaths of allegiance and mutual protection. This 
was Russia's legal pretext for conquering the Kazakhs. The Manchus 
eventually exterminated the Dzhungars, and the Kazakhs reoccupied their 
lands and even migrated into vacated Dzhungaria.^ The khan of the 
Little Horde took oath in 1731, several Middle Horde leaders followed 
17 
suit in 1740, and a few leading Great Horde Kazakhs gave nominal obeisance 
in 1742. In fact, the oathing of the khans meant no more to most Kazakhs 
than treaty-signing by chiefs meant to American plains nomads, given the 
fierce independence and scorn for imposed authority in their character. 
Russian authority, like American, ignored this in determination to enforce 
law and order, meaning only domesticating the free riders within the 
Empire. 
The Tsarist conquest of Kazakhstan falls into two phases, the initial 
period of gradual penetration and nominal rule, followed by full-fledged 
military, economic, and political domination.^ Tsarist expansion to the 
Volga and Siberia placed the Kazakhs between Russia and the Orientfs 
wealth. Cossacks were settled along the Ural and Irtysh rivers in the 
1600s and 1700s, while fortified lines edged southward across the wooded 
steppe, sheltering "illegal" Russian peasants. Already suffering from 
too little pasture, the Kazakhs resisted Russian encroachment. Russian 
concern turned to alarm in the 1770s, when large numbers of western 
Kazakhs joined in the Pugachev revolt.^ 
The Russians attempted a carrot and stick approach, installing 
"their" khans in Orenburg, the Steppe frontier capital, paying them 
salaries and presumably controlling them, while in the Steppe itself, 
brute military force was used against the "wild" Kazakhs who persisted 
in raiding and defying authority. The "kept" khans were worthless, for 
the Kazakhs generally ignored them as much as their Russian masters. 
However, a new element was introduced with Kazakhs who benefitted from 
Russian rule. 
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This developing internal conflict as well as resistance to the 
Russians reached dramatic proportions by the turn of the nineteenth 
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century, with Kazakhs fighting each other as well as the Russians. 
The Little Horde erupted in the 1780s and 1790s with the great rebellion 
of Batyr Srym. After its suppression, the tsar "authorized" a segment 
of the Little Horde, under Khan Bukei, to cross the Volga to occupy 
pastureland there; the creation of the "Inner" of "Bukei Horde" in 
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1801 proved ominous. 
In 1802, Kenesary Kasymov (Kine Sari Kasym-uli) was born to a noble 
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family of the Great Horde. He was attracted to the material advances 
of Russian-borne westernization, initially. Yet his youth saw hard 
years for his people: in 1819 and 1823, some Great Horde leaders took 
oath with the Russians; the Tsar "abolished" the Middle Horde Khanate 
in 1822, and the Little Horde in 1824. Russian military pressure and 
the tensions of socioeconomic changes only increased through the 1830s. 
In 1837, Kenesary launched the last great Kazakh revolt. Russian 
sources themselves describe the revolt as massive, popular, and widely 
supported, bitterly anti-Russian, with its goal independence. Large 
numbers of Kazakhs from all the hordes joined, and Kenesary was elected 
Khan of all the Kazakhs (the first since the early 1700s). In 1841, he 
issued a declaration of grievances decrying Russian massacres, injustice, 
and land-expropriation. The revolt was crushed in 1846-47; the Kazakhs 
lacked the discipline and modern armaments of the tsarist military as 
well as reserves of manpower or wealth to maintain prolonged war. The 
last Khan was killed in 1847, by Kirgiz nobles allied with the state of 
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Kokand, then encroaching on the southern Kazakhs. The Great Horde 
Khanate was abolished in 1848; since the Inner Horde was abolished in 
1845, no even nominal independence remained in Kazakhstan. 
The second phase of Tsarist rule was military colonial occupation 
2 1 
and administration. The Russians captured Tashkent in 1865, gaining 
efffective control over all Turkestan. A Steppe Commission was created 
which studied the region until 1867. The government then divided all of 
Central Asia into an array of administrative units. The emirates of 
Bokhara and Khiva retained semi-independent status as tsarist vassals. 
The remaining lands of the south were organized as the guberniia or 
Governorate-General of Turkestan. 
Kazakhstan was divided into six oblasts (provinces): Akmolinsk and 
Semipalatinsk, the northeastern and central regions; Turgay and Uralsk, 
the western and northwestern regions, and Syr Darya and Semirechye, the 
southern and eastern regions. All except Syr Darya, in the Turkestan 
guberniia, were governed by the Steppe Polozhenie (law code), while the 
four northern oblasts (excluding Syr Darya and Semirechye) were under th 
control of the Ministry of the Interior. Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, 
Semipalatinsk, and Semirechye constituted the guberniia of the Stepnoi 
Krai (lfSteppe Region11); Semirechye was transfered to the Turkestan 
guberniia in 1897. The Steppe governor-general resided at Omsk, with 
military governors in Semirechye and Uralsk. The Russians further split 
up the Kazakh lands at the uezd (county), volost (district), and aul 
levels. 
This deliberate gerrymandering had a profound impact on Kazakh 
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economy and thus their traditional culture. Herdsmen who once roamed the 
unbounded Steppe now confronted internal barriers across their accustomed 
routes. For nomads who depended on their pastures for survival, this 
administrative ripsawing was calamitous. Some auls of the Middle Horde, 
for example, had "nomadized" between the Irtysh, in summer, and the Syr 
Darya region in winter, distances of many hundreds of miles, which they 
could no longer do, crowding the poorer central and southern pastures 
while the Russians took the fertile north. Economic hardship was 
accompanied with cultural change as well. The Russians countered the 
traditional authorities, the aksakals and biis, by abolishing nomadic 
elections and appointing the native officials themselves, even paying 
salaries. This led to a serious decline in quality of the Kazakh leaders 
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and social relations. Many of these drastic changes were instituted 
with the Steppe Statute of 1868, including the outright expropriation 
of all Kazakh land as "crown land." Naturally, the last Kazakh revolt 
until 1916 occurred in 1868-70. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Russification as Modernization 
The TKirghizT [Kazakhs] are animals, nothing more. The 
Russians are men. The 'Kirghiz1 are going to China. God be 
with them! Let them go! Are they not pagans? We should be 
well rid of them! ... If they want to stay with us, let them 
remain in one spot, become civilized, and obtain proper 
passports; then their land will be secured to them. But if 
they must wander about like wild animals, here to-day and the 
other side of the mountain tomorrow, then they must pay for 
their liberty and wildness. 
— Peasant land-surveyor, 19 14, in 
Semirechye.^ 
The Russification of Kazakhstan is best reviewed in four 
categories: colonization, industrialization, socioeconomic change, and 
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education. The Russians migrated into Kazakhstan as permanent settlers 
forcefully displacing the natives from their land, much the way Americans 
tamed the Wild West. They were there to carve civilization from the 
wilderness. The Kazakhs could "choose" annihilation, exile, or 
assimilation. The physical presence of the Russians with their modern 
advances was accompanied by cultural influence as well. With the advent 
of modern education, imposed for Russian purposes, a small Russian-
educated intellectual elite developed and with them the powerful 
phenomenon of modern nationalism. 
Initially, Russian colonization had been limited to the imperial 
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frontier with the establishment of Cossack settlements and fortified 
lines, with the strategic purpose of encircling and dividing the Kazakhs. 
The irony of the Cossack role is their origins as free stepniks like the 
Kazakhs. Indeed, the very name of the Kazakhs was expropriated by the 
Russians; "Cossack" and "Kazak" are identical in Cyrillic, so to 
distinguish them, the Russians changed the Kazakhs to 'Kirghiz1 (while 
the real Kirghiz, related nomads of the Tien Shan alpine pastures, had 
their name changed to Kara-Kirghiz). 
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The nature of colonization changed radically in the mid-1800s. 
Russia's land-hungry serfs were set free by the Great Reforms of the 
1860s-70s, and the government opened Kazakhstan to peasant immigration 
in hopes the vast Steppe could alleviate pressure in Europe. Peasant 
colonization turned from a trickle to a flood in the 1890s, because of 
the great famine of 189 1-92 and also due to the construction of the { 
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Trans-Siberian Railroad, which greatly facilitated transportation. 
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In 1896, the Resettlement Administration, Pereselencheskoe 
Upravlenie, was created within the Interior Ministry. Numerous surveying 
expeditions were sent to determine which lands were "surplus" to the 
nomads' needs and could be turned over to Russian colonists (through 
the Public Land Fund). Colonization reached a crescendo following the 
Stolypin reforms of 1906, which created the first official Virgin Lands 
project in Kazakhstan. The influx decreased sharply with World War I 
and the following years of civil war, but by then a massive Russian 
population dwelt in Kazakhstan. About 1.5 million European settlers 
had flooded Kazakh lands occupied by only about four million Kazakhs, in 
a span of roughly two decades 
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Industrialization was only in its infancy during the tsarist 
period; the Trans-Siberian Railroad was the first significant step, 
and it came late.^ The mineral treasures of Kazakhstan were largely 
unexplored, but several major mining operations were undertaken, with 
lead, copper, and silver mining in the Altais in the 1700s, lead and 
silver mining in the central uplands in 1834, coal mining in the 
Karaganda region by 1855. By 19 14, some 1,400 industrial workers 
labored in the Karaganda area; the workers were overwhelmingly Russian, 
with Kazakhs working as laborers and tending to leave with the herds in 
winter or when they had accumulated enough to pay the kalym, the bride-
price . 
Urbanization is one of the strongest factors of industrialization. 
By 1911, seventeen towns in Kazakhstan contained 10,000 or more 
people. Omsk was largest, by far, with 127,000 people, located in 
the northeastern Virgin Lands. These cities served primarily as 
regional commercial and administrative centers, as manufacturing was 
scarcely begun. The towns along the Trans-Siberian Railroad grew 
largest and fastest. 
The urban population was also mostly European (Slavic); it 
numbered about half a million in 1916 (compared to the total rural 
population of about five million).^ Its presence was doubly significant. 
It symbolized how far Kazakhstan had come since its origins as simply 
the Steppe, home of the free riders. It also determined the course of 
events during the revolutionary era. In the country, Kazakh nomad faced 
Slavic peasant in the ancient duel of horseman versus farmer, but in the 
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city, the "pre-modern" Kazakh world-view confronted the truly alien 
"modern world." Because their cultural character was rooted in pastoral 
nomadism, which is utterly anti-urban, the socioeconomic effects of 
modernization were particularly stressful. 
The primary socioeconomic effect of Russian rule and its concomitant 
modernization was the extinction of the economic viabilty of Kazakh 
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pastoral nomadism. The Kazakh livestock-breeding economy had never 
been utterly self-sufficient, but it had proven to be the most efficient 
human exploitation of the arid grasslands, evidenced by the persistence 
of pastoral nomadism through time. The struggle of nomads for pasture 
has influenced Eurasian history, as is well known. The Dzhungar-Kazakh 
wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been a sort of 
nomad armageddon which left both sides at the mercy of the empires of 
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the civilized world. Against the inexorable economic forces of 
modernization the Kazakhs could not maintain their traditional economy, 
nor the culture which was based upon it. 
Sedentarization was not new in Kazakh history. Given the harsh 
nature of the Steppe and its history, the individual fortune of each 
herdsman and aul varied considerably over time and space. The great 
nomad chieftain with countless herds one summer could be struck by the 
dzhut next winter, or his rivals could carry off his livestock, leaving 
him a poor man dependent on his wealthier kin. By working for them, 
he could attain animals for himself, or he could let his kin pasture 
what livestock he had left, while he grew millet and harvested wild hay 
for them.^ The ex-nomadTs goal was always to regain his herds. 
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Sedentarization in terms of modernization was a very different 
phenomenon. The civilized attitude that the only good nomad was one 
planted in the ground—as either corpse or farmer—was reflected and 
engendered both by government policies and officials, and also by the 
structural impacts of industrial economics itself. Thus, the district 
gerrymandering and the Resettlement Administration represent the 
former, while the latter aspect manifested itself in the seizure of the 
best pasture lands for farming. In farming areas, pastoral extensive 
land use was replaced by intensive farming, deep plowing, and a typical 
grain-livestock rural economy. Even in pastoral areas, the pressures to 
supply the Russian market with meat and hides changed the composition 
of the Kazakh herds, with horned cattle paramount and the noble horse 
secondary. In fact, Kazakh livestock numbers flourished: from 1906 to 
19 16, the total herd size increased by five million head (76%).^ 
As available pasture declined due to Russian constriction, the 
Kazakh economic situation changed. In the north, close to the Russian 
markets and transport, the wealthy Kazakh was Russian-oriented. In the 
remote east, the traditional milieu was least affected. In the south, 
due to the influence of Kokand, the Kazakh elite was incorporated in 
the Turkestani world; however, there also developed large numbers of 
nomadic Kazakhs who had drifted southward as the Russian pressure in the 
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north forced them to seek other pasture. Finally, in the west, those 
near Russia were much affected but the tribes in the Ust-Urt and Turgai 
regions remained much more traditional. 
The modern sedentarization not only forced many Kazakhs to take up 
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subsistence farming because they could no longer maintain adequate herds; 
it ironically increased the power of numerous other Kazakhs. It was 
noted that at least by the early 1800s, a rift was developing between 
Kazakhs who benefitted from Russian rule, and those who suffered. The 
economic impact was to make many moderate and poor Kazakhs abandon 
nomadism, while wealthy Kazakhs often increased their wealth. By 
the revolutionary era, over 80% of the Kazakh population utilized some 
agriculture, while only about a third had done so merely 40 years 
i • 13 earller. 
Wealthy Kazakhs in Russian areas preserved and extended their 
power by allying with the Russians, that is, they remained nomads 
because their poorer kin could not. Wealthy Kazakhs in traditional 
areas remained nomads by maintaining their kin as nomads. This 
dichotomy of tangled interests proved a powerful tool of Russian rule. 
Pastoral nomads have sophisticated systems of land-use, enforced 
by custom (through trial-and-error) much more than by violence. Kazakhs 
had regarded the land (specifically, the pasture) as common to all, with 
traditional rights of usufruct for each family within its extended 
groupfs territory. In some places, the best sites were reserved for 
specific families, in others, it was first-come first-serve; in still 
others, usage rotated in a customary fashion between families. Relations 
over pasture and water were vital to the Kazakh culture, which stressed 
peaceful resolution over bloodshed. 
The pressures of Russification replaced the nomad concept with that 
of private property. The government had seized all Kazakh land as crown 
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property with the Steppe Polozhenie. The best lands were determined to 
be surplus to the nomads' needs and were given to the ministry of 
Agriculture for distribution to the peasants. The Kazakhs were left 
to compete among themselves for the marginal lands left them. Those 
most amenable to modern changes benefitted, but those most traditional 
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were more likely to be impoverished. 
The process began with the semi-private property of each nomad 
family, the winter quarters (kstau). Under Russian pressure, the 
group would lay claim to that land. The Kazakhs had traditionally not 
laid up fodder for their herds in the winter, a practice roundly 
condemned by civilized observers and seemingly illogical; in fact, 
Khazanov points out that the natural grasses recovered quickly when 
grazed but much more slowly when cropped.^ As the civilized practice 
of fodder-storage spread, Kazakh families would claim hay and meadow 
lands also. Wealthy Kazakhs could use money to buy or rent the lands 
of poorer families. There thus developed rich Kazakh landowners and 
jataks, "1 ie-aboutsff without herds, baigush, hired hands, and eginshi, 
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grain-growers or ex-nomads. As never before in Kazakh history, the 
nomad society was being stratified into classes. 
The fourth major aspect of Tsarist Russification is education.^ 
"Universal" schooling is a well-recognized component of modernization, 
given the industrial society's need for trained workers and skilled 
technicians. Also, colonial administrators need educated natives both 
for clerical aid and to stabilize control of the indigenous population. 
This education is a two-edged sword, for the native with the training to 
work and obey usually recognizes his inferior status and his superior 
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opportunity. He is caught between the modern and the traditional, but 
only he—not his colonial rulers nor his fellow people—can bridge the 
gap between the two. The Russian term intelligentsia can be applied 
to these intellectually emancipated critics of the existing order. 
As early as the 1780s, Empress Catherine II had encouraged Kazan 
Tatar mullahs and merchants to proselytize Islam among the Kazakhs; it 
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was hoped that this would civilize the Kazakhs. Although the Kazakhs 
were nominally Moslem, they retained much of their pre-Islamic culture 
and beliefs, merely overlaying them with an Islamic veneer. But through 
the nineteenth century, Kazakh Islamicization deepened, partly due to 
proselytization of the Tatars in the north and the Turkestanis in the 
south, and partly due to the increasing hardship of Kazakh life, which 
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increased religiosity. 
The Tatars proved troublesome, spreading not only Islam but anti-
Russian sentiments, while using their intermediary position for their 
own profit. Following the establishment of colonial rule in the mid-
1800s, the Russians ended Tatar influence and inaugurated government 
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schools. Three types developed: two-year aul schools, taught in 
Kazakh, providing a mimimal learning; four-year volost schools that 
taught Russian, and advanced six-year schools. From the latter, Kazakhs 
could go on to the Russian gymnasia in Orenburg and Omsk. The graduates 
either entered government service or became teachers themselves. 
The Russian-Kazakh secular schools represent direct Russification. 
But the impacts of modernization rippled more subtly, also. Another 
education system competed with the Russian, the Islamic. "Secret" 
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Islamic schools spread through the Steppe. From the south came a very 
conservative Islam, providing the traditional Koranic instruction. But 
modernization had created a new Islamic educational movement among the 
Crimean and Kazan Tatars. The "new method" (usul-i-jadid) movement was 
a westernized, progressive, yet overtly Islamic educational program 
which was very popular in the Russian Moslem world. It sought to bridge 
the gulf between the umma (Islamic society) and the modern world. Linked 
with this modernization of Islam was the Tatar-led movement which 
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envisioned a great nation of Turkish Moslems. Known variously as 
Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islam, depending on the emphasis of the reformer, it 
sought to gloss over regional, national, and cultural divisions by 
focusing on the shared ethnic, linguistic, and religious aspects of 
Russia's Turkish-speaking Moslems. 
The actual number of graduates of all of these schools was very 
small; government-school graduates with a secondary education numbered 
only in the hundreds, while only at most 2% of the Kazakh population 
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was literate by the revolutionary era. Nevertheless, their very 
existence reveals the extent of the modernization by Russification of 
the Kazakhs. 
Modern nationalism among the nomadic Kazakhs sprang forth in the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Because of the anomaly, civilized 
historians have sought to downplay its significance in the revolutionary 
era as well as to deny its existence in the pastoral nomad milieu. But 
the history of the Kazakhs reveals a fundamental sense of national 
identity that transcends "tribalism." 
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The Kazakhs were a polity before they were an ethnicity. From the 
beginning, they have been characterized by a strong self-conception of 
being a nation. The pastoral nomadic milieu must be analyzed on its own 
terms. Sedentary scholars have strict conceptions of nationalism which 
are based on sedentary history, so Kazakh traditional nationalism fails 
these modern criteria. To appreciate Kazakh nomadism on its own ground, 
one must recognize this "nomad nationalism." 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Nomad Nationalism, 1800s-1900 
We the children of the Kazakhs, 
What would be if we had unity? ^ 
—Kenesary Kasym-uli, 1840s 
Farewell forever, 
Cool mountain heights, 
Green carpet of grass. 
Never would we have left you, 
But the enemy is pressing us. ^ 
—Dosqodzha, mid-1800s 
Nationalism is one of the most potent yet protean forces of 
modernization. Central Asia, like so many other non-Western cultures, 
underwent a heightened nationalistic evolution due to the westernizing 
influences of colonial rule. It was typical of pre-industrial culture-
areas, composed not of ideological nation-states, but rather of entwined 
yet contrasting ethno-cultural groups identifying themselves by language, 
lineage, and lifestyle. Inner Asia was distinctly divided, from ancient 
times, between the nomads and the sedentary cultures, a division reflected 
in the widespread term "Sart" for the settled peoples whether of Turkish 
or Iranian ethnicity, even as "Kazakh" had been applied to the steppe 
people.^ 
The growth of modern nationalism was one of the nineteenth century's 
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strongest historical forces. It influenced the Kazakhs through the 
medium of Russia; as Russian culture experienced its impacts, nationalism 
thereby developed among many of the non-Russian peoples as well. The 
following summary of the evolution of nationalism in tsarist Russia 
is provided by Richard Pipes in his study of nationalism and Communism 
in the revolutionary period.^ 
Minority nationalism awakened due to romantic philosophy in the 
1820s, which stirred in non-Russians an interest in their own cultures. 
This led to "cultural nationalism" and the first national movements in 
the "borderlands." The spread of Russian Populism, in the 1860s-1870s, 
brought non-Russian intellectuals into contact with their own "masses." 
By 1900, national parties were forming with liberal and socialist 
programs, affiliated with Russian counterparts, except that while the 
Russians stressed empire-wide concerns, the minorities were "localist." 
Pipes notes the failure of the tsarist regime to heed the clamor for 
basic reforms, including the suppression of non-Russian cultures and 
minority desires. He also observes that "The fact that [Russian] 
minorities . . . developed a national consciousness before their fellow-
nationals across jhe border . . . was a result of the more rapid 
intellectual and economic growth of the Russian Empire."^ 
Particular developments fostered non-Russian nationalism. The 
growth of Russian nationalism led to "Great Russian chauvinism" which, by 
the latter 1800s, had become an official policy of Russification of the 
non-Russian peoples. This "Official Nationality" deliberately suppressed 
minority cultures, obviously encouraging the reaction of anti-Russian 
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"minority" nationalism. The Russo-Japanese War and consequent Russian 
Revolution of 1905 encouraged reformers and nationalists throughout the 
Empire: Russia was not invincible. Lastly, the years after 1905 were 
marked by unrest and hard times; the Kazakhs suffered the worst 
colonization and expropriation of the tsarist era at this time. 
Observers have noted that nationalism developed more swiftly among 
the nomads than among the Sarts; the implied surprise derives from the 
civilized prejudice which ranks pastoralism inferior to settled society.^ 
Aside from the basic question of what constitutes nationalism, as the 
discussion of "nomad nationalism" above indicated, it should not be 
unexpected that the homogenous Kazakhs, who were very mobile and 
gregarious, travelling great distances empty of any others but themselves, 
were characterized by stronger national ties than the settled peoples, 
splintered as they were by intricate, ancient political, social, economic, 
ethnic, religious, and historical divisions. 
Only 2% of the Kazakh population was educated by the time of the 
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Revolutions. Among the vast majority of Kazakhs, notions of nation-
states, Pan-Islam, or Pan-Turkism were practically non-existent. Up to 
1917, except for those settled near or among Russians, the Kazakhs were 
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primarily conscious of their tribal and sub-tribal identities. However, 
from the 1770s on, the Kazakhs had been struggling against Russian 
expansion and then administrative redistricting, both of which helped 
break down tribalism. The great revolt of Kenesary Kasym-uli, which had 
been a powerful "pan-Kazakh," anti-Russian independence struggle, was 
evidence of this change. 
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Scholars, products of civilization, have argued lengthily about how, 
when, and why nationalism developed among the Kazakhs. Nearly all agree 
that it occurred very late and was only a minor factor in the tsarist 
era. This negative view is clearly expressed by Geoffrey Wheeler, 
long-time editor of the British Central Asian Review, in his Modern 
History of Soviet Central Asia. 
Wheeler states that ". . . no coherent desire for separation was 
ever expressed by the Muslims of Central Asia."^ He suggests that 
what is called nationalism "may not be so much a desire for self-
government and civic freedom as simply an age-long addiction to 
lawlessness and a chronic dislike of any kind of regular government.11 ̂  
By 19 17, "the idea of a nation or even of a nationality had barely 
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penetrated among the people of Turkestan." The extent of pre-
revolutionary aspirations "did not include political independence or 
self-determination but were confined to such matters as the cessation of 
peasant colonization, freedom of religious teaching, freedom to publish 
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books and newspapers, and the right to elect deputies." Finally, 
following the argument of Elie Kedourie, Wheeler states, "In speaking of 
nationalism in Central Asia there is a tendency to confuse nationalism 
with national consciousness. . . . There is no direct evidence available 
of the existence of . . . particularist national consciousness in Central 
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Asia . . ." But he does admit that "the existence of nationalism in 
Central Asia cannot be finally proved or disproved."^ 
The negative view is widely shared among Western historians. A 
British mining operator in central Kazakhstan in the early 1900s, E. 
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Nelson Fell, not a historian but a sympathetic contemporary, perhaps 
expresses the negative sentiment: "Self-government is too hard a nut for 
our gentle, milk-drinking [Kazakh] to digest, who have no political 
genius and whose ideas of government do not stretch beyond the 
patriarchal Aool."^ 
Tsarist and Soviet opinion has generally agreed with the negative 
view, but has been complicated by shifting interpretations; for the 
Russians, Kazakh nationalism is burdened by connotations of Russian 
imperialism. The official tsarist version of 19 14, Aziatskaia Rossiia, 
acknowledges Kazakh resistance to maintain an independent existence.^ 
The Russians conquered Kazakhstan for their own imperial purposes. 
Soviet historiography has fluctuated with the dictates of 
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ideology. In the early years, Pokrovskii's "absolute evil" theory 
dominated: tsarist imperialism and capitalism had exploited the nomads 
with absolutely no benefits for the Kazakhs, who (save for the rich 
feudal leaders) vigorously resisted the Russian conquest. Growing Soviet 
(Great Russian) chauvinism and the patriotic demands of World War II led 
to the "lesser evil" interpretation. While the Empire had exploited the 
Kazakhs, at least the Russian people had brought enlightened civilization 
to the backwards nomads, who otherwise would have been conquered by 
Kokand, China, Turkey, or even the British. 
The Russian incorporation of Kazakhstan was an "absolute good" by 
1957, as expressed by the Kazakh scholar Tolybekov: 
. . . the Kazakh Steppes were not conquered by the 
Russian state, since the incorporation of the Lesser and 
later of the Middle and Great Hordes was carried out of 
their own free will. . . . the union of the Little Horde 
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with the Russian empire did not involve the restriction of 
its territory or of its nomadic practices. The isolated 
punitive expeditions carried out by Russian frontier troops 
in reply to the marauding expeditions of the Kazakh batyrs 
(warriors) in the course of which many innocent Kazakh 
villages also suffered, cannot be regarded as a general 
campaign of conquest against the Kazakhs carried out by 
the Russian state.^ 
The "official" histories of Kazakhstan of 1943 and of 1957 reveal 
the Soviet negative view in their variant interpretations of the great 
revolt of Kenesary Kasym-uli (1830s-40s). In the earlier history, the 
revolt occupies an entire chapter, entitled "The Struggle of the Kazakh 
Hordes to Preserve Their Independence." It described "the freedom-loving 
and fighting spirit of the Kazakh people, who were not easily to be 
parted from their national independence." By the 1957 history, only two 
pages on Kenesary are provided, and the revolt is described as: 
. . . a reactionary feudal-monarchical movement which 
dragged the Kazakh people back to the consolidation of 
patriarchal and feudal conditions, to the restoration of 
the medieval rule of the Khan, and to the isolation of 
Kazakhstan from Russia and the Russian people.^0 
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (3rd edition) says merely, "The most 
protracted feudal-monarchist movement . . ; was that of Sultan Kenesara 
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Kasymov, who strove to become the absolute feudal ruler of Kazakhstan." 
The negative view, as mentioned, prevails among scholars, who are 
the product of civilization. "Nomad nationalism," the positive view, 
may be equally too extreme from reality, but at least it seeks to 
understand the Kazakhs by their own values, which attributed great 
spiritual meaning to their pastoral nomadic culture. Fell provides some 
insight when he states, "the only conclusion which I ever drew from a 
study of the [Kazakh] mind, with any confidence in its correctness, was 
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that neither our formulae, nor our classifications, nor language could be 
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applied to it in any intelligent manner." 
Nomad nationalism, for the Kazakhs, meant the intense association 
of their self-identity with pastoral nomadism, as "free riders of the 
Steppe." This identity originated in the 1400s, consolidated in the 
1500s and 1600s, and then was assaulted by the aktaban shubirindi and 
the Russian conquests of the 1700s and 1800s. Economically and 
culturally, Kazakh self-identity was threatened. 
The Kazakhs are famed as a people of song; lacking written records, 
their oral art and literature encapsulated their culture, preserved their 
history, and expressed their desires. Whether he was the jyrau who 
served the powerful or merely the akyn who shared the life of the humble, 
the Kazakh bard communicated Kazakh thought. When Kazakh national 
identity was transforming in the nineteenth century, the bards reflected 
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and transmitted the change. 
The earlier poets of the Kazakh "classical" period were anonymous 
and worked within well-defined traditions, such as the dzhoqtau (songs of 
mourning), qostasu (farewell songs), and heroic epics (e.g., Qoblandy-
batyr). The bards of the era of resistance to Russian annexation are 
identified along with the leaders they memorialized; from the latter 1700s 
to middle 1800s, famous akyns fought beside great war-leaders and with 
their fighting poetry encouraged the masses. 
Thomas Winner, whose work The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs 
(1958) is indispensable for understanding Kazakh cultural development, 
describes the significance of the early-middle nineteenth century poets: 
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"Their poetry, simple in style and language, was filled with a great 
popular energy, a feeling for the justice of the national cause, and an 
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undying hatred of the Russians and their Kazakh collaborators." 
The role of the intellectual in leading modernization is to be seen 
in the pre-literate akyns of the early 1800s, who sought to mobilize the 
Kazakhs to the challenges of the new age. The literate, bourgeois 
intellectuals followed their example, when modern education came to the 
Steppe. The influence of the first generation of Kazakh intellectuals is 
discernible in the instance of the akyn Makhambet Utemisov (1804-1845), 
who played a major role in the revolt of Isatai Taimanov. Makhambet was 
IsataiTs counselor and intermediary with the Russians. Two themes emerge 
in Makhambet's surviving songs which foreshadow the development of modern 
Kazakh nationalism. 
One theme is that of encirclement by the enemy, really an old theme 
for the Kazakhs, apparent in the aktaban shubirindi. The other is a new 
theme in traditional Kazakh society, that of social oppression within 
Kazakh culture itself. The following lines illustrate these concerns. 
We cannot now take that which is ours, 
We cannot now, in great expanse, 
Camp in our own fields— 
A high-handed enemy has gripped us all around 
In a tight vise. 
Oh, men, we all are cursed 
Cursed by our unhappy life. 
Like free deer we went 
To drink from the clear spring; like the wild horse 
We grazed on the plains— 
And now again we are hemmed in by an enemy. 
And from another song: 
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What good are golden thrones to the people, 
What good are dashing khans to the people, 
If there is no justice 
For the weak and the p o o r ? ^ 5  
The defeat of the resistance in the middle 1800s ushered in an era 
of bitter resignation. The last major uprisings, those of Iset Kutebar-
uli and Jan Khoja, put down in 1857—58, and of the Adaev Kazakhs following 
the implementation of the 1868 Steppe Statute, were suppressed and Russian 
control was complete. Because military resistance was now fruitless, the 
Kazakh poet-intellectuals of the mid-1800s could only bemoan the situation 
and they withdrew into resentment. 
The leading poets of this second generation included Dulat Babatai-
uli (1802-1871), Abubakir Kerderi (1858-1903), Murat Monke-uli ( 1843— 
1906), and Shortambai Kanai-uli (or Qanaev; 1818-1881).^ Murat's 
famous "Three Epochs" contrasts the Kazakh golden age with the misery of 
Russian rule, concluding with the unanswered question, "How shall we heal 
this epoch?" 
Shortambai is most famous of these men. His poem "Zar Zamari' ("Time 
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of Trouble" or "Age of Misery") gave name to this entire period. 
Another famous work, "Opasiz Jalghan" ("Faithless Lying" or "Traitorous 
Slander"), cries: 
0 unfortunate good people, 
0 ill-starred times, 
God's anger, it seems, has 
Struck you, my native land. 
Everywhere the enemy sets nets for us, 
There's no freedom, wherever you may look. 
Winner describes Shortambai as "the first Kazakh poet able to 
analyze the sweep of history and its effect on the people in something 
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more than an immediately subjective way . . ." Well-educated, 
travelled, and strongly Islamic, Shortambai represented the new age as 
one of loss of tradition. The Zar Zamanists emphasized the good of the 
old days, free nomadic living, over the travails of the new age, with 
the encroachment of the modern world disintegrating the traditional 
values. Only a return to the old ways could save the Kazakhs, and 
because it was so obvious that this was impossible, deep resignation 
permeates their works; in their call for invigorated Islamic culture, 
they revealed the growing power of Islam among the Kazakhs, who were 
noted for their lack of Moslem religiosity. Mysticism and despair 
was their reaction to modernization. The Zar Zamanists could not 
answer Muratfs question. 
The Zar Zaman poets were strongly traditionalist and nationalist. 
They perceived the decline of the Kazakh nation in terms of the decline 
of nomadism. A crucial cleavage thus appears in Kazakh national thought, 
based on the support or rejection of pastoral nomadism as fundamental to 
Kazakh national character. Because the very origins of the Kazakh nation 
arose from the self-identification as nfree riders of the Steppe," this 
was a serious cleavage indeed. Amidst the death-throes of nomadism as a 
viable lifestyle overthrown by modernization, Kazakh thinkers argued over 
the future of their national self-identity. The Zar Zamanists clung to 
the past glories and the ideals of nomad nationalism. 
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A different outlook characterized the so-called Enllghteners. This 
group also flourished in the latter 1800s, thus must be considered to be 
of the same "generation" as the Zar Zamanists. They, however, were the 
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product of the modern education system, installed by the Russians and 
described above. As their name implies, the enlighteners were Kazakhs 
who sought to uplift and advance—modernize—their people via Russian 
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language and culture. They were fully as dedicated to the Kazakh 
nation as the Zar Zamanists, for they wanted to improve Kazakh life. 
They opposed Russian exploitation of Kazakhstan for this reason. But 
they recognized that to preserve the Kazakh nation, it must adapt to the 
modern world, and thus, they regarded pastoral nomadism as backwards, as 
a brake on modernization which had to be removed. They thus typified 
the same dichotomy that developed in Russian culture, between the 
traditionalist Slavophiles and the modernizing Westernizers. 
Three Kazakhs are reknowned as enlighteners. The first was Chokan 
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Valikhanov (Shoqan Valiqan-uli; 1837?-1865). The grandson of the last 
Khan of the Middle Horde, great-grandson of Khan Ablai, Chokan was a 
Russophile, a graduate of the Russian War Academy, and a close friend of 
Dostoevsky. An Orientalist, his admiration for Russian culture was 
balanced by his love of the ancient Turkish epics. He penetrated as a 
Russian spy into the Khotan emirate in Sinkiang; he wrote innumerable 
works on the history and culture of his people; he accompanied the Russian 
army in its conquest of the Great Horde, in Semirechye. This last 
experience, in which he witnessed outrages against the Kazakhs by the 
Russian troops (reminiscent of the American war against the Plains 
Indians), soured his faith in Russian superiority, but only at the very 
end (he died very young, of exhaustion and tuberculosis, withdrawing to 
his people's aul to do so). 
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Chokan was typical of the well-born Kazakh educated in the Russian 
system. Indeed, he was famous only to the Russians and to those Kazakhs 
who came later. His significance was in interpreting Kazakh culture to 
the Russians, not vice-versa. Yet, ChokanTs pursuit of modern knowledge 
was based on his desire to preserve his people as a nation. His goals 
for the Kazakhs were "Self-development, self-defense, self-government, 
and self-just ice;" he dedicated himself "to the useful work of serving 
his compatriots and defending them from Russian officials and wealthy 
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Kazakhs." 
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The second great enlightener was Ibrai Altynsaryn (184 1-1889). 
Modern education was his primary concern, and he is remembered as the 
"Kazakh pedagogue." He was author of the first Kazakh-Russian dictionary 
and first Kazakh grammar; he introduced secular prose into Kazakh 
literature; he created a new Kazakh script, replacing the Arabic with a 
Cyrillic-based alphabet. He translated numerous Russian literary works 
into Kazakh, and was greatly influenced by Pushkin. 
Altynsaryn, of the Qypchaq tribe, Middle Horde, attended a Russian 
school for interpreters in Orenburg, from 1850 to 1857; he met the noted 
Russian educator N. I. Ilminsky in 1859, who greatly influenced him. He 
was appointed school inspector of Turgai oblast in 1879, and did much to 
expand the Turgai education system for Kazakh benefit. In 1887, he tried 
to introduce modern education for Kazakh girls; he also sought to create 
an agricultural school for Kazakhs. For his reformist efforts, Altynsaryn 
achieved the distrust of his Russian overseers, who feared the power of 
his reforms, inasmuch as their goal was subservient Kazakh interpreters 
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and not truly educated Kazakhs; he also gained the enmity of the 
traditionalists, who opposed Russian contamination, and of the elders, 
who opposed secular education generally. 
Although Altynsaryn initiated Kazakh prose, the milieu of mass 
appeal was poetry. The following lines come from "Children, Let's 
Study." 
My child, when you start to learn, 
Knowledge, brighter than a lamp, 
Will light your way through darkness. 
Therefore, children, let us start to learn, 
And let us weave forever into our grateful memory 
The bright thread of k n o w l e d g e .  
The most significant of the enlighteners was Abai Kunanbaev (Abaj 
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or Ibrahim Qunanbay-uli; 1845-1904). Abai was born in a remote area 
of the Kazakh uplands, shortly after his people accepted Russian rule. 
Son of a traditional patriarchal chief, Abai first was taught by local 
mullahs; he eventually attended an Islamic secondary school (madresse) 
in Semipalatinsk, and then a Russian school. He broke with his family 
when he was 28, choosing to pursue education over administering his 
tribal group. Versed in Kazakh, Islamic, and Western thought, Abai was 
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the greatest Kazakh intellectual of the nineteenth century. Winner 
describes him: "He was at once an educator, a humanist, and philosophical 
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internationalist, as well as a poet, prose writer, and translator." 
Abai wished to modernize the Kazakhs through the medium of Russian 
culture. His translations of Russian works were well known in the Steppe. 
He sought to synthesize Western, Moslem, and Kazakh traditions, and he 
popularized prose as a literary medium. Like Altynsaryn, he wished to 
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bring education to all Kazakhs, wealthy or not, male and female. Even 
more so than Altynsaryn, AbaiTs enlightenment brought him rejection from 
conservative Kazakh leaders as well as the distrust of the Russians, who 
regarded him as revolutionary. Abai withdrew to his peoplefs aul in the 
end, bitter and lonely, yet his efforts proved widespread and long-
lasting . 
The following quotes from Abai best typify the role of the 
enlighteners: 
Study Russian culture and literature. This is the key 
to life. If you learn it, your life will be easier. . . . 
However, at the present time, people giving their children 
a Russian education are training them, with the help of the 
Russian language, to exist at the expense of other Kazakhs. 
DonTt take this v i e w .39 
I want to sow the seed of truth and put wings 
to the tongue, 
So that the light will enter not only the eyes, 
but also the soul.^® 
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Kazakh nationalism 
seemed to be diverging. The Zar Zaman poets saw no hope but in the 
preservation of pastoral nomadism and the traditional culture based on 
it. They were strongly Islamic and passionately anti-Russian. Their 
goal was maintaining the traditional nomad nationalism that had marked 
the Kazakhs from their origins. 
The enlighteners, on the other hand, saw no hope in nomadism to 
protect the Kazakh nation in the modern world. They wished to modernize 
Kazakhstan via Russian culture, not to Russify the Kazakhs, but to give 
them the tools and understanding to prevent Russification. While their 
path was to prove dominant, they lacked the nationalist passion of the 
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Zar Zamanists. Precisely because the Kazakh masses remained traditional 
and uneducated, the enlighteners failed to broadly elevate their people 
into the modern age. Yet, because the nomadic economy was crumbling due 
to modernization, the Zar Zaman thinkers offered only a sterile pessimism 
and no solutions. 
The late 1800s and early 1900s, as previously indicated, witnessed a 
significant change in the Steppe. The incredible flood of Russian 
peasant colonists in those decades transformed the Kazakh problem. The 
Zar Zaman poets and the enlighteners seemed much less relevant; the 
latter based their uneasy alliance with Russia on the premise that the 
Kazakhs would have the precious time necessary to gradually modernize, 
which meant de-nomadize. When the deluge of colonization crashed over 
the Steppe, Kazakh thinkers of the third "generation" faced crucial 
choices to be made in the storm of revolutionary changes. Their path 
proved to be a melding of the fervent nationalism of the Zar Zamanists 
with the westernized outlook of the enlighteners. 
This melding was visible by the late 1880s. In 1870, the Russian 
militaryfs official Central Asian bulletin was begun, the Turkistan 
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Vilayet Gazeti. Published in Tashkent, up to 1888 it alternated 
between Uzbek "Turki" and Kazakh; this was the first appearance of what 
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was to become the Kazakh press. As with other official papers of the 
1880s, such as the Akmolinskii Listok and Orenburgskii Listok, there was 
not expression of dissent, but they did bolster Kazakh writing. In 1888, 
a separate Kazakh-language bulletin was begun, Dala Vilayeti, published 
dually with the Russian Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta, in Omsk; they were 
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supplements of the Akmolmskie Vedomosti, and existed up to 1906. The 
Kazakh writers who appeared in Dala Vilayeti wrote cultural, technical, 
and historical pieces which would not offend Russian concerns, such as 
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criticism of Islam. 
However, as the hardships of the Kazakhs worsened, the Russian-
controlled press was the only outlet for the educated Kazakhs to express 
dismay. Martha B. Olcott, foremost modern American historian of the 
Kazakhs, notes that as early as 1890, a series of articles entitled 
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"Hunger in the Steppe" appeared. The 1890s proved exceptionally harsh 
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on the Kazakh nomads, with very severe winters and droughts. The great 
Russian famine of 189 1-92 sent waves of peasants in search of land to 
colonize, aided by the Resettlement Administration and the beginning of 
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Time was running out for the traditional 
Kazakh lifestyle, time the enlighteners had hoped to use gradually to 
settle the nomads while holding Russian cultural assimilation at bay. 
At this time, a writer named "Qyr Balasy" or "Child of the Uplands" 
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appeared in the Dala Vilayeti. These articles, including scholarly 
studies of epics as well as poetry, appealed to the Kazakhs to revive 
their patriotic nationalism, revealing the influence of the Zar Zamanists. 
Yet, partly because they appeared in an official Russian publication, 
they also encouraged the elevation of Kazakh culture within the Russian 
context. The fusion of nationalism and enlightenment had begun. 
Qyr Balasy was the pen-name of Ali Khan Bukeykhanov (Aliqan 
Bokeyqan-uli; 1869-1932), destined to be one of the greatest nationalist 
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Kazakh leaders. Like most Kazakh intellectuals of the turn of the 
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century, Bukeykhanov came of wealthy background: born in Samara, he was 
the grandson of Khan Baraq of the Bukey Horde. Educated at several 
Russian schools, he graduated from the Omsk Higher Institute of Forestry 
in 1894. It was while still a student that he began writing as Qyr 
Balasy (he was 2 1 in 1890). 
Bukeykhanov was inspired by the Zar Zaman poets in his nationalism, 
yet he lacked their Islamic and conservative tendencies; he was produced 
by the same Russian educational system as the enlighteners, but he was 
far more critical of Russians and Russian culture. As the Kazakhs 
prepared to enter the twentieth century, the first truly "modern" 
nationalists were arising from the nomad masses. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Qazaq Nationalism, 1900-1916 
But what unity is and how to achieve it the Kazakhs do 
not know. 
—Abay, 1891. 
Our newspaper is named Qazaq, our slogan is the 
preservation of our national character. 
—Ahmed Baytursun, 19 13. 
Kazakh nationalism transformed in the early 1900s. A full-fledged 
nationalist intelligentsia emerged, Kazakh written literature gained 
great influence, and Western political ideas developed Kazakh form and 
content. The Russian flood of colonization and the decline of traditional 
pastoralism placed great strains on the Kazakh masses and their local 
leaders, while the hierarchy of sultans crumbled as that of the khans had. 
The early twentieth century nationalists, like their predecessors, were 
concerned primarily with the cultural preservation of their people. Their 
dilemma was not to create nationalism where it did not exist, rather, it 
was to transform the Kazakh nomad nationalism into modern nationalism. 
The fundamental cleavage in Kazakh nationalism always remained the 
tension between modernization and traditionalism. This dichotomy appears 
in the differences between the elite intellectuals and the illiterate 
masses, between the secularists and the clergy, between the Jadids and 
48 
49 
the Kadimists (conservative clergy), between Northern and Southern 
Kazakhs, and between fpro-T and fanti-RussianT factions. Nevertheless, 
these cleavages were not enough to prevent the Kazakh nationalists of all 
persuasions from working together in the pre-revolutionary era. The 
crisis facing the Kazakh nation in the early 1900s overwhelmed the 
differences in outlook. 
As early as the 1860s, a Russian observer noted, "The steppe was then 
divided into two parties, the pro-Russian and the pro-national. . . . The 
most convinced supporters of the latter roamed the south .... The 
antagonism between these two parties manifested itself in every thing, 
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even in the songs of Kazakh bards." Northern Kazakhs had a longer 
history of relations with the Russians and they were less Islamicized, 
more likely to be educated in modern schools. Southern Kazakhs were 
enmeshed in the Turkestani milieu, their nobles and wealthy being under 
sway of Kokand and Bokhara, their masses much more Islamic. Many Kazakhs 
in the south, also, had fled Russian expansion over the northern pastures 
and thus were both poorer and more resentful. It is notable, however, 
that two cleavages one might expect did not manifest themselves: inter-
Horde and inter-class struggle was absent. The former was no longer 
relevant, and the latter was developing potency but still minor. 
In the context of pre-1905 Russia, Kazakh dissent and agitation for 
change was extremely limited. The writings of Bukeykhanov and other Zar 
Zaman heirs in the 1890s and early 1900s urged cultural preservation and 
historical pride. Abubakir Kerderi, for example, recognizing the need 
for drastic change, urged the spread of Jadid education so that the 
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Kazakhs could effectively compete with the Russians while remaining 
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Moslem. Early twentieth century Kazakh writers who followed Abubakirfs 
example included Mashur Zhusup Kopeyev (1857-1931) and Nurzhan Naushbayev 
( 1859-1919). 
Despite censorship and police surveillance, Kazakh dissatisfaction 
apparently was spreading in the early 1900s, though Western and Soviet 
research on this is sketchy.^ Pamphlets appeared which, addressed to the 
"Children of Alash," urged resistance to Russian efforts to limit Islam. 
Clandestine meetings in the steppe spread anti-Russian sentiments. The 
regime reacted quickly to these threats, for the first time arresting 
Kazakh leaders and searching Kazakh auls to seize seditious materials. 
The extent of this activity is unknown; but the Russian authorities did 
respond with further restrictions against Moslem clergy and "secret" 
schools. 
The 1905 revolution changed the rules of national resistance, and the 
Kazakhs responded swiftly. Revolutionary* unrest and violence was 
restricted to the Russian industrial workers, in the cities and along the 
railways; the size of the proletariat in pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan was 
small, a few tens of thousands, and while several thousands of Kazakhs 
worked in the mining industry, they provided unskilled labor.^ The real 
significance of the 1905 revolution for Central Asians was psychological. 
The defeat of the tsarist regime by an Asian power reversed the sense of 
hopelessness regarding the immutability of Russian rule. Just as 
important, the reformist agitation that swept the empire forced the 
government to permit native publishing, and the creation of the Duma 
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meant the opportunity to elect representatives and to openly discuss 
politics, for the first time within the modern context.^ 
Modern Kazakh political development began with the proclamation of 
the tsarist Manifesto of February 18, 1905, which permitted political 
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meetings at the various Steppe fairs. The initial agitation was led by 
the Islamic clergy, which sponsored mass rallies in early and middle 1905. 
In response to their mostly religious demands, the government allowed 
Islamic Kazakh-language teaching in the aul schools, on April 17, and 
recommended the creation of a separate Steppe muftiate (official 
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jurisdiction) in June, which followed the next year. 
Wholly religious concerns quickly came to include secular problems 
as the mood of potentiality spread. A "bais1 congress" was held in the 
summer in Karkaralinsk, attended by over 14,000 people in response to a 
clergy-sponsored petition.^ This meeting petitioned the tsar to grant 
more freedom to the Moslems: to make Islam legally equal to the Orthodox 
church, to employ the Shariat (Islamic law) in civil court, to allow 
more mosques and the right of pilgrimage. But it also directly addressed 
the fundamental issue of the Kazakh nation, what Olcott calls "the land 
problem." The petition called for the end of land-expropriation and the 
return of already-seized lands, with the Kazakhs to control their natural 
resources as well. 
A similar gathering occurred in October, in Kazalinsk.*^ It also 
petitioned the government to ease restrictions on Islam, but even more 
forcefully these Kazakhs called for just land distribution and restoration 
of nomadic access to the SteppeTs water and pasture resources. The 
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regime did nothing to respond to these requests. When the fervor of the 
fspirit of 1905* had initially swept Central Asia?s Russian population, 
the government had been relieved at the quiescence of the Moslem urban 
natives. In the country, however, in middle and latter 1905, a wave of 
brigandage swelled against the Russians, becoming anti-Russian violence, 
1 2  
that lasted at least to 19 10. Among the southern Kazakhs (Syr Darya 
and Semirechye), nomads resisted the seizure of their lands for colonists, 
13 
refusing to cooperate with Russian authority. 
The Moslem clergy was always closer to the Kazakh nomad "masses" than 
the secular elite, for Islam was part of the Kazakh traditional culture. 
The Kazakh clerics, save for those of the settled south, seem to have 
placed their religious goals secondary to the preservation of Kazakh 
culture, and therefore they more readily allied with the secular elite 
in this era. As time passed, then, Kazakh demands shifted from the 
religious focus to the socioeconomic, yet even as the earliest demands 
mentioned the latter, the later nationalist demands always mentioned 
Islam. The alliance of Moslem and secular elites was crucial. 
The secular Kazakh intellectuals of the north were also active in 
1905. A delegation of reformists and tribal elders travelled all the way 
to St. Petersburg to seek cessation of colonization and the use of Kazakh 
as well as Russian in Steppe government; rebuffed, they used the 
opportunity to associate with the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), 
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which association proved significant in the coming years. 
The promulgation of the October Manifesto which included the 
announcement of a true legislative Duma allowed the Kazakhs to prepare 
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their first modern electioneering and democratic politics. The leading 
reformists and nationalists convened two "Congresses of Intellectuals" 
in December, that of the East in Vernyy (now Alma Ata) in Semirechye, and 
that of the West in Uralsk.^ Both congresses resolved that the Kazakhs 
needed to ally with the Kadets for effective Duma representation. 
The Congress of the East was presided over by Mokhamedzhan 
Tanyshbayev (Tynyshpaev; 1879-1920s?), a Semirechye Kazakh nationalist 
who was a road and bridge engineer, and who played a major role in the 
revolutionary era. This congress was dominated by the 1 ideologist1 of 
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Kazakh nationalism, Ahmed Baytursun (1873-1937). Baytursun was born in 
Sartubek, Turgay oblast, into an aristocratic family of the Argyn tribe. 
First taught by local Tatar mullahs, he went to the Russian-Kazakh school 
in Turgay (town), then attended the Orenburg Pedagogical Institute from 
189 1 to 1895. Thereupon he became a teacher in Kazakh schools from 1895 
to 1909, teaching in various villages and the towns of Aktyubinsk, 
Kustanay, and Karkaralinsk. A poet and linguist, Baytursun developed a 
Kazakh script based on Arabic, rather than utilizing Altynsarynfs 
Cyrillic-based alphabet. By 1905, he was generally regarded as one of 
the secular elite's leading thinkers. 
Ali Khan Bukeykhanov was president of the Congress of Intellectuals 
of the West. Attending were important intellectuals, elders, and 
aristocrats of five oblasts; absent were the westernmost Kazakhs of the 
old Inner or Bukey Horde, who generally kept apart from the other northern 
Kazakh elites.^ It was at this meeting that the group later called 
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"Alash Orda" was formed. 
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The Congress of the West, besides approving the alliance with the 
Russian Kadets, also proclaimed the following: 
In the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Steppe no one other than the 
Kirghiz has any rights; the laws which declare that the 
Kirghiz Steppe belongs to the Crown, and that peasants and 
cossacks can be settled on it at no cost need to be r e v o k e d . ^  
From 1905 on, the secular elites dominated the nationalist struggle, 
particularly Baytursun and Bukeykhanov. This dominance is evident in 
both the pan-Islamic 1al1-Russianf Moslem congresses of 1905-06 and the 
Dumas, as well as in the Kazakh press and publishing of 1905 to 1916. 
While the Islamic clergy remained important at the local level, the 
secular reformists led the movement Steppe-wide, and their alliance 
remained mutually beneficial. 
In Moslem Russia generally, the 1905 revolutionary era allowed the 
pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic reformists, predominantly Tatar, to organize 
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several "All-Russian Moslem Congresses." The First Moslem Congress was 
held secretly in Nizhnii Novgorod in August, 1905; the Second, also 
unsanctioned, occurred in St. Petersburg in January, 1906. Neither the 
Kazakh nor Central Asian Moslems participated in the first two congresses. 
The Third Moslem Congress, this time legally convened, occurred in 
August, 1906, again at Nizhnii Novgorod. A mass meeting was held in 
Kazalinsk in January, representing much of the Steppe, in order to draw 
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up a list of demands for the congress. Both socioeconomic and Islamic 
concerns were expressed, as previously. The Kazakhs continued to practice 
modern politics; despite their great geographical and ideological 
diversity, the Kazakh elites were developing the arts of compromise and 
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concerted action which they needed to face the overwhelming Russian and 
strong Tatar forces blocking their nationalist goals. 
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The Kazakh presence at the Third Moslem Congress was significant. 
Shah Mardan Koshchegulov was elected to the presidium; Koshchegulov was a 
mullah, of the Bukey Horde, Astrakhan province. The relative lack of 
relevance of the Moslem Congresses, dominated by Tatars with their goals 
of pan-Turlcism and pan-Islam, emphasizing the "middle dialect" reformism 
of the Tatar leader Gaspirinsky, is indicated by KoshchegulovTs presence. 
The Kazakh nationalists emphasized Kazakh language over any other, and 
the long antipathy of the Kazakhs to their Tatar mentors meant that the 
Kazakhs offered no support to pan-Turkism. Koshchegulov, though a 
nationalist, was not part of the northern Kazakh intellectual circles 
that became the Alash Orda. While the Tatars sought to unify all the 
Turkic Moslems of Russia, the Kazakhs sought to modernize their own 
unique nationalism. Likewise, they were not interested in pan-Islam 
due to the secondary importance Islam had in the structure of Kazakh 
nat ionalism. 
The most significant 'laboratory1 of modern Kazakh nationalism was 
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the State Duma. Although the Kazakhs participated fully only in the 
Second Duma, the experience of holding meetings to elect representatives 
and sending these delegates to St. Petersburg elevated political 
awareness across the Steppe. Communication is an elemental force of 
modern nationalism; the Duma, especially the journalistic reporting of 
its deliberations and the new press's discussions and editorials, proved 
the catalyst of modern Kazakh nationalism. 
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The elections to the First Duma occurred in spring, 1906. Though 
Turkestan was prevented from participating, and the limited franchise 
excluded many Kazakhs, the electioneering in the Steppe was exuberant. 
Richard Pierce describes it best: "Speaking in the open air, often from 
horseback, candidates in the Steppe discussed land reform and urged the 
abolition of the Steppe [guberniia] and the establishment of self-
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government." Russians and Kazakhs voted separately; the Russians sent 
leftist representatives (Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, 
Trudoviks), five altogether. 
The Kazakhs sent four delegates to the First Duma, which was held 
from April to July, 1906. Ali Khan Bukeikhanov represented Semipalatinsk 
oblast, the northeastmost Steppe (though he was of the Bukey Horde, and 
had presided over the Congress of the West, revealing his broad support). 
The mullah Bahit Kirei Kulmanov represented Akmolinsk; the bii Alpyspay 
Kalmenev, Uralsk; and Akhmed Beremzhanov, a justice of the peace, Turgay. 
The Kazakhs cooperated with both the Moslem fraction1 (largely represented 
by the Ittifaq-al-Muslimin, or "Muslim Union," created at the Second and 
Third Moslem Congresses) and with the Kadets. However, the First Duma 
ignored the concerns of the Kazakhs. 
Due to transportation difficulties, Bukeykhanov did not reach St. 
Petersburg until July 9, 1906. On that very day, the Duma had been 
dissolved by Tsar Nicholas for being too liberal. Bukeykhanov went with 
the other delegates who travelled to Viborg to sign the protest manifesto. 
For this act, he was arrested, tried, disenfranchised, and sent to a 
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Semipalatinsk jail for three months. 
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The Second Duma convened from February to June, 1907. The Steppe 
sent eight Russians and four Kazakhs; the Turkestan guberniia was able to 
participate in this election, sending a fifth Kazakh. Shah Mardan 
Koshchegulov represented Akmolinsk, Beremzhanov again represented Turgay, 
Khadzhi Narokonev, Semipalatinsk, and the lawyer Bakhitjan Karataev, 
Uralsk. Tanyshbayev represented Semirechye oblast. 
Karataev, an examining magistrate and member of the government land 
2 6 
commission, was able to address the Second Duma upon the Kazakh plight. 
He cailed for a commission, including Kazakhs, to investigate the land 
problem; the Octobrists, Kadets, and Moslem fraction supported him, but 
the Council of Ministers refused. The Kazakhs then petitioned Stolypin 
directly, to curtail further Russian colonization and to study the land 
problem, but were rejected again. 
In 1907, the "Stolypin reaction" brought to a halt the budding 
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political process. The Kazakhs, with most other Moslems, were denied 
further Duma representation. Many Jadid schools were closed, some leaders 
arrested, and the incipient Kazakh press was stillborn. However, the 
Kazakh leaders continued to organize and to lobby the remnant Moslem 
fraction and the Kadets. Thus, in late 1907, they organized meetings 
in various towns of the Steppe, including Troitsk and Kustanay, to gather 
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material for a Moslem fraction report presented to the Third Duma. The 
Kazakhs demanded the end of peasant colonization, freedom of religion, 
freedom of the press, and Duma representation. The Kazakhs proposed 
reform of the granting of land to the Third Duma, also, and though sixty 
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delegates supported the legislation, it failed. 
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During the Third Duma, the Kadets prepared a volume of reports on 
the nationalities of Russia. Bukeykhanov prepared the essay on the 
Kazakhs in 19 10, which clearly details the Kazakh plight and harshly 
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criticizes the governments policies and practices. Bukeykhanov noted 
that Russian oppression had created such economic hardship that the 
Kazakh people had been forced to overcome their old divisions and unite, 
creating an intellectual transition from passive to active national 
consciousness. He recognized that nationalism usually arose to safeguard 
territorial integrity, but that the Kazakhs, being pastoral nomads, were 
concerned with preserving their way of life, not geography. With the 
decline of the economic viability of nomadism, Kazakh nationalism had to 
be based on the traditional culture of the Kazakh heritage, not on 
pastoral nomadism itself. 
The goal of Russian policy, Bukeykhanov argued, was not merely the 
sedentarization of the Kazakh people, but the destruction of their unique 
Kazakh culture. Therefore, Russian rule was actually antagonistic to the 
Kazakh nation, even having seized Kazakh ownership of the land to give to 
the tsar. The Kazakhs must launch a political struggle to preserve their 
culture, and to remain a unique people they must unite despite many 
differences. 
. . . in the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Steppe a policy of Russification 
has from time immemorial been conducted by those who shine neither 
in educational qualifications nor in knowledge of the local 
population. The customary attendant of this Russifying policy is 
coarseness, rudeness, and the unceremonious slighting of us by 
those who constitute the sacred population.^* 
BukeykhanovTs essay provides an introduction to the role of the 
Kazakh press and publishing in the development of Kazakh nationalism in 
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this period. The Kazakh press was the mode whereby the Kazakh leaders 
communicated, with each other and with the masses, their frustrations, 
perceptions, and goals. In articulating these factors, the Kazakh 
intellectuals continued to thrash between modernization and traditionalism. 
The revolutionary-era Kazakh press was the single most influential element 
in the swift maturation of Kazakh nationalism between 1900 and 1920. 
The Kazakh press went through four 'waves' in that time. The first 
occurred in 1905-07, and was reformist (Jadidist). The second came in 
1911, following the Stolypin reaction, and was therefore radicalized. 
The third arose in 1913; the last, in 1917-20, will be discussed later. 
The initial Kazakh press proved ephemeral, partly due to the paucity 
of printing technology and the newness of the concept of journalism, but 
mostly due to the police repression which closed down on it. The first 
Kazakh newspaper was Qazaq gazeti, published in Troitsk in March, 1907, 
and immediately suspended. Bukeykhanov appeared regularly in the Russian 
opposition press Irtysh (1905-06), Omich, and Golos Stepi (both 1907), all 
in Omsk. Kazakh writers also appeared in 1906 in Tatar papers such as 
Fiker (Uralsk), Vaqt, and Shura; in 1907, in Sirke (St. Petersburg). 
The Stolypin reaction drove underground much activism. The Kazakhs 
continued to hold clandestine meetings, where Kazakh writings were read 
and discussed, while numerous 'youth groups' were organized, especially 
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in the northern towns where there were many Kazakh students. The 
activities of these groups were significant in developing Kazakh 
nationalism, but their secrecy hinders evaluation to this day. 
The nationalist press had justified itself to the regime by reporting 
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on the Dumas; when the Central Asians were denied Duma representation, 
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their journalist press was forbidden as well. However, Kazakh literary-
publishing was developing as well, and managed to continue the reformist 
and nationalist development throughout this period. Winnerfs Oral Art 
and Literature of the Kazakhs amply details much of the writing of this 
time; the following discussion is intended only to indicate the diversity 
and depth of Kazakh publishing between 1905 and 1916. 
Perhaps the greatest Kazakh poet of the revolutionary nationalist 
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era was Mir Jaqib Dulatov (Duwlat-uli; 1885-1937). Born in Turgay 
uezd, he was educated by Tatar mullahs, in aul schools, and at the 
Turgay Russian-Kazakh school. He was a qualified teacher at both the 
Gaurgan Russian-Kazakh school and the Galiyeh madresse in Ufa. He was 
close friends with Tatar reformers, was a prolific poet, and wrote one 
of the first Kazakh novels, Bahtsyz Jamal (1910), criticizing traditional 
marriage customs. A close confederate of Baytursun and Bukeykhanov, 
Dulatov is usually included with them as the three great leaders of 
Kazakh nationalism. Vilified in Soviet historiography, yet he was 
described in the Literaturnaya Entsiklopediya (Moscow, 1928) as "the 
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leader of the revolutionary Kazakh masses" in 1905. 
In 1909, Dulatov published a collection of poems entitled Oyan 
Qazaq! (Awake, 0 Kazakh!). The work was so popular it quickly went 
through two editions, before the Russians banned it as inflammatory. 
The poem "Kazakh Lands" is worth quoting at length. 
Noble, influential men, pay attention to this! They say 
"Strike while the iron is hot;" by not following this 
proverb, 
You take responsibility on yourselves for the tears of 
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future generations. 
Oh, dear native land, you have gone entirely to the 
[Russian] settlers! 
The sacred graves of our forefathers are now amidst 
village streets. 
The tombstones over them will be used by the peasants 
for bathhouses, 
The wooden fences [around them] will go for firewood. 
Then, finding no signs of our old graves, we shall 
pour out streams of tears. 
The huge lakes and flowing springs, like the summer 
pastures and forests, are all alienated. 
When I think about all this I go out of my mind and 
burn (as in a fire) from grief. 
But we accepted citizenship without giving up our land, 
We hoped to live under the shelter of justice. 
If now we give up the last land, the cattle will have 
to be pastured on sand. 
The simple people are stunned. . . . 
Kazakhs, now where is the land on which you have lived 
since the Kazakh tribe was formed? 
They drove you off and put the land under Little 
Russian settlements. . . . 
Only the salt lakes and the waterless plain, useless for 
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agriculture, are left to us.J/ 
Shangerei Bukeev (1847-1920) was a poet from western Kazakhstan, 
born into an aristocratic family and educated at a secondary school in 
Astrakhan. Of Russian gentry rank and a justice of the peace, Bukeev 
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concentrated on lyrical love poetry and literary artistry. Sabit 
Donentaev (1894-1933), born in rural Semipalatinsk, was a satirist and 
journalist. He was first published in 1913; his satires strongly 
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attacked the old aristocracy and the nationalists. 
Omer Karasy (Qarashev; 1876-1921) came of a poor nomad family in 
the Bukey Horde; he went to a Tatar madresse and to secondary school in 
Istanbul. He became an ishan (cleric), and was widely versed in Islamic 
literature. However, the 1905 revolution caused him to become a social 
agitator and he was dropped from the clergy. His poetry was steeped in 
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Kazakh tradition, yet he criticized not just the Russian oppressors, but 
also the Kazakh aristocracy. His social and nationalist protest was 
modern in content, but often traditional in form.^ 
Ispandiar Kobeyev (1878-1956) published the first Kazakh novel, 
Qalym, in 1908. It not only criticized the tradition of the bride-price, 
one of the strongest Kazakh customs, and the general inferiority of 
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women in society, it actually advocated marriage for love. 
Beimbet Mailin (1894-1939) was born in Kustanay to poor nomads; he 
studied at an Ufa madresse from 19 13 to 1915, when he published his first 
work, concerning the tragic love of a Kazakh girl. Mailin eventually 
became a Communist (1925) and was considered a "founder" of Kazakh Soviet 
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1 iterature. 
Sultanmakhmut Toraygyrov (Toraighir-uli; 1893-1920), born in 
Semipalatinsk oblast, was one of the first Kazakh writers to emphasize 
social protest in revolutionary terms. Though he only received a 
madiesse education, by 19 13 he was working in the Kazakh press; he was 
also a teacher. Toraygyrov1s social protest was striking; the metaphors 
and imagery of traditional Kazakh poetry he replaced with unflinching 
43 
directness, as the following lines, from "The Pauper," reveal. 
Autumn's hand has endowed the grass with a silvery hue; 
Over the nocturnal earth clouds are floating. 
Dark is the night. I am guarding the sheep with my dog; 
Not even a little fire lights up the darkness. 
My clothes are in rags, I am almost not clad, 
And these are the only clothes I've ever had. 
From the day of birth, only hunger I've known; 
Crying I would ask my mother for food . . . 
From earliest childhood I had but one dream: 
Once only to fill my stomach with good food. 
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All my life, like an ox, I have worked day and night, 
And yet this dream has remained but a dream.^ 
Despite Toraygyrov's emphasis as a social protester, regarding the 
Kazakh aristocracy as no better than the Russians, he still fulfilled 
the role of Kazakh educated elite as enlightener, evidenced by the 
following lines: 
I do not live in order to sow flowers, 
And see them bloom into live beauty; 
I live to help my descendants with my song, 
So that their paths may be easy and simple.^ 
Magzhan Zhumabayev (1894-1937?), born in remote northwestern 
Semirechye, was reknowned as a leading nationalist poet. He studied 
first at a Tatar madresse then the Omsk gymnasium, and eventually at 
the Institute of Artistic Literature in Moscow. His poems first 
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appeared in 19 13, and he was a leading contributor to the Kazakh press. 
Saken Seifullin (1894-1939) came to be regarded as the first Kazakh 
"proletarian writer." Born into a moderate nomad family, in Akmolinsk, 
he was taught first by the aul mullah, then he attended a nearby Russian 
factory school for three years, before going to school in Akmolinsk (town). 
He went to the Omsk Teachers' Seminary from 19 13 to 1916. Here he was 
exposed to Russian socialism and even Bolshevism; he was active in the 
Omsk student group Birlik. In 19 16, Seifullin became an aul teacher in 
Akmolinsk uezd. As will be seen, Seifullin's significance actually 
concerns his role as the first Kazakh Soviet writer and opponent of Alash 
Orda; but his early biography provides another example of the development 
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of the Kazakh intellectuals of the period 1900-1916. 
The years 1908 to 1911, despite the suppression of the Kazakh press, 
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were by no means quiet. Rather, Kazakh nationalism intensified, as the 
Russian peasantry swarmed over the best lands at the peak of colonization, 
while the government not only facilitated their invasion, it arbitrarily 
denied the Kazakhs the newly-found freedom to criticize it. 
Just as in the days of Abay, when activists gathered at his aul for 
discussions, the intellectuals and youths continued to meet in camps and 
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in towns. Baytursun himself was imprisoned m 1909-19 10 for anti-
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Russian agitation among clandestine revolutionary groups. As he had 
been a teacher until this, one can surmise that the Kazakh tradition of 
enlightenment was now utilized to spread nationalism among the students 
and through them their traditionalist nomad families scattered across the 
Steppe. 
Thus, M. S. Kashatov wrote in 1908, "Let us study sciences, 
religion and trade, and lead our people out into the world.The 
result is revealed by the Kazakh Communist G. Togzhanov, writing in 1927: 
In the prerevolutionary period the only political 
education we received was from the nationalists. We saw 
and knew only Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, Ahmed Baytursunov, 
and Mir Yakub Dulatov. They were the example for us. From 
them there was one road, nationalism, and by this nationalism 
we came to the revolution. Nationalism did not come from the 
head of Ahmed and Ali Khan. Nationalism was the general 
desire of the Kazakhs. Nationalism was directed against 
tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie.^^ 
By this time, the upsurge in education that had begun in the 1890s 
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had led to many more educated youths. By 1905, there were over 2,000 
Russian schools in Kazakhstan, almost 130 Russian-Kazakh schools, and 
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135 Islamic mekteps (primary schools). Literacy was increasing, 
though the actual numbers of literate Kazakhs was small (perhaps only 
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100,000 by 1920, in a population of about 4 million). A measure of the 
increase is that while only 75 books were published in the 1800s, 
mostly in the latter decades, over 200 were published from 1900 to 
The absolute numbers of educated Kazakhs and published materials 
seem comparatively small, but their influence was much more widespread 
than available Russian statistics might indicate. The governor-general 
of Turkestan, Samsonov, stated in 1910: 
A great many publications are being issued in the native 
languages continuously, [and] . . . are sold at extremely low 
prices, being distributed quickly without leaving a trace (as 
a consequence of which a majority of such publications remain) 
completely unknown not only to Russian scholarly institutions 
but also to the local administration.^ 
And Bukeykhanov, writing in 1924, recalled that: 
Before the revolution, not a tiny spot in the plains was 
unacquainted with Kazan's publication of Kazakh books. . . . 
The Kazakhs who had studied in the Tatar schools of Kazan, Ufa, 
Orenburg, Troitsk, and Petropavlovsk were themselves the 
suppliers of Kazakh books. . . . Judging by the fact that one 
meets the old Kazan publications throughout the plains even 
today, it must be concluded that the merchants organized the 
distribution of their publications e f f i c i e n t l y . ^  
The third and most significant surge of the Kazakh periodical press 
rose up in 19 11-12. Despite police repression, Kazakhs started up 
several journals and newspapers, some of which were as short-lived as 
previously, but others were significant through the civil war era. The 
nationalist group Alash Orda coalesced in 1912.^ Writing in 1920, 
Manab Shamil noted: 
. . . the spreading of revolutionary ideas, that is, rather, the 
ideas of national equality and liberation, was observed especially 
among the student young people from 1912 on. Those who inspired 
the awakening of the young Kazakh intelligentsia 
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were 'revolutionary' Kadets prominent at that time, the 
journalists Bukeykhanov, Dulatov, and Baytursun.^8 
Among the briefer journals appeared Qazaqstan, four issues published 
in Urda (Khanskaya Stavka) in 1911, and fourteen issues in Ural'sk in 
19 13. Its circulation was a few hundred, its program pan-Islamic and 
anti-Russian, and it was published by Shangerei (Shahin Girey) Bukeev. 
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Among its contributors was Omer Karasy. It did not survive the tsarist 
censors. Another paper was Ishim dalasy, published in Petropavlovsk 
by the Russian daily Ishimskii kray in latter 19 13; one of the very few 
socialist-inclined papers in the Steppe, it was quickly suspended; its 
focus was the land problem.^ 
f\ i 
The journal Ay gap began in January, 1911, published m Troitsk. 1 
It was a modernist literary and cultural review, its editors being poets 
and writers, teachers, and historians. Its chief editor was Mukhammedzhan 
Seralin (1872-1929), a poet and intellectual activist who had been a 
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teacher from 189 1 to 1902. Contributors included Bukeykhanov and 
Baytursun, Koshchegulov, Bukeev, Naushbayev, Toraygyrov, Donentaev, 
Zhumabayev, and Seifullin. Ay gap emphasized the revival of Kazakh 
culture and language, revealing the unbroken line from the enlighteners 
to the reformists to the nationalists. Eighty-eight issues (monthly, 
then bimonthly) appeared before it was suspended by the government in 
1916, with 900 to 1,200 copies per issue. 
With such a diversity of contributors and its focus on cultural 
preservation, Ay gap presented the entire spectrum of Kazakh nationalism. 
It was both bourgeois liberal and pro-Islamic; its contributors were 
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nearly all from the aristocratic or clerical elite. It supported the 
pan-Turkist movement of Gaspirinsky, it criticized the outmoded 
patriarchal customs and especially the position of women in society, 
and it supported the spread of Islamic education. Indeed, Ay gap argued 
for the use of the Shariat or Islamic law, and it regarded the Moslem 
clergy as the needed ally of the secular elite. 
The editors of Ay gap viewed pastoral nomadism as a brake on the 
modernization of the Kazakhs; sedentarization was a necessity in order 
to create a nation able to resist the physical and cultural invasion of 
the Russians. But settlement needed to take place at a pace that would 
not destabilize Kazakh society, or it would be as destructive as Russian 
colonization. The tsarist regime's policy of sedentarization was for 
Russian, not Kazakh purposes. When Ay gap sought a pan-Kazakh congress 
for the winter of 1913/14, to work out the best method of settlement, 
the Steppe governor-general refused to allow it, arguing that Russian 
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policy was not within their purview. Russian denial of the nationalists' 
involvement in shaping a sedentarization plan remained a constant of 
Kazakh history throughout this period. 
The editors of Ay gap believed that the material decline of Kazakh 
life was due to the economic decline of nomadism. They felt that, while 
pastoral nomadism had been the foundation of the unigue Kazakh culture, 
it was no longer relevant to a modern Kazakhstan. The inevitable first 
step as a modern nation reguired sedentarization, as Omar Karasy implied: 
Eternal nomadic livestock breeding was not ordered as 
the eternal Kazakh fate. There comes a time when we are 
able to live as agriculturists and as traders. The present-
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day Russians and Tatars and other settled peoples first led 
nomadic lives, raising livestock. How they are occupied in 
the present day is known by all. We are no worse off than 
they are and we are the children of humanity. We are also 
able to live as they d o .  
On February 2, 19 13, the bi-weekly periodical Qazaq appeared.^ This 
was the vehicle of the leading nationalists who formed the group called 
Alash Orda, "Horde of Alash." Published at Orenburg by Mustafa Urazayev, 
with chief editor Baytursun, its staff and contributors constituted the 
core of the secular intellectual activists of the prerevolutionary and 
revolutionary periods: Bukeykhanov, Dulatov, Zhumabayev, Tanyshbayev, 
Halel Dosmukhammedov, and others. Within a year, its circulation rose 
from 3,000 to 8,000 copies per issue.^ Qazaq ceased in 19 18. 
Like Ay gap, Qazaq emphasized the preservation of Kazakh culture. 
Folklore, literature, and above all, the Kazakh language occupied its 
pages. Unlike Ay gap, however, Qazag was much more overtly political in 
nature, and it disdained Islam. It was suspended by the Russian censors 
over two dozen times in its first two years alone. 
For the writers of Qazag, the preservation of their language was as 
crucial as the land problem. The lead editorial of the very first issue, 
written by Baytursun, explains this position and deserves guotation at 
length: 
For centuries the Kirgiz [Kazakh] people occupied its 
own territory and lived its own life; but now a flood of 
colonists is inundating our steppes. What is our future to 
be? History teaches us that when a foreign element shows 
itself to be culturally stronger than the native population, 
it inevitably absorbs the latter. By contrast, if the two 
elements balance each other culturally, they can develop 
side by side enjoying their own rights and preserving their 
national characteristics. The ultimate transformation of 
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the economic life of the Kirgiz seems to be inevitable. 
Peasants are settling on our arable land, our lands are 
being requisitioned . . ., in short foreigners are penetrating 
into our midst. The problem of the very existence of the 
Kirgiz people is facing us in a most acute form. In order to 
preserve our autonomy we should struggle with all our strength 
in order to acquire education and culture. We must in the 
first place develop our national literature. We should never 
forget that only a people who has been able to create its own 
literature in its national language has the right to an 
independent existence . 
In general, Qazaq advocated expanded Kazakh-language education, 
emancipation of women, and equality of rights for Kazakhs with Russians. 
It perforce tread carefully regarding the regime, but forcefully argued 
against Russian economic and social policies harmful to the Kazakhs. Its 
contributors criticized the traditional leadership for failing to 
preserve, much less advance, Kazakh culture, they chastised those 
intellectuals who placed Russian knowledge before their own, and they 
regarded Islam as a hindrance to modernization. 
Whereas Ay gap wanted Shariat law, the editors of Qazaq were against 
increasing Islamic power, given Tatar domination of the Islamic reform 
movements. They upheld adat, customary law, as Bukeykhanov explained: 
The Kazakhs are non-Muslims, at very most half-Muslims. 
The preservation of cutoms and traditions is useful to the 
Kazakhs. The Shariat is harmful to the Kazakhs.^ 
The Qazaq writers regarded pastoral nomadism as no longer viable, 
and that clinging to it was dragging the nation to ruin, because the 
Russians grew stronger while the Kazakhs weakened. The fear of alien 
blood swamping their nation, and the rational realization that economic 
advancement was vital for its survival, impelled the intellectual 
nationalists to advocate sedentarization, which was the antithesis of 
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Kazakh self-identity as free riders of the Steppe. The nationalists 
could accept settlement, but only if the Russian colonization ceased, 
in order to provide the time and space the Kazakh masses needed to become 
modern. In this regard, Qazaq was much more bitter towards the regime 
and its policies than Ay gap, and more specific in its analysis: 
. . . the transition of the local population to a sedentary way 
of life means the voluntary giving over of land to the settlers 
from the central guberniias of Russia. In order to maintain 
in their hands sufficient land masses the local residents ought 
to receive land parcels according to the so-called 'nomadic 
norm' and so land parcels in that norm would be twice as great 
as according to the sedentary norm . . . 
The opinion of the newspaper Qazag on the agricultural 
guestion is to support the position of seizing the Kazakh land 
according to order and law. The expropriation of land 
according to order means not to destroy the existing economic 
order of the Kazakhs: that is, if the Kazakhs live by 
agriculture, then give them land according to livestock breeding 
norms and take the remaining surplus. To take away land means 
to have some sort of legal position, published so that the 
resettlement officials do not get out of hand. When the 
resettlement officials take away Kazakh land, they are unable 
to depart from this legal position. 69 
As indicated by the guote from Baytursun at the opening of this 
chapter, the founders of Qazag deliberately chose to name their 
journal "Kazakh11 and not "Kirghiz.11 The utter lack of regard for the 
Kazakhs by their Russian conguerors was proven every time a Russian called 
a Kazakh by the other name. The Kazakhs themselves always used "Kazakh" 
(or "Qazag" in the contemporary orthography).^ To use the title Qazag 
was a fundamental revolutionary statement. Unlike the enlighteners of 
the past, the Qazag nationalists did not wish to emulate the Russian 
culture, they only wanted to acguire the modern technological skills of 
the Russians so they could better oppose them. Tsarist imperial rule 
was antithetical to Kazakh existence. The secular intellectuals were 
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realists, and knew that overt demands would only rouse overt Russian 
resistance. Nevertheless, their ultimate goal was the creation of a 
wholly Kazakh nation—Qazaqjylyq.7 1 
Ay gap and Qazaq were allies, not rivals; the overlapping lists of 
contributors prove that. The former focused on cultural preservation, 
the latter on economic and political. They represented the main stream 
of Kazakh intellectual development, and dominated the politics of the 
Steppe. However, two much weaker intellectual currents opposed them, 
the southern Kazakhs of Syr Darya and a scattering of socialist-leaning 
Kazakhs found in the larger, Russian-dominated towns. 
In late 1913, a group of southern Kazakhs formed "Ush Zhuz," or 
"The Three Hordes." They began a periodical, Ush Zhuz, at first published 
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in Tashkent. The Kazakhs of Syr Darya were distinctly more anti-Russian 
than the northern Kazakhs, and much more Islamic in outlook. Some were 
aristocratic and pro-Bukharan, given their long relations with the emirs 
of Turkestan; others were poor or even destitute, driven out of the Steppe 
and Semirechye by the Russian exploiters and expropriators. They were a 
combination of very conservative Islamic clergy, reformist intellectuals 
who looked to pan-Islam or even Istanbul for rescue from Russian rule, 
and angry young nomads or ex-nomads hating Russia. The leader of the 
Ush Zhuz was Kolbay Togusov, himself left-leaning and also personally 
antagonistic to the leadership of the Qazag group. 
After 1914, Ush Zhuz found supporters in Semirechye, Turgay, and 
in the Russian towns of the north, particularly Omsk. It advocated armed 
resistance to the Russians. As time passed, it grew more radical, which 
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drained its support among the southern Kazakh clergy but increased it 
among the poor north and south. 
The second strand of opposition to the Qazaq intellectuals was that 
of the few socialist Kazakhs found in the towns, and especially among the 
students exposed to Russian radical thought. Though very few in number, 
given the lack of a Kazakh proletariat, the leftists have ever since been 
lionized by Soviet historiography as the true leaders of the Kazakh 
masses, while the Qazaq writers are scorned as "bourgeois-nationalists11 
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and the conservatives as "feudal reactionaries." Ironically, the Kazakh 
leftists had the least prerevolutionary significance, but the longest 
history of Kazakh intellectuals: in 1849, the tsarist government had 
exiled to Vernyi, Turgay, and Semipalatinsk members of the radical group 
called the Petrashevtzy; in the Steppe, these radicals met and influenced 
Kazakh intellectuals of the incipient national movement 
From 1900 to 1916, Kazakh nationalism developed rapidly and deeply. 
But modern nationalism existed only among the intellectuals, who were 
very few in number, widely scattered, and divided by upbringing and 
outlook. The nomad (rather, by now, semi-nomad) Kazakh masses were not 
antagonistic to the intellectuals, though often their elders were; the 
intellectuals1 tradition of enlightenment spurred their efforts to 
communicate with the general population, and despite difficulties of 
terrain, class status, and limited technology, the intellectual elites 
were not separated from their people in comparison to the gulf between 
the Russian intelligentsia and the peasantry. Kazakh traditional society 
consisted, at least ideally and to some extent in reality, of harmony 
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between aristocrats and commoners, white bones and black, bais and 
baigushes. The overwhelming threat of Russian annihilation of their 
culture was a powerful bond of unity among a people whose national identity 
had always been strong. 
The Kazakh masses lacked comprehension of the Westernized political 
system of thought that modern nationalism implies. Up to 19 16, even the 
Kazakh intellectuals apparently sought only cultural autonomy and the 
political rights to preserve that autonomy. The absence of any overt 
demands for political/territorial independence by the nationalists is 
justification for the view of modern experts that the Kazakhs did not 
experience 'real1 nationalism. 
However, when one considers the day-to-day context of prerevolutionary 
Kazakhstan, it becomes apparent that such demands for independence would 
have only set back the intellectuals' struggle even more. The political 
and cultural repression of the Kazakhs was based on the overwhelming 
material superiority the Russians possessed. Also, the Kazakhs lacked 
accessible models of nation-states, surrounded as they were by empires 
like the Russian, Chinese, and Ottoman. The intellectual nationalists 
were desperately seeking time to coax the Kazakh masses into the modern 
world; calls for full independence would have been suicidal. 
The prerevolutionary Kazakh nationalists acknowledged that the 
Kazakh people had ceded their sovereignty to the conquering Russians.^ 
They therefore worked with the basic assumption that they were part of 
a huge multinational empire with a favored overclass, the Russians. In 
that framework, the intellectuals demanded a great deal of independence, 
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from land expropriation, cultural assault, and population inundation. 
To seek to lever the Kazakh millions into the twentieth century while 
advancing their culture, to try to sedentarize a people whose very identity 
was the antithesis of settlement, was an awesome task in itself; they 
needed to modernize first, and regain their independence from a position 
of strength later. 
In early 1916, had one asked a leading Kazakh intellectual, he would 
have been dismayed at the thought of attempting full independence from 
Russia. The intellectuals needed to modernize; Russia was the avenue of 
that modernization. Looking about him at the typical Kazakh herdsman, 
peaceful, friendly, even meek, lacking all but rudimentary hand weapons, 
the intellectual would have predicted the obvious: if the Kazakh people 
took up arms against the Russian Empire, they would be slaughtered. The 
goal of Qazaqjylyq would be delayed greatly, if not forever. To seek full 
national independence, in the context of his world in 1916, would only 
result in a terrible, avoidable tragedy. 
The events of 1916 were very tragic. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Steppe Aflame: Revolt of 1916 
The times have become evil, 
Under the heaviness of the tsar's hand. 
What can we expect from the authorities, 
Since for them we are but beasts of burden? 
Hearts have become inflamed in anger against them, 
The dzhigits (warriors) are eagerly awaiting the 
ris ing. 
They will not submit to the decree, 
But are going into battle. . 
—Qulbash, 1916. 
Rumors are flying across the steppe, 
Rumors about human misery. 
Aytkhodzha dies under the whip, 
And Uzakh under the bayonet. 
Above the blue waves of the Issyk-Kul, 
A hot battle took place, 
And from the deadly bullet of the tsar, 
Many a dzhigit laid down his life. 
And in the bloody Karakul 
Over their captive victims 
The authorities have avenged themselves 
Behind the steel of prison doors: 
Submissively here soldiers were shooting 
In prisons, among stone walls, 
And our delegates were falling, 
Washing the courtyards with their blood. 
By night the prison had almost emptied; 
They rolled the bodies into ditches and 
Ending this bloody business, 
The enemy raced towards our auls. ^ 
—Anonymous, 1916. 
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World War I transformed the modern age. Its relationship to the fall 
of the tsarist empire and the rise of the Soviet Union is axiomatic for 
historians. The great 'native' uprisings in Central Asia in 19 16 have 
been oddly overlooked, however, despite their significance as a massive 
mid-war diversion of Russian military resources, as part of the rise of 
'third-world1 nationalism, and as a crucial precursor of the Bolshevik-
White struggle in this arena. This bitter vosstanie or popular revolt 
rocked Russian Central Asia from July through the end of 19 16, involving, 
though very separately, the civilized peoples of Turkestan and the 
Turkomans of the desert, the Kirghiz of the mountains, and the Kazakhs of 
3 
the steppe. When finally suppressed, the revolt had cost the Central 
Asians dearly in destroyed and plundered property, as well as in lives. 
Hundreds of thousands were killed, out of a total population of eight 
million, while about four thousand Russians were lost, with over 90% 
being settlers and the rest officials, out of nearly two million 
4 
residents. 
The Kazakhs fully participated in the turmoil of 1916. The secular 
nationalists, however, withheld public support in their publications and 
meetings, while doing everything they could do mitigate the uprising. 
The traditional local leaders, the elders, as well as the anti-Russian 
Islamic clergy were everywhere in support of the rebels, who were gangs of 
youths hiding in the steppe. The Russian suppression of the uprising 
devastated the innocent herdsmen as much as or more than the marauding 
youths. The social and economic havoc that resulted weakened Kazakh 
national resources, but left the secular intellectuals as the only real 
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focus of opposition to the Russians in the revolutionary era to follow. 
The spark of the uprising was an imperial ukase of June 25, 19 16, 
which decreed that a half-million Central Asians, aged 19-43, were to 
be mobilized for labor brigades in the war effort. The immediate cause, 
then, was the hardships of World War I on Russia's Central Asian colonies. 
However, the underlying reason for the desperate, doomed uprising of the 
Kazakhs in 19 16 was due to Russian colonization and the usurpation of 
their land. Therefore, a summary of the impact of that expropriation is 
appropriate. 
By the census of 1897, about 600,000 Russians dwelt in Kazakhstan.^ 
In the next twenty years, over 1.5 million emigrated to Kazakh lands, so 
that by 19 16, four million Kazakhs shared the six oblasts with nearly two 
million Russians. The ratio of Kazakhs to Russians fell from 5.5:1 in 
1897, to 2:1 in 1916. The heaviest influx occurred in the five uezds of 
the northern plains called the Virgin Lands, where the Russian population 
jumped from 230,000 to 900,000. Semirechye was heavily inundated as well, 
with a quarter-million Russian colonists, and over 11 million acres 
seized.^ By 1915, the Russians had taken 67 million acres from the 
Kazakhs.^ The invasion peaked just before World War I (when immigration 
was suspended): while the Russian population increased by 400,000 from 
1897 to 1905, it grew by 900,000 between 1905 and 1916. 
The Kazakhs were not only crowded off the best pasture-lands by this 
invasion, they were increasingly impoverished as nomads. In the early 
1700s, an 'average1 Kazakh household of the Middle Horde possessed about 
100 sheep, 30-50 horses, 20-25 goats, 15-25 cattle, and several camels 
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(while a wealthy nomad might own ten to twenty times as many.) By 19 15, 
the average nomad household owned a total of 26 animals, while only one 
in twenty families owned more than 50 animals in 19 17; yet the size of 
9 
the Kazakh herds increased from 17 to 30 million from 1885 to 1917. 
Obviously, some Kazakhs did benefit from Russian rule, perhaps one-tenth 
to one-fourth; in 1910, Bukeykhanov estimated that 61% of Kazakhs were 
poor, and 22% were rich.^ 
Nomadism declined greatly. At least one in five Kazakhs received 
some sort of wages in 19 14; over 18,000 Kazakhs worked in the coal and 
copper industries by 19 16.^ By 1911, the majority of Kazakh families 
1 2  
did some farming, with 70% combining agriculture and herding by 19 17. 
Only one in four Kazakhs was wholly nomadic, while 18% of the Kazakhs of 
the Steppe and Semirechye lacked sufficient livestock and 40% had no sown 
13 
land whatsoever. The amount of land farmed by Kazakhs increased from 
1.2 million to 1.65 million acres between 1906 and 1916; by 1917, 50-75% 
of farmers in Kazakh areas were Kazakhs, but they tilled only 20% of all 
i ^ 14 sown lands. 
World War I exacted further hardships on the Kazakhs. Central Asians 
had always been exempted from Russian military service, and during the 
war the government expected whole-hearted economic support to ?payf for 
this exemption.^ The Kazakhs already paid the so-called fkibitkaT tax; 
other special taxes and Requisitions' were added on, greatly burdening 
the nomads, who paid a flat per-household rate that harmed the poor, 
16 
obviously, more than the rich. Besides the special war-taxes and 
contributions required of all Central Asians, the nomads also had to pay 
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an added kibitka tax, a local tax, and a war-tax. The government forced 
them to give supplies to troops through their areas, to transport goods, 
perform other war-related labor (ditches, etc.), and to contribute huge 
numbers of livestocks and yurts. Despite the huge price-spiral in food 
and price-fixing by Russian merchants, Kazakh animals were seized for a 
fraction of their value, or for nothing at all. Corrupt and partisan 
officials, Russian and Kazakh, often profited greatly, by pocketing what 
funds the government did pay, and by skimming the nomads' tax payments and 
contributions. In the Steppe and Semirechye, where many peasants had gone 
to war, the nomads were forced to work their farms for them.^ 
As the war lurched disastrously in 19 15-16, the Russian government 
considered the mobilization of Central Asians and other exempted inorodtsy 
18 
(non-Russians) for military or at least labor service. Huge losses in 
manpower in late 1915 initiated the debate, and by mid-1916 the situation 
seemed critical: the army needed a half-million replacements per month, 
and there was only a three-month reserve. The regime decided to mobilize 
the Central Asians for rear-line labor (supply transport, wood-chopping, 
guarding horses, digging ditches) throughout the empire, freeing Russian 
soldiers for the front. 
Tsar Nicholas signed the mobilization decree June 25, 1916. The 
decree called for 243,000 natives of the Steppe oblasts (250,000 from 
Turkestan). The Steppe natives were nearly all Kazakhs, so using 
statistics for the Steppe oblasts only, the following calculations show 
19 
that the government requisitioned the vast majority of eligible Kazakhs. 
Half of all Steppe Kazakhs were male; of these, 70% were aged 10 to 59 
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(that is, 20% were 10-20, 50% were 20-59). Assuming that half of these 
were aged 19 to 43, some 300-350,000 Kazakhs were eligible to be drafted. 
Thus, while about 8% of the total male population of Turkestan was to 
20 
be mobilized, some 25% of the Steppe was to be. 
The date for the call-up was set for July 15. The decree was 
hastily drawn up and poorly thought out. Kuropatkin, the Russian general 
who suppressed the revolt, wrote that the Prime Minister and the Minister 
of War "did all that was possible to stir up the population," and that 
the decree was written "in such a hurried and indefinite form that it 
2 1 
caused utter confusion in the minds of the population." The Russian 
officials in Central Asia gave scant attention to educating the natives 
as to the purpose and nature of the mobilization. They briefly considered 
that the Central Asians might misconstrue the military-style call-up (by 
age-brackets), but dismissed the concern. The decree reached Tashkent 
and Semipalatinsk on June 28, Akmolinsk on June 29. Governor-General 
Erofeev of Turkestan held a meeting July 2 to work out the mechanics; it 
was decided to establish regional quotas to be met by conscription based 
on lists drawn up by local officials and village elders. Governor-General 
Sukhomlinov of the Steppe announced his order for June 30, 1916, and tried 
to explain the decree: 
The requisition order does not call these persons as 
soldiers into the army but for work necessary for the army 
in return for pay and provisions from the Treasury.^2 
Despite the vastness of the steppe, word of the conscription order 
spread swiftly. A Semirechye Kazakh intellectual, Turar Ryskulov ( 1894 — 
1937), hurried home from Tashkent to spread the word. Kazakhs working 
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on Russian farms immediately returned to their homes. It was summer in 
the steppe, and the Kazakh auls were widely scattered. Rumors and the 
lack of government explanation fanned worry into panic and anger. Some 
Kazakhs began to flee immediately, fearing the worst. It was rumored 
that the government was taking the Kazakh youths away to dig trenches 
under enemy fire. In Semipalatinsk, the story spread that the conscripts 
would be forcibly Christianized. Semirechye nomads believed it was a 
ruse whereby the Russians would seize the rest of their lands. Many in 
Turgay thought the order came not from the tsar, but was a plot of the 
bais and volost (district) elders to benefit at the expense of the poor. 
Everywhere, the Kazakh youths fled into the wilderness in bands. Adding 
to the confusion, the Kazakh interpreters had difficulty translating the 
23 
decree into Kazakh terms. 
The government's response to the first troubles was to send Cossack 
detachments through the Steppe. An official report from early August 
indicates the result: 
The appearance in the steppe of the Cossack units brought 
terror to the peaceful population of the great area. The Kazakhs 
up to this time peacefully awaiting the call of the subject 
workers, became agitated: in places leaving all of their property, 
selling the land for a song, they went away to the south. The 
youths left the auls, went into the steppe, and it's unknown 
where they are. Everywhere the Kazakhs left the ripening grain; 
the cut hay remains in heaps, rots, and is carried away by the 
wind. The economy is dealt an irreparable blow seeing that from 
the time of the announcement of the call no one has been 
occupying himself with agricultural matters. In the Urzhavsk 
volost of the Lepsinsk uezd of the Semirechye oblast the Kazakhs, 
goiqgno one knows where, poisoned their grain and hay for the 
cattle.24 
The first outbreaks of violence occurred in early July, in Samarkand 
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among the Sarts, and among the Kazakhs, in all the Steppe oblasts. By 
mid-July, the disturbances were severe in Turkestan and widespread in 
the Kazakh areas. Semirechye nomads began fleeing east and south into 
Chinese Sinkiang. Finally, on July 30th, the tsar postponed the call-up 
to September 15, which had the desired effect of cooling the uprisings. 
But by latter September, violence flared anew; however, the government 
had by this time gathered the military force to suppress the revolt, 
25 
which consisted now of stomping out local fires. 
Popular reaction in the revolt of 19 16 was split between flight and 
resistance. Bands of youths up to 1,000 strong roamed the countryside, 
armed with crude implements, where they assaulted the officials to seize 
their conscription lists. Sometimes the native officials were killed as 
well; when Russian troops were sent to protect the officials, the Kazakhs 
fought them. The decree became the tool of numerous corrupt officials to 
extort and harass their rivals, and many of the wealthy simply bought 
their way out of conscription (the decree exempted mullahs, some bais, 
and local officials, but rather than mollify popular resentment by not 
taking the local leaders, this further inflamed the anger of the poor). 
The greatest amount of violence was not between Kazakhs, however, it was 
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directed against the Russians, especially the settlers. 
The following regional summary of the revolt among the Kazakhs is 
intended to show its variability of intensity as well as its widespread 
27 
character. 
In western Kazakhstan, unrest began in Temirtau and Guryev areas. 
On July 8, a volost starshina (headman) was killed in Uralsk uezd; soon, 
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the entire oblast was in disorder. Volost officials were beaten and 
their lists seized by gangs of youths. The unrest was scattered and 
sporadic, however, The Russians had long been established in Uralsk, 
especially the Cossacks, and punitive detachments had quelled the 
uprising by November. 
Neighboring Turgay, on the other hand, witnessed the fiercest 
resistance of the Steppe oblasts, from Kustanay and Aktyubinsk in 
the north and west to Irgiz and Turgay in the south and east. Turgay 
oblast had received many poor nomads driven from the northern plains and 
the southern deserts by the Russian settlers, and its tribal groups 
remained some of the least 1 tamed1 of all Kazakhs. Under Khan Abdul 
Gafar Dzhambusynov, the warrior Amangeldy Imanov (1873-1919), and the 
revolutionary Alibai Dzhangildin (1884-1953), the Kipchaks allied with 
the Argyn and Naiman tribes to form the best-organized rebel force in 
the steppe. On October 23, they attacked the town of Turgay with some 
15,000 men, and beseiged it for three weeks. They assaulted the town on 
November 5, but failed to take it due to dissension and lack of arms. 
The Russian relief expedition under Lieutenant-General Lavrentiev raised 
the seige on November 16, scattering the rebels with heavy casualties. 
By the end of November, only 6,000 Kazakh warriors remained; Amangeldy 
held out in the Batlakkara desert until the following February when the 
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Provisional government passed a general amnesty. 
The resistance in Akmolinsk began in mid-July and was widespread. 
A group of central steppe elders met in Atbasar uezd on July 16. Violence 
had occurred in Petropavlovsk a week before, in Akmolinsk July 11. The 
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most serious fighting was in the Bayan-aul region; Akmolinsk officials 
sent the following message to Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg) on 
August 1: 
The Kazakhs are acting in a very provocatory manner, 
ride about only in large parties and threaten the population 
of the Russian settlements that they will kill and burn in 
all directions, especially the very new settlements. The 
Russians cannot defend themselves as the men of the Russian 
settlements have been taken away for the war. The Kazakhs 
attacked the Russians working in the fields, and took away 
all their draught animals, machines, carts and harnesses. 
. . . In place of the usual 25-40 kibitkas the Kazakhs began 
to group themselves into 300-400 kibitkas. The Kazakhs 
gathered into a group of 15 thousand around Lake Kurgalajin.^9 
By September, Omsk authorities reported nearly 30,000 Kazakhs 
near Akmolinsk. The town itself, with a population over 60,000, was 
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attacked September 26-7, October 3-4, and October 6. The Lavrentiev 
forces began pacification of Akmolinsk oblast then, and the disorders 
were over by late November. The Cossack sweep of the Kenderlinsk 
region indicates the method: over forty armed Kazakhs were killed here 
on October 25, then the Russians killed twenty more nearby, and stormed 
through the area attacking auls, seizing herds and food, burning winter 
camps, and killing. 
The first violence in Semipalatinsk was in mid-July along the Chinese 
border. At their height, the Kazakh bands numbered several thousands, 
3 1 
with several such bands in all four uezds. In the central steppe, 
a large number of Kazakhs gathered in Karkaralinsk. They refused to 
listen to those urging submission. The Governor himself came to calm 
the area, after the murder of several officials; an angry Kazakh mob 
. 3 2  
slew two native officials right in front of him. The uprising was 
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put down in Semipalatinsk region by region, though Zaisan was not 
pacified until early January, 19 17. 
Syr Darya was least disturbed by the revolt, which began here in 
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mid-August and had ended by late September. Many Kazakhs fled, fearing 
Russian reprisals. Syr Darya had the least number of Russian settlers, 
primarily because most of its arable land was already farmed by the 
Turkestanis. 
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The revolt in Semirechye was most violent of all. The nomads here, 
both Kazakh and Kirghiz, had suffered the most recent and devastating 
colonization. General Folbaum, aware that the uprising was imminent, took 
measures in July to suppress it, including the placement of troops 
throughout the oblast, and also made efforts through intermediaries to 
persuade the nomads to stay calm. The revolt came later to Semirchye, 
perhaps due to this, but it was the fiercest. On July 10, delegates of 
eleven districts met at ancient Otrar to plan the resistance; thousands 
of youths were ordered to hide in the wilderness along Lake Balkhash. 
The Tashkent-Vernyi road was assaulted, and by August 10, the oblast was 
in general revolt. 
The Russian settlements, strung along post-roads and river-valleys, 
were attacked by Kazakh and Kirghiz marauders, some of whom had seized a 
shipment of Russian arms. Thousands of Kirghiz beseiged Tokmak in mid-
August, dying with amazing bravery against Russian machine-guns. In the 
mountains, settlers were attacked mercilessly, so that entire regions 
were depopulated of Russians, the farms in ruins. The arrival of the 
Lavrentiev expeditionary force in mid-September turned the tide; soldiers 
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and settler militias had pacified Semirechye by the end of the year. One 
of the great tragedies of the revolt was the 300,000 nomads who fled into 
Sinkiang during the revolt. Unwanted by the Chinese and attacked by the 
locals, afraid to return to Russian vengeance, these refugees perished in 
great numbers; eventually, about 30,000 returned. 
A more typical tragedy is found in the story of the Kazakhs of 
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Belovodsk, in Semirechye, m mid-August. Here, two Russians were found 
murdered. The settlers formed a militia which rampaged through the Kazakh 
auls indiscriminately. After several days, the local police chief 
persuaded more than 500 Kazakhs to come to Belovodsk to discuss the awful 
situation. Upon arrival3 the Kazakhs were arrested and locked up, and 
then the Russian colonists were allowed to slaughter them. 
When Kuropatkin toured Semirechye in September, he passed through 
Belovodsk and recorded this: 
At the entrance to the settlement . . . the widows of the 
murdered men stood on both sides of the road in [Kazakh] mourning 
clothes, and as if at a command they raised a cry, asking me to 
return their men. . . .Follbaum, the military governor of 
Semirechye . . . believes that this cruel punishment served a 
purpose, as it stopped the wavering [Kazakhs] of other volosts 
from joining the rebellion, for which they made preparations. 
I strongly warned the population that anyone who now takes it 
into his head to plunder, whether Russian or [Kazakh], will be 
given over to court-martial and the gallows.^ 
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Estimations of Kazakh losses m the revolt are difficult to make. 
The Russians compiled statistics on their own losses in Turkestan and 
Turgay, but not for the rest of the Steppe, and not at all on native 
losses. If one includes deaths through the consequent famine in much of 
the area, the casualties were staggering. The Russians lost about 4,000 
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people, over 3,000 of whom were in Semirechye alone, and about 9,000 
farms. In Turgay, 45 Russian civilians and 3 officers died. 
Central Asian losses numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Later 
Soviet calculations estimated that Semirechye alone lost 300,000; the 
number of nomad households there fell by two-thirds (62,000 to 20,000); 
losses here amounted to 20% of the people, 50% of the horses, 40% of the 
cattle, 60% of the sheep and goats, and about 400,000 acres of cropland. 
The heavy-handed peace imposed by Kuropatkin in Semirechye, which forced 
thousands of nomads to resettle in barren mountain regions, took its 
toll. The population of Turkestan fell by one million from 19 14 to 19 18. 
The Kazakh revolt of 19 16 was spontaneous and sporadic. The leaders 
were mostly local elders and headstrong youths; the majority of Kazakhs 
did not participate in the revolt, seeking only to protect their families 
and herds. No upper class Kazakhs were associated with the revolt except 
in Turgay and Semirechye, where it was the fiercest. The 19 16 uprising 
was the desperate act of impoverished nomads and angry youths, while the 
settled Kazakhs of north and south, and the established, wealthy bais, 
mostly kept apart from the revolt. The Kazakh secular nationalists also 
did not openly support the uprising. 
When the Russian government, including the Duma, first began to 
consider mobilization, the nationalists carried on heated discussion of 
the issue, particularly in the pages of Qazaq. In the January 24, 19 15 
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issue, for example, three writers made the same points. Ahmed Jantaliev 
wrote: 
. . . in case Kazakhs are taken to military service, then 
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it is necessary that they be given the same advantages which 
those people who have always served in the army already have. 
Kazakhs must also be given the rights which Cossacks enjoy 
and they should serve in the cavalry. Furthermore, Kazakhs 
should be allotted lands equally with the Cossacks. 
Mustaki Maldybayev noted that, "as a result of the absence of birth 
certificates and other documents among the Kazakhs, it is very difficult 
to determine their ages and clarify who is liable for call." And Salmak 
bey Kesmetov argued: 
It is impossible to assume that Kazakhs will forever be 
free from military service. But if the question of military 
service is to be decided, then it would follow that this decision 
come with the participation of the Kazakhs themselves. If 
Kazakhs must be called, will they serve in the infantry or the 
cavalry? ... We think that it would be very opportune to 
raise simultaneously with the question of military service, 
the question of Kazakhs1 participation in the Duma and the 
distribution of their lands. 
Other Kazakh writers discussed the issue in various other papers 
as well. All linked military or labor service with restored Duma rights 
and the land problem. The Kazakh nomads discussed the issue among 
themselves as well, as a Semirechye nomad described a meeting in the 
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fall of 1915. 
From January, 1916, right up to the decree itself, the writers in 
Qazaq argued that mobilization should be as cavalry troops, with rights 
equal to the Cossacks, and Duma representation restored. Tanyshbayev, 
later testifying about the revolt of 1916, said this: 
In December 1915 this project was discussed in the press. 
On Jan. 24, 1916 the paper "Kazak" (no. 166) gave the opinions 
of some influential Kirghiz (Kazakhs) as to the question of the 
expected placing of military service on the Kirghiz; the question 
of the desire or lack of desire to serve in the army was not 
discussed at all; all interested themselves in the question of 
how the Kirghiz would serve—in the infantry or in the cavalry, 
the question being thrashed out on the pages of the "Kazak" 
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Nos. 166, 168, 177, 179, 184—the last of June 9 . . . In 
general the articles of the said numbers may be summarized 
thus: 1) the majority of the Kirghiz prefer service in the 
cavalry (including myself), the minority stood for service 
in the infantry. 2) It is proposed that in view of the 
absence of birth certificates among the Kirghiz the call for 
military service in the near future will be beset with many 
difficult ies 
Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, and N. Begymbetov travelled to Petrograd 
, 4 
in early February, 1916, to discuss mobilization with tsarist officials. 
Among the Russians they met was the Minister of War, General Polivanov; 
apparently satisfied, the Kazakh leaders returned to the steppe and 
continued to argue for rights in return for service. They had gone to 
the capital in order to bring "to the attention of the Government and 
the Duma the general opinion of the Kazakh nation," that "in the event 
of an inelcutable call—to be placed in the cavalry and not the infantry 
with an equalization of the Kazakhs with the Russian Cossacks in land 
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ut ilization." 
When the mobilization decree came, the Kazakh leaders must have 
been bitterly disappointed. Their goal of modernizing the Kazakh nomads 
required time and exposure to modern institutions; appropriate military 
service would have provided both in good measure. But they realized that 
the Kazakhs were in no bargaining position, and therefore sought to 
ameliorate the distress which the order caused among their people. Qazaq 
stressed cooperation with the order and urged calm: "The order of the 
tsar should be carried out without question. To serve the tsar, that 
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must be our duty." "Restrain yourselves, submit to law. Away with 
ill-intentioned provocators. Guard the people of Allah from a calamity 
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inspired by an evil spirit." 
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Tanyshbayev, an Alash Orda leader in Semirechye, and the guberniia 
interpreter I. Dzainokov travelled the oblast, seeking to calm the nomads 
and convince them to cooperate with the decree. They distributed issues 
of Qazaq, which argued that the tsar's order must be obeyed, and perhaps 
. . 45 
the Kazakhs would be rewarded with military status thereafter. Later, 
Tanyshbayev described his experience: 
I, myself, though personally understanding the essence of 
the whole matter of conscription found myself in a difficult 
position: at the gatherings of Kirghiz [Kazakhs] I explained 
that the term military work included work on the construction 
and operation of the railway, lading, the carrying of 
provisions, the guarding of horses, the chopping of trees for 
fuel, etc., but was told sharply that in the telegrams and 
newspapers nothing was said about this but only about 
emplacement work and that I do not speak accurately at all 
and that they had been told this by peasants they knew in the 
settlements, among whom there were relatives at the front . . 
In late July, two delegations of Kazakh intellectuals passed 
through Astrakhan, going to Petrograd to petition for recission of the 
order. The first was led by Kalmenev, Uralsk representative at the 
First Duma; the second was led by a former official, G. Nukashev. Though 
unsuccessful, their journeys reveal the growing sophistication of the 
nationalists, willing to travel the vast distance to the capital to deal 
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with the Russian regime directly. 
On August 7, 19 16, the Kazakh secular nationalists convened a 
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meeting of Kazakhs from across the Steppe and Semirechye. The 
conference was held in Turgay with the participation of the oblast 
governor, who announced the decree and asked for their help. After he 
left the hall, the conferees elected Bukeykhanov president of the 
assembly, with Dulatov and 0. Almasov as secretaries. The informal 
9 1 
protocol of the meeting reveals the position of the moderate nationalists 
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of Alash Orda during the crisis of 1916. The assembly recommended that 
the mobilization proceed, but only after modifying it and delaying it. 
It should be postponed to January 1; the first to be called should come 
from the youngest age-group, who had the fewest families; workers should 
be kept close to home, one worker should be left per family, and workers 
should be able to substitute others. Mullahs and teachers should be 
reserved for each aul, and the medressa teachers should be exempted. 
The old lists must be discarded, and new lists drawn up by committees of 
one representative per 10 households. Each volost was to have two 
delegates, and workers in towns should participate in city and zemsky 
voting. The workers should form artels, each with a translator and 
every ten with a mullah; transportation and passes must be provided for 
the conscripted workers. 
These Kazakh demands were ignored by the government, and the mass 
of Kazakhs ignored the intellectual elites generally during 1916. The 
secular nationalists, most of whom came from upper and middle class 
backgrounds, supported the regime out of practical necessity. However, 
given the situation Qazaq faced, skirting the Russian censors amidst the 
turmoil of World War I (it was suspended 26 times in 19 13-14 alone), the 
nationalists could hardly have advocated any other course and remain with 
any voice or influence at all.~^ Apparently, in private, even the Alash 
Orda moderates supported the rebels, or at least their goal of defending 
the poor nomads. ̂  
The revolt of 19 16 was a powerful radicalizing experience for many 
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Kazakh intellectuals. Not all equivocated as Qazaq did: in September, 
19 16, the journal Ay gap was suspended for advocating support for the 
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rebels. It was during this time, also, that the more extreme Ush Zhuz 
group spread its support into Semirechye and northern Kazakhstan; it also 
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supported the revolt whole-heartedly. 
The Duma sent a special investigating committee to Central Asia at 
the height of the revolt. The committee, led by Alexander Kerensky and 
including the leader of the Moslem fraction, Tevkelev, reported in secret 
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on September 10, 1916. After discussions, the Duma in December issued 
three questions to the government, never satisfactorily answered, which 
blamed it for the revolt. The Duma did not sympathize with the native 
vict ims. 
The 19 16 rebellion was truly a popular insurrection. The elites did 
not openly participate, a factor noted by an official report later: 
But what was noticed was that the [Kazakh] youth searched 
for a leader but did not find him, therefore the agitation took 
the character of disorganization not different from the usual 
friction caused by every new development in the national life. 
This did not comprise a sign of rebellion or of agitation with 
the aim of separation from R u s s i a .^5 .  
Another report found that, "in almost every volost the leaders of the 
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revolt were the volost starshinas." 
A description from early January, 1917, describes the climate of 
terror that followed the Russian retaliation: 
The population has so suffered from the punitive units and 
is so frightened that not only is it afraid to talk of any sort 
of attack but even to think of one. . . . The former local bais 
in the village do not, at present, appear as bais but as destitute 
persons, ruined completely by the late disorders.^ 
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In 19 16, the wealthy and the nationalists remained on the side of 
the establishment, while the poor and the young rose up in reckless 
rebellion, and the majority of Kazakhs simply tried to survive. As 
Dulatov wrote in Qazaq: "Kazakhs have been ruined by this senseless 
disorder. The cause of this terrible disaster lies in the Kazakhs1 
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backwardness and their lack of culture." The Kazakh nation had not 
recovered materially or in spirit, when the revolutionary and civil war 
period crashed over the steppe. The nationalist leaders were in place 
to guide the Kazakhs through the trauma of war and famine, because to 
some extent the traditional leaders were discredited by the disaster of 
1916. 
But the passion of the desperate Kazakh nomads who struggled in 
the steppe in 19 16 is still echoed in the following rebel song, by the 
fighting akyn Byzaubaq: 
Tsar Nikolai is perplexed and upset: 
The enemies1 armies are closing in from all sides. 
There are also not a few internal enemies, 
Enemies are everywhere, and he's in despair. 
And the miserable courtiers cry, 
Give him advice, but it's all in vain. 
They want to take all our youth, 
Since they've not enough soldiers of their own. 
But even if we give into them now, 
And send our men far to strange shores, 
What will it matter—the tsar will continue to oppress, 
Even if we offer our lives for him. 
But if, as one, we rise against them, 
They will not be able to destroy us all, my people! 
No, a tsar's heart knows no compassion. 
Kazakhs, give your answer now to the tsar! 
Is it worthwhile to live the life of a slave, 
Only to reach a ripe old agje? 
Listen to what the akyn sings to you: 
Misery awaits you from the tsar's hands 
Even if you offer your son to him. 
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Go then, my people, 
Go then, in war against the tsar! 
Where now are the aksakals and wise leaders? 
Or do we no longer have strength in our hands? 
0 look! 
They are leading your most beautiful ones to the tsar! 
Why are you silent? Is there no heart in your breast? 
0 youth! You are the beauty of our land! 
The time has come! Just listen to the thunder of the storm! 
To horse, then, and let your steel shine in the sun, 
Like a deadly scythe in your hands! 
The day of sharp suffering has dawned. . . . 
0 come you all! Close your ranks, my people! 
0 place no faith in cowards who speak sweetly to the foe. 
To arms! Our land is calling to us! 
0 my people! You are so strong, so proud, so much alive! 
0 listen to my battlecry, to my fiery call! 
You will be happy after bloody fight, 
After defeating the enemies of your liberty.^9 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Revolutionary Nationalism, 1917-1920 
The [Kazakhs] received the first revolution with joy and 
the second with consternation and terror. It is easy to 
understand why. The first revolution had liberated them from 
the oppression of the tsarist regime and reinforced their 
perennial dream of autonomy. . . . The second revolution was 
accompanied in the borderlands by violence, plundering, 
exactions and by the establishment of a dictatorial regime 
. . . in short, it was a period of sheer anarchy. In the past, 
a small group of tsarist bureaucrats oppressed the [Kazakhs]; 
today the same group of people, or others, who cloak themselves 
in the name of Bolsheviks perpetuate in the borderlands the 
same regime. . . . Only the politics of Kolchak which promised 
to return to the tsarist regime forced Alash Orda to turn 
itself toward the Soviet regime, even though, judging by the 
local Bolsheviks, it did not appear to be a very attractive 
alternative. 
—Baytursun, 19 19. 
Modern Kazakh nationalism peaked during the crisis of 1917-1920, 
when famine, anarcy, and civil war stalked Kazakhstan. The Kazakh masses 
struggled simply to survive the hunger. The traditional leadership had 
failed them in the 1916 uprising. The intellectual leaders, though not 
united, organized the only modern independent nation the Kazakhs would 
ever know, the Alash in 1917, but they could not defend it during the war 
years of 19 18-19. With no other choice, the nationalists submitted to 
the Communists in 1920. They hoped only to intermediate between that 
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brave new Russian world and the desperate Kazakh people. The dream of 
Qazaqjylyq was over. 
2 
Famine ruled the Steppe during the entire revolutionary era. The 
Kazakh nomads had always faced the calamities of dzhut and drought, but 
now they suffered the mass starvations of the modern age. Russian 
colonization had created great numbers of impoverished Kazakhs; then the 
stress of war-time exactions and the collapse of distribution systems in 
the empire during World War I had pushed them to the edge of disaster. 
The revolt of 19 16, which ruined the harvest of that year and prevented 
much of the nextfs, which created hundreds of thousands of refugees, and 
which caused the destruction of much livestock, led directly to the famine 
which lasted until 1923. The ravages of the Civil War, 1918-19, ensured 
that starvation oppressed the Kazakh masses during this critical time. 
The Kazakh intellectuals received word of the fall of the Empire in 
late February, 1917, with guarded optimism, while the educated youth were 
more enthusiastic. The influence of Tyouth groups1 among Kazakh students, 
especially in the northern (Russian) areas, grew ever more significant as 
their numbers grew and as they experienced the dramatic events from 1905 
on. The group "Birlik" ("Unity"), which formed in 19 15 in Omsk, was one 
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of the most important. It included both Seifullin and Togzhanov, later 
Communists, as well as other Kazakhs, who represented the more radical or 
class-conscious intellectuals. Another major group was "Jas Qazaq," or 
"Young Kazakh," in Uralsk, which was closely tied to the moderate Qazaq 
nationalists. The formation of some twenty such groups in early 1917 
indicates the fervor of the young intellectuals. 
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The leading Kazakh nationalists regarded the February revolution as 
the chance to return to the path of a federated Russian multinational 
state which the early Duma era had promised. However, the dominant 
issue for the Kazakh nation remained the land problem, which solution was 
necessary before they could hope to modernize the Kazakh herdsmen. The 
Provisional Government seemed more amenable to Kazakh concerns, but proved 
too weak to fulfill its potential. 
Its early actions were promising. The mobilization decree which had 
sparked the 19 16 revolt was rescinded March 9; Bukeykhanov was appointed 
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commissar of Turgay oblast, center of Kazakh resistance, on March 19. 
The Provisional Government declared general amnesty for the rebels, and 
ordered the return of over six million acres of nomad land seized but not 
distributed to Russians in Semirechye. However, the new Russian regime 
would not install Tanyshbayev as agriculture minister, which would have 
greatly increased Kazakh participation in solving the land problem.^ In 
early April, the Provisional Government created the Turkestan Committee 
to administer the southern oblasts, while the Steppe region was under 
direct central control (as in tsarist days). Its presidium of five 
Russians and four Moslems included both Bukeykhanov and Tanyshbayev. 
Finding itself impotent, this committee resigned in the summer.^ 
For the Kazakhs of Syr Darya and Semirechye, the situation in 
Turkestan was chaotic. The authority of the Provisional Government was 
minimal; many tsarist officials remained in charge until April, with old 
Kuropatkin himself only removed by arrest on March 31.^ The Russian 
workers and soldiers formed the Tashkent Soviet March 5-6, which held 
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the revolution was for Russians only, openly declaring itself anti-Moslem 
g 
at the Third Congress of Turkestan Soviets in mid-November, 19 17. The 
Moslems, meanwhile, also convened congresses in Tashkent, creating the 
Shura Islamiyeh or Moslem Central Council to represent the natives of 
9 
Turkestan. Chairman of the Council was Mustafa Chokay (1890-194 1), the 
brilliant young lawyer from the Kipchaks of Ak Mechet, Syr Darya.^ 
Chokay (Chokaev) had represented Kazakh interests while working for the 
Moslem fraction in the Fourth Duma, and he maintained contact with the 
Qazaq nationalists. Among his associates in the Council was Tanyshbayev, 
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representing Semirechye. 
In the Steppe itself, the Kazakhs held various councils and meetings 
in early and middle 19 17, wherein the nationalists, the clergy, and the 
elders sought common ground to unify the beleagured nation. The weakness 
of the Provisional Government was apparent, but the Kazakh leaders still 
placed their hope in a democratic, federated future. However, the Qazaq 
moderates were opposed both by southern, anti-Russian Kazakhs and by more 
radicalized, quasi-socialist educated youths. 
In mid-March, 1917, Kolbay Togusov of the Ush Zhuz held a meeting in 
Tashkent. By this time, Togusov had split with the anti-Russian southern 
Kazakhs, the meeting including Turar Ryskulov, already supporting the 
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Tashkent Soviet and soon to join the Communist Party. Two weeks later, 
Togusov had moved north to Kazalinsk, where he led a meeting of over 
5,000 Central Asian workers. 
A large conference held in Uralsk about this time exemplifies the 
13 
character of Kazakh nationalism in the early revolutionary months. The 
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attending clerics, who refused to allow women to be present and who 
protested the Western dress of the secular nationalists, joined with the 
conservative leadership to resist the proposals of the secularists. But 
though the Kazakh leadership continued to be divided, the very process of 
organizing meetings increased their political skills and maintained 
contact with the Kazakh masses. 
During March and April, the nationalist group centered about the 
14 
journal Qazaq created the political party called Alash Orda. The 
founders included Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, Dulatov, H. Dosmukhammedov, 
Tanyshbayev, 0. Omerov, and A. Zhuzhdybayev. At a major conference held 
in Turgay and at the so-called "Pan-Kirghiz Congress" in Orenburg, the 
moderate Alash Orda leaders limited their demands to the return of lands 
seized illegally, mandatory universal education, the use of the Kazakh 
language in schools and government, and limited self-government. They 
sought greater religious freedom; they also supported continuing Russia7s 
involvement in World War I, including renewing the labor mobilization. 
The nationalists were clearly opting to remain within the Russian state. 
In early May, the First Ail-Russian Moslem Congress was held in 
Moscow.^ Leading members of the Alash Orda attended, and Dosmukhammedov 
was elected to the executive all-Russian Moslem Council, the Milli Shura. 
The Congress had been convened on Tatar initiative with a goal being to 
create a pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic political movement in Russia. However, 
the Kazakhs maintained their antipathy to Tatar-led pan-Turkism, and the 
congress foundered on the question of whether the Moslems should seek a 
unitary state with cultural autonomy, or a federative state with full 
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territorial autonomy. The delegates voted for the latter, 460 to 27 1. 
Dosmukhammedov attacked the unitarian position and Tatar-dominated pan-
Turkism, expressing the Kazakh understanding of a unique nationalism: 
Do you have any idea what a nationality is? It is the 
unity of blood, spirit, culture, traditions, language, customs, 
and territory. You cannot create a 'Moslem1 nation on the basis 
of a non-territorial, centralized autonomy.^ 
Thereafter, the Kazakhs rejected the pan-Islamic, unitarian efforts 
of Russian Moslems to focus on strengthening Kazakh nationalism. In 
June, 19 17, two journals began which revealed the opposing currents of 
that nationalism. The first, Sary Arqa, which began in Semipalatinsk, 
was the paper of the Jas Qazaq group, and thus was an extension of 
Qazaq.^ ̂ These papers urged political autonomy for the Kazakhs, and 
carried the debate over its potential form: 
. . . if it is decided that autonomy is needed, what 
form is more acceptable to the Kazakhs; state autonomy or 
regional autonomy? If we come to a formula of regional 
autonomy what shall be its basis, territoriality or the 
peculiarities of culture (nationality)? Can the Kazakhs 
lay claim to an independent autonomy or establish it in 
unity with other peoples?^ 
The other journal, Birlik Tuuy ("Flag of Union"), was begun in 
Tashkent, and it represented the more radicalized, anti-Russian southern 
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Kazakhs. Its editor-in-chief was Mustafa Chokay, and its contributors 
included S. Khodzhanov and Dulatov of the Alash Orda. This paper was 
much more influenced by pan-Islam; its Turkestani proclivity was shown by 
its nickname, Kurama gazetasy, or "Half-breed," because its language was 
Kazakh thoroughly mixed with Uzbek. 
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The Second "Pan-Kirghiz" Congress was held in Orenburg July 21-28. 
It was led by Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, Dulatov, and Dosmukhammedov. It 
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reaffirmed and strengthened the resolutions of April, calling for the end 
of colonization and the return of seized but unused lands, mandatory 
education, the use of the Kazakh language, an independent Kazakh muftiate, 
and non-clerical courts. The rights of women were affirmed and the kalym 
abolished, indicating the decline both of traditional and Islamic custom 
was a goal of the secular nationalists who now led the intellectual elite. 
At this congress, Baytursun advocated complete independence, while 
Bukeykhanov argued for national autonomy within a democratic, federated 
Russian state. Bukeykhanovfs position dominated. The congress created 
the Alash Orda political party, and worked out the procedures for broad-
based representation for an all-union congress to be held in November, 
when the autonomous government would be proclaimed. The Kazakh moderates 
still sought only the economic and cultural protection of autonomy within 
the stronger, modernizing Russian state. Between July and November, a 
number of regional conferences supported the results of the Second 
Congress. In the Steppe, the majority of Kazakhs supported the Alash 
Orda. 
However, a congress of Syr Darya Kazakhs held in Tashkent in early 
August was much more radical. During the summer, the 1916 refugees began 
returning to Semirechye. A 'peasants' congress' in Vernyi in July had 
resolved to suppress the nomads, and Russian militias had engaged in such 
massacres that protest riots broke out in Tashkent in August. The 
Tashkent Kazakh congress called for protection of the Semirechye nomads, 
proposed greater autonomy than Alash Orda, and resolved that Birlik Tuuy 
become the official journal of the Kazakh nation (even as Qazaq had been 
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designated in April by the Alash Ordists). Responding to the Tashkent 
protests, the Provisional Government placed Semirechye under martial law 
in September and sent an investigating commitee. Like so much of its 
efforts, the Provisional Government's involvment consisted of promises it 
was unable to keep, due to the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution. 
The October revolution brought even greater chaos to Central Asia. 
The Russian colonists seized the Bolshevik platform of a proletariat 
dictatorship to justify complete suppression of the native efforts for 
autonomy. Because Central Asia lacked a native proletariat, only the 
Russians could lead the revolution, and only for Russian benefit. The 
Civil War which barred the European Bolsheviks from Central Asia gave the 
local Bolsheviks free rein. The result was an anarchic struggle between 
native autonomists such as the Alash Orda, rovi.ug White and Cossack 
armies, bands of peasant Greens, and Red troops made up both of settler 
militias and European Bolsheviks. 
The long-planned pre-congress planning sessions convened by the 
Alash Orda in Orenburg occurred only two weeks after the October 
revolution. The Tashkent Soviet had immediately overthrown the feeble 
Provisional administration. Bolsheviks seized control of the Orenburg 
Soviet. Whereas the Kazakh nationalists had been developing their 
program within the Russian federative context, the October revolution 
completely overturned that goal. The Kazakh leaders now faced the 
necessity of independence; the alternatives were alliance with the local 
Bolsheviks, their Russian tormentors in new clothes, or with the Whites, 
who sought to reestablish the system the Kazakhs had been fighting. 
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The mid-November conference in Orenburg was designed to organize the 
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framework of the crucial Third "Pan-Kirghiz" Congress set for December. 
The creation of an autonomous Kazakh government was necessary because of 
the vacuum of authority in the Steppe. The delegates from across 
Kazakhstan, whose familiarity with the Bolsheviks was as yet minimal, 
wished to create a "Kirghiz Provisional Government" which would be an 
autonomous republic within a democratic Russian federation. This Kazakh-
Kirghiz government would control internal affairs to protect the native 
nations, but would provide free speech and assembly for all. The state 
would manage political and criminal affairs, including an independent 
militia and graduated taxation; an Islamic clerical administration would 
control religious afffairs (including marriage). Universal education 
would be run by the state. Of course, the primary concern of the land 
problem was prominent: the conferees demanded the return of all lands 
seized by the Russians, as part of the priority to be given henceforth to 
the Kazakhs in the land issue. 
Latter November, 1917, witnessed a great deal of revolutionary 
activity in Central Asia. Togusov formed the Ush Zhuz political party 
in Omsk. By now the Ush Zhuz was still pan-Islamic but veering left to 
socialism, and eventually its members joined the Bolsheviks during 19 18-
19. The Ush Zhuz, arisen in anti-Russian Turkestan, had taken hold in 
the Russian-dominated northern towns; its combination of Islam and 
socialism was not unique in the Russian Moslem world during the 
revolutionary era, but it guaranteed that the Ush Zhuz would remain small 
and isolated from the traditional masses much more than the moderates. 
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The Ush Zhuz party was headquartered in Omsk, with Mikhay Aytpenev as 
president, and Togusov and Shakhmardan Elzhanov as vice-presidents. It 
included Shaimerdin Alimzhanov and formerBirlikers 1 ike -Seifullin. The 
Ush Zhuzists had participated in the "pan-Kirghiz" congresses and other 
meetings during 1917 and represented the leading opposition to the Alash 
Orda, which they regarded as too willing to collaborate with moderate and 
23 
conservative Russians. 
Also in late November, the Moslem nationalists of Turkestan held the 
"Fourth Extraordinary Regional Moslem Congress" in the ancient city of 
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Kokand. They declared the Moslem Provisional Autonomous Government of 
Turkestan, which news was wildly received by Tashkent's Moslems, where 
the Tahskent Soviet ruled. Two Kazakhs were named to head the Kokand 
government: Tanyshbayev, and in January, Chokay (due to the former's 
ill-fated attempt to float a loan to protect the fledgling regime). The 
fluid nature of the times is shown by Tanyshbayev's many roles as an 
appointee of the Russian Provisional Government, leading member of the 
Alash Orda, and first president of the Turkestan Autonomous Government. 
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The Third "pan-Kirghiz" Congress met December 5-13, 1917. The 
congress established the Kazakh-Kirghiz government, to be called Alash. 
The delegates, who represented all four Steppe oblasts, both Turkestan 
oblasts with Kazakh-Kirghiz populations, Samarkand, and the Altai, 
resolved that only a Kazakh-run government could effectively administer 
Kazakhstan in the crisis of anarchy and famine. The government of Alash 
Orda would control all "state land" and manage it for the best interests 
of all residents, with Kazakh needs to be first. Alash would encompass 
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the oblasts of Uralsk, Akmolinsk, Turgay, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, and 
Syr Darya, as well as the Kazakh regions of Transcaspia and the Kirghiz 
regions of Turkestan. The capital would be in Semipalatinsk. 
The congress declared that "Kirghizia" would be an autonomous 
republic within a federated Russian republic. The government would 
consist of an executive soviet (sic), as well as oblast committees. It 
would organize and maintain a Kazakh militia raised from each oblast and 
supported by central taxation. The government would tax and regulate 
fiscal affairs. It would also organize local elections to a constituent 
assembly, draft a constitution, and directly negotiate with its neighbors. 
The presidium of this congress was chaired by Kulmanov, and included 
Bukeykhanov, Dosmukhammedov, Azim Kenisarin, and 0. Karasy, with D. 
Galiev, Seid Kadirbayev, and Dulatov as secretaries. The government of 
Alash Orda was to be run by a provisional popular soviet with twenty-five 
members, of whom ten were to be non-Kazakh to ensure minority rights. The 
congress then came to the issue of declaring autonomy, and here developed 
a controversy which nearly broke up the conference. The majority of 
delegates wished to delay announcement until a militia could be formed 
and negotiations with the Syr Darya and Semirechye Kazakhs for annexation 
could be conducted. All the nationalists realized that, without military 
power, the Alash Orda was futile. But the minority, led by Bukeykhanov 
and including the Uralsk, Bukey Horde, and Syr Darya representatives, 
demanded immediate announcement. The factions compromised by delaying 
the actual inauguration of the autonomous government until January, and 
Bukeykhanov was elected chairman of the new government. For a moment, 
the dream of Qazaqjylyq seemed to be realized. 
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The Civil War began in earnest in early January, 19 18. The Tashkent 
Soviet sent Red troops which sacked Kokand in early February; thousands 
were killed and the Turkestan Autonomous Government was destroyed. Red 
troops seized much of northern and western Kazakhstan's major towns 
during January. The Cossack troops of the Ural, Irtysh, and Semirechye 
Hosts established "White Guard" counter-revolutionary armies to battle 
the Reds in northern, western, and southeastern Kazakhstan. The 
Czechoslovak Legion, tsarist POWs being shipped home, seized control of 
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The anti-Bolshevik Komuch government was 
created in Samara in June, and the All-Russian Directory in Omsk in 
September. Armies of Russian Reds, Whites, and Greens struggled against 
each other, while Kazakh and other Central Asian militias surged on the 
peripheries. The Kazakh masses, already hard-pressed merely to survive 
the famine, were forced to pay taxes and requisitions of food and clothing 
to whoever currently held sway in their region. During 1918, the fortunes 
of war favored the Whites (Dutov in Western Kazakhstan, Kolchak in 
Northern). But by 1919, the Bolsheviks were clearly in the ascendancy. 
During 1918, the influence of the Ush Zhuz group declined. However, 
the Kazakhs of Turgay, Uralsk, and Transcaspia who had played a major 
role in the 1916 revolt now rose up against the Whites and their allies. 
Dzhangildin, now a Bolshevik himself, was sent to the Steppe to agitate 
among the fiercely anti-Russian southwestern tribes, the Adai (Adaev) 
in particular, as well as the Bukey Horde intellectuals who had usually 
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resisted alliance with the Alash Orda nationalists. Like the Ush 
Zhuz, these intellectuals were not so much pro-Bolshevik as they were 
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anti-Alash Orda. During the critical years 1916 to 1920, the dynamic 
cleavages of the Kazakh intellectual elites meant that a great majority 
of Kazakhs supported the moderate or "bourgeoisie" Alash Orda, while small 
but significant minorities who opposed the Alash Orda for its upper-class 
leadership (Ush Zhuz), its compromise with Russian liberals over full 
independence (the southern Kazakhs), its individual leaders (the Bukey 
Horde intellectuals), and its role in the 19 16 revolt (the Turgay tribes), 
allied themselves with the Bolsheviks or otherwise refused cooperation. 
In early 19 18, the Alash Orda leaders sought to ally themselves with 
various neighboring groups. Initial contacts with the Kokand Government, 
itself run by Alash Orda Kazakhs, were aborted by the vicious February 
massacre (which Chokay escaped). The Turkestan Bolsheviks and the 
Semirechye peasants were violently anti-native and anti-nomad. The 
Cossacks had long been the neighbors of the Kazakhs, but the suppression 
of the 1916 uprising was too recent. Thus, in March, 1918, in response 
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to an invitation from Moscow, the Alash Orda met with Lenin. 
The Bolshevik nationality policy has been thoroughly examined 
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elsewhere. In practical terms, the policy during the Civil War was 
designed to entice the regional native autonomists to ally with the 
Bolsheviks, promising national "self-determination" in contrast to the 
reactionary Whites. The Commissariat for Nationalities1 Affairs, or 
Narkomnats, was created in November, 1917, with Stalin as head. It 
sent Dzhangildin to organize western Kazakhstan, forming a special 
"Kirghiz" bureau in May. In December, 1917, Lenin and Stalin had 
issued the famous Appeal to Moslems. Although the Alash Orda rejected 
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the Bolsheviks for usurping the Provisional Government, in early 19 18, 
the Kazakh nationalists recognized the precariousness of their situation. 
Halel Dosmukhammedov and his brother, Muhammadjan, Alash Orda 
leaders of Uralsk, were dispatched to Moscow in March, 19 18, to confer 
with Bolshevik leaders. They were promised that the Bolsheviks adhered 
to national self-determination and that Kazakh autonomy was achievable 
under Communist rule. Halel Gabbasov, one of the top Alash leaders, went 
to Moscow in mid-April to meet Stalin. Gabbasov broke off the talks 
shortly, however, and returned to Kazakhstan rejecting Bolshevik rule. 
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By May, the Alash Orda was firmly anti^Bolshevik. By this time, the 
Bolsheviks had instituted mass conscription and their nationalization 
decrees, both of which caused great hostility among the Central Asians 
and cemented their opposition to the Communist regime. 
In May, the so-called White Congress witnessed formal military 
alliance between the Ural Cossacks and the Alash Orda; on May 18, the 
first Kazakh militia fought along side the Semipalatinsk Cossacks; by 
June, Cossack-trained Kazakh units were fighting in Semipalatinsk, 
Akmolinsk, Semirechye, and Turgay (Uralsk being firmly in Red hands); 
in early August, a formal military alliance was created by Bukeykhanov 
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and Dutov. 
The great vastness of Kazakhstan hindered Alash Orda communications 
from the start, so that in practical terms the Kazakh government had two 
foci, the "Alash Orda center" in Semipalatinsk, under Bukeykhanov, and 
the "Alash Orda West," located in the Uralsk town of Dzhambeity, which was 
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under Halel Dosmukhammedov. Thus, during the Civil War, the central (or 
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Eastern) Alash Orda allied itself with the Siberian government in Omsk, 
while the Western cooperated with the Ural Cossacks and the Komuch 
government. The Alash Orda was forced to ally with the Whites despite 
their blatant rejection of autonomy for non-Russians. 
In September, 19 18, the Alash Orda joined with the Komuch and other 
regional governments in a conference in Ufa to form an anti-Bolshevik 
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provisional government. The conference formulated a future federative 
Russian republic composed of autonomous regions, and rejected the 
Bolshevik regime. The delegates elected a presidium of twenty, with 
six Turkic leaders among them, including Chokay (representing Turkestan) 
and Dosmukhammedov (Alash Orda West). The declaration was eventually 
signed by Kazakh, Bashkir, and Tatar leaders. Kazakh signatories were 
Bukeykhanov, Chokay, A. Alimbekov, G. Alibekov, Beremzhanov, and 
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Baytursun. Although the Komuch failed, the following speech by 
Bukeykhanov indicates how the moderate Alash Ordists still hoped to 
create a federative Russian republic: 
Citizens! I have been sent here by the Moslem members of 
the Consituent Assembly, by the governments of the autonomous 
regions of Turkestan, Bashkurdistan, Alash-Orda, and by the 
National Administration of Turko-Tata.rs of the Interior of 
Russia and Siberia. 
Until the February Revolution, Russia was an autocracy. 
The February Revolution promised to give us a government by 
the people . . . and to realize the age-old ideals of the 
Russian intelligentsia. The non-Russian peoples of old 
autocratic Russia joined the democratic part of Russia, 
republican Russia, in the hope that the All-Russian Constituent 
Assembly would establish popular government . . ., but our 
hopes . . . were defeated. Power was seized by demogogues who 
wished to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat . . . 
[but actually] introduced a reign of anarchy, disruption, and 
the absence of all government. It was under such conditions 
that regional governments began to appear. These governments 
were absolutely necessary; without them it would have been 
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impossible to govern the region liberated from the Bolsheviks. 
There are those who ascribe the organization of regional 
governments to separatism, but they are wrong. The organizations 
in the name of which I now speak do not adhere to the separatist 
point of view. They consider themselves to be parts of an 
undivided Russia and believe that the autonomous regions could 
have played no role in the concert of Powers had they formed 
independent states. We are at one with a democratic federated 
Russian republic . . . and shall go hand in hand with the 
Russian people to create a great and happy Russia.^5 
Despite such expressions of fealty, the Alash Orda was not treated 
as an equal partner by the Siberian anti-Bolshevik government in Omsk. 
The growing disarray among the anti-Bolshevik forces had led Admiral 
Kolchak to overthrow the Directory in November, 1918. The White leaders 
regarded the national autonomists as distractions in their goal to revive 
the Empire. On Nov. 4, the Kolchak government ordered the suppression 
of Alash Orda and commanded its militia units to subordinate themselves 
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to the White Guards. The increasing hostility of the Whites to the 
nationalists led to the situation described by Baytursun in the quote 
at the beginning of this chapter. By late 1918 and during early 1919, 
the Kazakh nationalists, witnessing the military decline of the Whites, 
had turned again towards compromise with the Bolsheviks. 
The height of the Alash Orda government, then, was 1918. Soviet 
historiography has long vilified the Alash Orda group as reactionary 
feudal-patriarchs and bourgeois nationalists* and documentary materials 
are virtually unavailable. Olcott, who had access to some archival 
Alash materials, provides the details of three Alash Orda government 
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sessions in 1918. 
The session of June 11-24 was concerned primarily with the land 
question; it issued the Statute "On Provisional Land Utilization on the 
Territory of the Autonomous Alash." All Kaazkh lands that had been 
seized for Russian colonization but not allotted were to be returned to 
the original owners; disputes over land between Kazakhs would be settled 
by aksakals, between Kazakhs and Russians by elected zemstvo committees. 
Both Russians and Kazakhs who lost lands were to receive compensation 
from the government. It declared private ownership of land but state 
control of water resources, it urge. This session also nullified all 
Soviet decrees and stipulated treason trials for Kazakh Bolsheviks. 
The session of July 24, 19 18, concentrated on regularizing local 
government (with uezd soviets), forming the militias (thirty horsemen 
per volost), and taxation. Some indication of the support of the Kazakh 
masses for the Alash Orda is revealed by the 3 million rubles which Alash 
Orda collected in Akmolinsk alone, in 1918. The class differences of 
Kazakh leaders emerged in the political battle between G. Alibekov and 
Dosmukhammedov over graduated versus flat tazation. Dosmukhammedov y/as 
the victor (each Kazakh household was to pay a flat 100 rubles per year); 
thereupon, Alibekov and his group, called Ak Zhol (White Road), left the 
Alash Orda to join the Bolsheviks. 
The session of September 11, meeting in Ufa, formally recognized the 
East-West split of the Alash government. The Alash Orda West was to be 
led by the Dosmukhammedovs, Kulmanov, Turmuhammadov, and two Russians; 
its sphere was Uralsk, Turgai, the Bukey Horde, Mangyshlak (northern 
Transcaspia), and Aktyubinsk. The central Alash Orda would retain basic 
control. 
In December, 1918, disaffection for the Whites permeated the Kazakh 
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leadership and ranks. The Alash Orda West had to suppress a pro-Bolshevik 
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protest on Dec. 7. At the same time, the Bashkir nationalists led by 
Vakhitov were abandoning Kolchak, and they met with Alash Ordists to 
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discuss joining the Bolsheviks. The willingness of the Kazakhs to 
go over to the Reds by middle 19 19 contrasts with the situation a year 
earlier: in March, 19 18, Dzhangildin had convened a "Turgay Congress of 
Soviets" at which only one (then, three) of the delegates was a 
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Bolshevik. 
In January, 19 19, General M. V. Frunze, commander of the Red armies 
of the Eastern Front, called on the Kazakh nationalists to join the 
4 1 
Bolsheviks, and he promised a general amnesty. In February, the 
Bashkir nationalists had gone over to the Communists, and their troops 
were taken into the Red Army. Dzhangildin managed to convene a meeting 
with an Alash Orda delegation in March; using the Bashkir example, he 
managed to convince Baytursun himself that by joining the Bolsheviks, the 
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Alash Orda would be serving the best interests of the desperate Kazakhs. 
On March 22, Dzhangildin telegraphed Moscow: "Unification is now 
completed of all the laboring Kirghiz [Kazakh] people under the Red 
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banner of the worker-peasant government." 
In June, Baytursun met with Lenin, Stalin, and Dzhangildin in 
Moscow. As a result of their discussions, Lenin signed the order creating 
44 
the "Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee," or Kirrevkom, on July 10. This 
embryonic Soviet Kazakh government was chaired by the Russian S. 
Pestkowski, with principal Russian member S. Dimanshtein, ally of Stalin 
on the Narkomnats; Kazakh members, though actually mere figureheads, 
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included Dzhangildin as well as Seitkali Mendeshev (Mindash-uli), A. 
Aitiev, A. Kulatov, and A. Adveev. The authority of Kirrevkom held 
only in the so-called Inner Side (Bukey Horde), though it claimed to 
control the entire Steppe region. The creation of Kirrevkom in mid-
1919 signalled the end of Alash Orda. 
The rapid retreat of White forces in latter 1919 allowed the direct 
intervention of Moscow in Central Asia for the first time in two years. 
The so-called Turkestan Commission (Turkkomissiya), created in October, 
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reached Tashkent in November. Composed of Bolshevik Russians like 
Frunze, V. Kuibyshev, la. Rudzutak, and F. Goloshchekin, the Turkkomissiya 
included the Kazakh Communist Turar Ryskulov, who was head of the Musburo 
or Moslem Bureau. Ryskulov's role in the struggle of the Turkestanis to 
create a Turkic Communist Party and Turkestan Soviet Republic is properly 
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outside the scope of the purely Kazakh nationalism of Qazaqjylyq. 
However, Ryskulov was one of the most important Kazakhs of the entire 
revolutionary era, and his contribution to the development of "Moslem 
National Communism" was significant in both Communist and Third-World 
history. Regarding the Alash Orda nationalists, Ryskulov represented 
those southern Kazakhs who were both pan-Turkic and socially radicalized. 
By late 1919, the Red forces were mopping up resistance in Siberia 
and the Steppe; the last battles for Semirechye were won by early 1920. 
The Alash Orda government, always thinly-spread and never well-defended, 
more or less disintegrated. The journal Qazaq had disappeared in 19 18, 
its Orenburg presses destroyed; Sary Arqa, which had carried on for 
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Qazaq, also was discontinued. Most of the nationalist writers 
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joined the staffs of various early Bolshevik papers, such as Durystyk 
zholy (Path of Truth, Urda), Ushqyn (The Spark, Orenburg), Qazaq tili 
(Kazakh Word, Semipalatinsk), and Izvestiia Kirgizskogo kraia (News of 
the Kirghiz Region). The last anti-Bolshevik Kazakh nationalist paper 
was Qazaq sozu (Voice of the Kazakhs), by A. Bulatov, which began in 
Semipalatinsk and moved eastward with KolchakTs retreat, from September 
1919. 
By the fall of 1919, the Communists were sufficiently certain of 
their hold on Kazakhstan to convene a Kirrevkom conference to prepare 
for a constituent congress of Kazakh soviets. The Bolsheviks sought to 
deny suffrage to all clergy, former tsarist and Alash officials, bais, 
and village elders. Baytursunov was able to battle this plan, which he 
declared amounted to "depriving the Kazakh people of its representation, 
and suspension of its rights to express its own will through its most 
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capable representatives. 
The majority of Alash Ordists crossed to the Communist side in late 
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1919 and early 1920. The Military Revolutionary Soviet (Revvoensovet) 
declared a general amnesty for Alash Orda on November 5, and the Alash 
leaders formally recognized the Communist Party on November 10. A 
conference between the Alash Orda and Revvoensovet took place December 
10-24 in Orenburg, during which the Kazakh nationalists negotiated their 
surrender to the Communists. 
The Alash Orda officially ended at the second conference, held 
January 11-20.^ Kirrevkom liquidated the Alash and disbanded its 
militia. Baytursun was placed on the committee, while Tanyshbayev was 
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made commissar of Semirechye, and Bukeykhanov of Turgay. The apparent 
harmony of this momentous change, however, was disturbed by Pestkowski's 
insistence on Russian domination and his antagonism to the nationalists-
turned-Communists. Baytursun, along with the former Social Democrat 
Sedelnikov, a Russian, sought to create a locally-controlled Communist 
apparatus in Central Asia, to "give effective and real guarantee for the 
self-determination of the peoples of the Kazakh, Bashkir, and Turkestan 
autonomous republics.* Baytursun and Sedelnikov carried their arguments 
with Kirrevkom all the way to Lenin, with secret telegrams and personal 
visits, in the spring of 1920. Although their efforts failed, they 
ecouraged the young Kazakh Communists with their example; as a Kazakh 
Orgburo (Organizational Bureau) report stated, "Sedelnikov has become the 
leader of Kazakh nationalism and is conducting an open chauvinistic fight 
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against Communism. 
During the spring and summer, while the nationalists discovered what 
their role in the Communist government was to be, leading Kazakh, Bashkir, 
Tatar, and Turkestani nationalists may have met clandestinely to form the 
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secret organization Ittihad ve Taraqqi (Union and Progress). Although 
very little is known of this group, which could be a Soviet fabrication, 
it apparently sought to maintain an anti-Russian, anti-Communist movement 
alive within the Party itself. Baytursun and Bukeykhanov were reputed 
members, as well as Ryskulov. 
On August 26, 1920, the "Kirghiz" Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
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Republic was formed, within the RSFSR. At this time, Baytursun and 
Sedelnikov were removed from Kirrevkom. The capital was Orenburg, and 
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the KASSR included the former tsarist regions of Uralsk, Turgay, the Inner 
Side (Bokey Horde), Mangyshlak, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk. Although 
the Kazakhs of Syr Darya and Semirechye agitated for inclusion in the 
new autonomous republic, they remained part of the Turkestan SSR (created 
in April, 1920). 
The last major role of Alash Orda occurred at the constituent 
assembly which met in Orenburg on October 4-12, 1920."^ Over 700 
delegates participated, with some 270 eligible to vote (including 197 
Communists). The Turgay and Uralsk representatives were strongly 
Communist, recalling the roles of Amangeldy and Dzhangildin, and formed 
over half the delegation. The other half grouped around the Alash Orda 
leaders Baytursun and Bukeykhanov. The congress banned further Russian 
colonization, it elected a central committee and Council of People's 
Commissars, and it published the manifesto of the Kazakh constitution, 
"Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring Kirghiz (Kazakh) Autonomous 
Republic." By this time, the Kazakh nationalists were all too aware 
that their position was precarious. However, they had joined the new 
regime out of the deep desire to protect the Kazakh people as best they 
could, and despite their failure to create a true autonomous republic, 
they did not abandon working for the Kazakh cause from within the system. 
A delegate to the constituent congress, A. Nakhimjan, one of the 
young new Kazakh Communists, recalls the words of Togzhanov, quoted 
earlier, when he described the assembly in his memoirs thusly: 
We came to the first all-Kirghiz (Kazakh) congress . . . 
united with the Alash Orda intellectuals, many of whom, under 
Baytursunov, were delegates. Hence, it is not surprising that 
we joined the [Communist] party still dominated by an Alash 
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Orda ideology . . . Before going to the [Communist] faction's 
conference, we usually received directions from our Alash Orda 
leaders, and after the faction gathering we would report what 
had happened at the meeting of RKP(b).^" 
The Kazakh nationalists between 19 17 and 1920 were thrust too 
quickly into the revolutionary world, while the Kazakh people were too 
desperate to survive the great famine to participate in determining 
their own future. The Alash Orda moderates had struggled to conceptualize 
and formalize the first modern Kazakh national government, and they 
succeeded much better than one might have supposed beforehand. A nation-
state is created not just by intellectuals, however, and the twin hammer-
blows of the 1916 uprising and the great famine deprived them of the full 
support of the several million Kazakhs they represented. The dream of 
Qazaqjylyq had required adequate time and education, as well as full 
bellies the Kazakhs needed full minds. Anything was possible, in the 
revolutionary flush of 19 17; it seemed probable, in the days of 1918 
when the Alash Orda ran the country; but it faded with the military 
decline of 1919, and by 1920, it was a half-forgotten dream amidst the 
sad, grim necessity of submitting, yet again, to the Russian masters. 
CONCLUSION 
Settlement is collectivization. Settlement is the 
liquidation of the bai semi-feudals. Settlement is the 
destruction of tribal attitudes . . . Settlement is 
simultaneously the question of socialist construction and 
the approach of socialism, of the socialist reconstruction 
of the Kazakh mass without divisions by nationality under 
the leadership of the vanguard of the proletariat and the 
Communist party. , 
—Goloshchekin, 1932. 
Those who used to be slaves and serfs, 
Have now been made heroes by the Turksib 
[Turkestan-Siberian Railroad]. 
The simple shepherd, tempered by work, 
Has now become dispatcher of the train, 
And thus gained batyr-like power. 
He used to herd the sheep, and beat them 
with the whip, 
But now with steady hand, 
He draws the diagram of railroad traffic. ^ 
—Anonymous, c. 1930. 
Modern Kazakh nationalism blossomed and withered in one generation. 
The Kazakh intellectual nationalists arose from the modernization of 
Kazakhstan under Russian rule, they matured swiftly under difficult 
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conditions, and they were destroyed by the Sovietization of Kazakhstan. 
Nearly every single significant Kazakh nationalist and most of the early 
Kazakh Communists were purged from the mid-1920s to 1938. In the same 
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period, the regime destroyed the Kazakh traditional elite with a series 
of "reforms" intended as a cultural revolution. Finally, just as the 
Kazakh people were recovering from a decade of famine, civil war, and 
desperation, with a resurgence of (at least partial) nomadism, the 
Soviets collectivized them with a tremendous toll of Kazakh life. By 
1938, the Kazakh nation had been broken on the Soviet Unionfs wheel of 
modernizat ion. 
When the Communist Party created the "Kirghiz" ASSR in 1920, they 
made Orenburg the capital. By 1924, the republic had incorporated Syr 
Darya and Semirechye, and the capital was moved to Kzyl-Orda ("Red 
Horde;" formerly Perovsk); Orenburg and Omsk were transferred to the 
RSFSR. In April, 1925, the First Kazakh Congress of Soviets officially 
changed the designation "Kirghiz" to "Kazakh;" for the first time in 
their Russian history, the Kazakhs could use their own name. In mid-
1929, Alma Ata (formerly Vernyi, in Semirechye) became the capital of ,/ 
Kazakhstan. Finally, with the "Stalin constitution" of 1936, Kazakhstan 
was elevated to full republic status, becoming the second largest SSR in 
the Soviet Union. 
During this period, the Alash Orda nationalists struggled within the 
Party and state organizations to preserve Kazakh culture. The famine was 
exceptionally severe in 192 1 in Kazakhstan, where an estimated one million 
people starved to death; hundreds of thousands of destitute Kazakhs lined 
railways hoping for food-aid, while the estimated herd-size in 1923 was 
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only one-third of the pre-19 16 level. The regime had no choice but to 
allow the New Economic Policy in Kazakhstan, given its dire condition, 
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while the (ex-)nationalists had to accommodate the Party's control to 
ensure as much aid was given the people as could be. The masses, of 
course, could hardly resist or participate in any way with the changes. 
In the early 1920s, the government instituted a series of land-
reforms that redistributed over one million acres in southern Kazakhstan; 
however, the Kazakh nationalists suffered a bitter defeat when Lenin 
backed the Russian Communists in not allowing the return of lands seized 
before 1918. In mid-1921, the Party purged many ex-Alash Ordists, though 
their leaders remained, isolated; in early 1922, Baytursun was dismissed 
from his post as minister of education (recalling his trouble as a teacher 
in the tsarist era). Within the Communist party, the pro-nationalists 
('rights*) and the 'lefts' debated the role of the Alash Ordists; by 
1923, they were disgraced, and their opposition to Soviet policies was 
labelled "national deviationism." By 1926, all the Alash Ordists were 
removed from government and party; Bukeykhanov was publicly condemned at 
this time.^ At the same time, however, the Soviets implemented their 
"nativization" policy (korenizatsiia) to greatly increase the role of 
Kazakhs in the Party and state. 
In the mid-1920s, the economic situation of the Kazakh masses slowly 
recovered, so that their herds had returned to prewar levels by 1927. 
The unforeseen result of this recovery was the resurgence of the Kazakh 
traditional leadership (mullahs, bais, aksakals) to authority among the 
masses. The first Soviet elections in Kazakhstan, in early 1921, and 
despite disenfranchisement of the "ruling class," the Party suffered 
humiliation as the Kazakhs placed their non-Communist traditional leaders 
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over the Communist candidates. The results of the 1925-26 elections were 
even worse (88% of those elected being herders or farmers, not poor). By 
1927, rather than improved, the situation was worse, so that the elections 
of T28 were postponed; and a popular slogan of the 1930 campaigns was 
"Soviets without Communists."^ Clearly, the traditional leaders were 
challenging the regime. 
The atomization of Kazakh society in the early 1900s, with the 
breakdown of larger Kazakh authority and the growth of "aul-communes" 
that were small groups much more associational than consanguineal, had 
promoted the local leader to great importance. With the recovery of 
Kazakh nomadic herding, the traditional leaders were the primary 
obstacle to Soviet control of the common Kazakh. Therefore, the regime 
launched various confiscation, education, and cultural campaigns 
designed to eliminate traditional authority. The Koshchi (Poorman) 
Union was created, Red Caravans and Red Yurts travelled the Steppe with 
teachers and doctors, a mass literacy campaign was begun, and several 
waves of livestock-confiscations emanated. Perhaps the least-known but 
most wrenching Soviet effort was the so-called khudzhum ("assault, storm") 
of the late f20s; this Soviet effort to crash-emancipate Central Asian 
Moslem women created a tremendous Islamic male backlash that resulted in 
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the killing of thousands of women and their male supporters. Though 
many individuals suffered, these campaigns all failed to liquidate the 
traditional leadership (e.g., the Koshchi Union was controlled by local 
leaders, becoming in effect anti-Communist; and the repeated waves of 
purges of Kazakhs in the Party showed how the traditionals were even 
becoming "Communist" to preserve their authority^). Even the policy of 
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"Sovietization of the Kazakh Aul," a unique Soviet effort to substitute 
loyalty to the regime for loyalty to the aul, failed, though in its 
development, the Party debated and rejected the Kazakh argument (by 
both right and left) that Kazakh nomadism was different from settled 
agriculture and ought to be treated as such.*^ 
Ultimately, the Soviets were only able to eliminate the traditional 
leaders by destroying their very society. The rejection of the unicity of 
Kazakh culture was ominous. In 1929, the collectivization of Kazakhstan 
was begun. Of all the tragedies of Kazakh history, this is the most 
awful. Simple statistics overwhelm. Over one million Kazakhs died—in a 
population of perhaps four million. Having barely recovered by the late 
T20s, Kazakh nomadic socio-economy was shattered; the traditional elites 
and the stubborn masses were broken. 
The details of the collectivization drive of 1929-38 in Kazakhstan 
are related at length by Olcott and Robert Conquest, as well as many 
others.** The following facts are provided only to dramatize that story. 
The Soviets had undertaken numerous livestock, grain, and other 
requisitions and confiscations from early 1918 onward. The Kazakh herdsmen 
therefore responded immediately and drastically to the last, greatest 
assault. The Kazakhs were rounded up and compressed, herds and all, into 
hastily-erected collectives in the Steppe. Rapidly, the overcrowded 
animals perished as the scanty pasturage disappeared. The Kazakhs lived 
—and died—by the fate of their herds. Those who resisted—and such 
resistance was widespread, violent, and organized—were killed. Special 
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OGPU/NKVD forces operated in the Steppe as late as 1938. 
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The Kazakhs fled in vast numbers, tens to hundreds of thousands to 
China and Turkestan; many perished of hardship. Kazakh herdsmen 
slaughtered their animals wholesale to keep them from the confiscators 
and collective camps. Considering the special, loving relationship 
between the Kazakh people and their animals, one can only imagine the 
suffering this caused them. By 1930 only, one-third of the Kazakh herds 
had been killed (meaning ten million sheep, over two million cattle); 
though the slaughtering abated after 1932, herd size did not recover until 
the 1960s. The number of Kazakh households fell from over 1,200,000 in 
1929 to 565,000 in 1936; 400,000 households were settled from 1930 to 
1937 (the remainder were wholly nomadic families wandering the central 
Kazakh Steppe); the seven-year age group was but 40% in size of the 
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11-year olds, and could have been 160% without this tragedy. Of those 
Kazakhs who were "settled" by 1933, over 100,000 were otkochevniki, 
"former nomads" who had fled the collectives to wander the Steppe in 
utter destitution; this return of Kazakhs to the Steppe to escape 
civilization recalls the very origins of the Kazakhs as "free riders of 
the Steppe"—and they can be regarded as the ironic end of Qazaqjylyq. 
The period 1928-1938 encompassed the destruction of the Kazakh 
masses, the traditional leadership, and the nationalists. Whereas 
collectivization itself physically liquidated the former two, the latter 
were destroyed in a series of purges, especially in the years 1928, 
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1932, and 1937-38. The failures of the f20s campaigns and the 
persistence of Kazakh nomadism, as well as Stalin's attacks on "national 
deviationists" and especially on Moslem national Communism, provided 
the regime with the excuse to eliminate the nationalists once and for all. 
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The following list of executed Kazakh leaders is merely partial, to 
provide the end of the story of their lives and struggle: Ahmed 
Baytursun, killed in 1937 (aged 64); Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, 1932 (63); 
Mir Jaqib Dulatov, 1937 (52); Turar Ryskulov, 1937 (43); Saken Seifullin, 
1939 (45); Magzhan Zhumabayev, 1937 (43). Hundreds of others, the first 
Kazakh Bolsheviks and earliest Communist cadres, were purged during this 
period also. Thus, by 1939, the Soviet regime had thoroughly crushed all 
Kazakh opposition—Kazakh herdsmen, aksakals, and nationalists all met 
the same violent fate. 
Modern Kazakh nationalism was the development of Kazakh nomad 
nationalism under the influence of modernization. The "free riders of the 
Steppe" from beginning to end, traditional or modern, clerical or secular, 
northern or southern, moderate or radical, always identified themselves as 
a proud, unique nation. The nature of Kazakh nationalism is constant; 
only its manifestation is transitory. Kazakh nomadism itself has 
survived in the so-called "roving economy" (otgon or otgonnoye 
zhivotnovodstvo), though no longer, of course, free.*^ And recent unrest 
in Kazakhstan (student riots in 1987 in Alma Ata, anti-minority violence 
in 1989 in Mangyshlak) indicate that nationalism still exists also. 
Kazakh history is symbolic of the history of pastoral nomadism in 
the modern world. The inexorable mutation of society by modernization, 
in the case of the Kazakhs, has meant denomadization but not annihilation. 
The dream of Qazaqjylyq goes on. 
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"The Steppe is cruel, and Heaven is far." 
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THE KAZAKH KHANATE 
1468-80 Janibek (son of Barak, Uzbek Khan) 
1480-88 Kirai (brother of Janibek): first elected Khan 
1488-1511 Buyunduk (son of Kirai) 
1511-23 Qasym (greatest Khan) 
1523-33 Tahir (QasymTs nephew) 
1533-38 Buidashe 
1538-80 Haq Nazar (son of Qasym): formation of Three Zhuzes (Hordes) 
1580-82 Shigai (Tahir's nephew) 
1586-98 Taulkel (son of Shigai) 
1598-1628 Esim 
1643-80 (?) Jangir (Esim's son) 
1680-17 11 Tauke (JangirTs son): codified Kazakh law (Jhety Jharga) 
1718-49 Abulkhair (Abu! 1 Khayr): Middle and Little Hordes only 
1723 aqtaban shubirindi 
1731 AbulkhairTs oath to Russian tsar: end of independent Khanate 
1732 Middle HordeTs Semeke1s oath to tsar 
1740-81 Sultan Ablai (Middle Horde): last great Kazakh Khan 
1740 Ablai's oath to tsar (resurgent Dzhungar threat) 
1756/59 Great Horde claimed by Manchu China (occupying Dzhungaria) 
1801 Bukey or Inner Horde created by Tsar Paul 
1808 Kokand conquers Tashkent and western Great Horde 
1818, 1824, 1847 remaining Great Horde leaders' oaths to tsar 
1822 Middle Horde Khanate abolished 
1824 Little Horde Khanate abolished 
1837-48 Kenesary Kasymov's revolt: last pan-Khanate independence revolt 
1845 Inner Horde Khanate abolished 
1848 Great Horde Khanate abolished 
1865 Russian conquest of Tashkent: Russian rule of all Kazakhs 
1868-70 last 19th-century Kazakh mass uprisings, against Steppe Statute 
Figure 4. 
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TROITSK , PETROPAVLOVSK 
Kokchetav 
URALSK, I KUSTANAY Pavlodar 
SEMIPALATINSK Dzhambeity © 
Lbishchensk 
AKTYUBINSK AKMOLINSK 
UST-KAMENOGORSK 
Turgay, 
Temirsk/ Karkaralinsk 
GURYEV 
Lepsinsk/ 
\ \v O /K 
KAZALINSK 
Kopal 
DZHARKENT 
VERNYI PEROVSK 
TURKESTAN ®. 
AULIE-ATA 
PISHPEK \ ftO-ul;.., 
CHIMKENT 
KHIVA 
POPULATION CENTERS, 1911 
loFTsiD . . . 100,000+ 
VERNYI . . 30,000-100,000 
AKMOLINSK . . 10,000-30,000 
Atbasar . . . >10,000 
OK AND 
POPULATION STATISTICS FOR TSARIST KAZAKHSTAN, 1897-1916* 
Total Kazakhs Russians Total 
1897 J,312 W~ I7TZ5 
T955 3,564 987 5,000 
TjfiS 3,768 1,868 6,471 
Steppe Oblasts 
1,903 493 2,467 
2,074 844 2,978 
2,179 1,548 4,206 
Ural'sk Oblast 
4S0 TS4 S46 
477 268 769 
480 278 854 
Syr Darya Obi. 
742 21 836 
790? 23? 880? 
846? 25? 1,166 
By Uezch Ural' sk 
Kazakhs Russians 
1897 151 125 
191(3 77 165 
Irglz 
97 1 
117 3 
Atbasar 
75 
104 
11 
58 
Lepsinak 
156 22 
139 78 
Lbishchensk 
144 
133 
22;: 
70 
Turgay 
86 1 
110 2 
Pavlodar 
143 
162 
U 
93 
Kopal 
126 9 
172 41 
Gur'yev 
15 
26 
71 
124 
Omsk 
38 
39 
55 
176 
82 
87 
6 
16 
Turgai Oblast 
411 35 454 
440 120 567 
507 305 856 
Semirechye Obi, 
657 82 84? 
700? 120? 880? 
743 295 1,099 
Akmolinsk Obi, 
427 22S 582 
488 374 880 
527 765 1,567 
Semipalatinsk Obi, 
605 58 585" 
82 762 
200 929 
669 
665 
Temir 
94 
146 
1 
17 
Semipalatinsk 
122 27 
112 34 
Dzharkent 
Petropavlovsk 
69 77 
108 169 
Ust1-
Kamengorsk 
81 21 
100 52 
Vernyi 
151 35 
176 76 
Kustanay 
118 29 
154 200 
Kokchetav 
79 
97 
68 
255 
Zaisan 
89 
100 
5 
17 
Piahpek 
152 12 
169 84 
Aktyubinsk 
110 4 
126 100 
Akmolinsk 
166 15 
179 107 
Karkaralinsk 
170 
191 
Aulie-Ata 
251 11 
286? ? 
Chimkent 
225 
257? 
Perovsk 
130 1 
148? ? 
Kazalinsk 
136 
155 
Total Kazakhs in Russia or USSR 
1897: 3.8 million 
1911: 4.0 11 
1926: 4.0 " 
1939: 
1959: 
1970: 
1979: 
3.1 million 
3.6 » 
5.2 » 
6.6 " 
*Based on Demko, Russian Colonization, & Krader, Peoples (statistics passim). The statistics do not include 
Kazakhs of Astrakhan, Transcaspia, Orenburg, Siberia, or China, Semirechye stats, exclude Przhevalsk 
uezd: Syr Darya excludes Tashkent & Petro-Alexandrovsk uezds. All numbers in thousands. Totals include 
Kazakhs, Russians (incl, Ukrainians & Byelorussians), and "others" (Dungans, Uzbeks, Jews, Tatars, etc,) 
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Main areas of revolt 
Lesser Disturbances 
Figure 10. 
AHMED BAYTURSUN 
TURAR RYSKULOV 
MIR JAQIB DULATOV 
MUSTAFA CHOKAY 
Figure II PORTRAITS 
134 
, ' 
P i 
. > 
i . ' •' •'• ••>• 
ALI KHAN NURMAGOMET-ULI BUKEYKHANOV 
(1869-1932) 
135 
NOTES 
136 
NOTES 
Introduct ion 
1. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "The History 
of the Kazakh Press, 1900-1920," Central Asian Review 14, 2 (1966): 161; 
Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Studies of Nationalities in the USSR 
Series, Hoover Press Publication 338 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
Stanford University, 1987), p. 255, 
Chapter One: The Free Horsemen of the Steppe 
1. Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 20. 
2. The main sources on pastoral nomadism are: Elizabeth E. Bacon, 
"Types of Pastoral Nomadism in Central and Southwest Asia," Southwestern 
Journal of Anthropology 10 (1954): 44-68; Leslie Dienes, "Pasturalism in 
Turkestan: Its Decline and Its Persistence," Soviet Studies 27, 3 (July 
1975): 343-65; Alfred E. Hudson, Kazak Social Structure (New Haven, CN: 
Yale University Press, 1938); A. M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Lawrence Krader, 
"The Ecology of Nomadic Pastoral ism," International Social Science 
Journal 11, 4 (Dec. 1959): 499-510; Krader, The Peoples of Central Asia 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1966); Krader, Social 
Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads (The Hague: Mouton and 
Co., 1963); "Seasonal Nomadism," Central Asian Review 4, 3 (1956): 226-38; 
"The Social Structure and Customs of the Kazakhs," Central Asian Review 
5, 1 (1957): 5-25; and Wolfgang Weissleder, ed., The Nomadic Alternative: 
Modes and Models of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and Steppes 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1978). 
3. The main sources on geography are listed in the Bibliography. 
4. The best source on the natural habitat of Kazakhstan is Neil E. 
West, ed., Temperate Deserts and Semi-Deserts (Ecosystems of the World 5) 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing, 1983), pp. 3-236, and 
especially Chap. 4, "Semi-Deserts and Deserts of Central Kazakhstan," by 
H. Walter and E. 0. Box, pp. 43-78. 
5. In Russian, Tselinnyi krai. 
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6. The central uplands are described in Sergei P. Suslov, The 
Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 
1961), 17 5 f f. 
7. "Kirghiz Steppe" because the Russians changed "Kazakh" to 
"Kirghiz" to prevent confusion between the Russian kazaks (Cossacks) and 
the Turkic kazaks (Kazakhs), spelled identically in Cyrillic. "Sary-
Arka (Arqa)" literally means "Yellow Back," and is descriptive of the 
grassland-watershed; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Press," p. 16 In. 
8. Dzheti Su, medieval Moghulistan, was chronicled by none other 
than Vasili Bartold in The History of Semirechye, in Vol. 1 of Four 
Studies on the History of Central Asia, 3 vols, transl. by V. and T. 
Minorsky (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1956-62), originally 
written in 1893. 
9. Elizabeth E. Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study 
in Culture Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 1. 
10. Bacon, Central Asians, p. 2; Frank Trippett et al., The First 
Horsemen, Emergence of Man Series (New York: Time-Life Books, 1974), 
pp. 9, 58, 74-9, 155; Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 85-118. 
11. Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 86-88, 94-95, argues persuasively that the 
climatic change recorded in the 1000s B.C. was primarily responsible. 
12. Khazanov, an expert on the Scythians, uses this fact of 'pan-
historical1 similarity to prove that pastoral nomadism is basically 
stagnant economically and culturally (pp. 69ff). 
13. The numerous sources on pastoral nomadism, especially of the 
Kazakhs, detail this dependence at length; e.g., Khazanov, Nomads, p. 38. 
Also, one finds ample descriptions of Kazakh diet in various travellers1 
works; e.g., E. Nelson Fell, Russian and Nomad: Tales of the Kirghiz 
Steppes (New York: Duffield, 1916), pp. 49-51. 
14. Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 73-4, notes that 19th century Kazakhstan 
suffered major dzhuts, with losses of 50-75% of the herds, every 6-11 
years, and local dzhuts annually, and quotes the Mongol proverb, "One 
jute [dzhut] suffices the rich man, and one arrow the hero." Richard 
A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-19 17: A Study in Colonial Rule 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p. 154, mentions the 
disastrous winters of 1879-80 and 189 1-92, in Turgay oblast; in the 
first, one-half of the 3k million livestock perished, and in the second, 
47% of the horses, 32% of the cattle, sheep, and goats, and 22% of the 
camels were lost. Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 92, states that the 1879-80 
winter was called "The Great Jut," and besides the Turgay losses, notes 
that 800,000 cattle died in Akmolinsk oblast. Also cf. P. Alampiev, 
Soviet Kazakhstan (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 30; 
Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (New York: 
Praeger, p. 34. 
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15. Owen Lattimore, High Tartary (Boston: Little, Brown, 1930), 
p. 245, calls grain the "staple luxury" of nomads. Khazanov, Nomads, 
pp. 52-53, discusses Kazakh diet. 
16. The primary English-language source is Thomas Winner, The Oral 
Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1958). 
17. Gavin Hambly, ed., Central Asia (New York: Delacorte Press, 
Dell Publishing, 1969), pp. 12-13. 
Chapter Two: Kazakhstan and the Tsars 
1. Major historical sources are listed in the Bibliography. 
2. Frank Bessac, "Co-variation between Interethnic Relations and 
SOcial Organization in Inner Asia," Papers of the Michigan Academy of 
Science, Arts, and Letters 50 (1965): 380. 
3. The etymology of kazak (qazaq) is disputed. Cf. William Allen, 
The Ukraine: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 
pp. 68-70, 250; Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and 
Stalinism, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 38n, 42-
43; George V. Lantzeff and Richard A. Pierce, Eastward to Empire: 
Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier, to 1750 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queenfs University Press, 1973), pp. 73-75; Owen Lattimore, Pivot 
of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), pp. 128-9, and High Tartary, p. 244; 
Philip Longworth, The Cossacks (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1969), pp. 14, 342-44; Hudson, Kazak, pp. 13-14. 
4. For anthropological perspective on nomads and sociopolitical 
development, compare Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968) with Marshall Sahlins, Tribesmen 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968). Also see Bessac, "Co­
variation," pp. 375-83. 
5. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Press," p. 157n; Olcott, 
The Kazakhs, pp. 4, 11, 110; Wheeler, p. 101. 
6. Krader, Format ion, pp. 82-103. 
7. Ernest Gellner, "Foreword," in Khazanov, Nomads, pp. xiv-xxii. 
Cf. V. F. Shakhmatov, "The Basic Characteristics of the Kazakh 
Patriarchal Feudal State Organization," translated as "Feudalism in 
Kazakhstan," Central Asian Review 9, 2 (1961): 126-33. 
8. An example of this is the custom of saun. As part of the duties 
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of wealthier Kazakhs to support poorer kinsmen, saun was the free loan of 
milk-animals for sustenance. Eventually, the recipient was expected to 
repay the loan with labor. Soviet critics thus portrayed saun as a 
system of economic exploitation. E.g., Central Asian Review, "Social 
Structure and Customs," p. 7. 
9. Tolybekov is discussed extensively in Ernest Gellner's Foreword 
in Khazanov, Nomads, pp. xviii-xxiv. His article "The Reactionary 
Struggle of the Kazakh Sultans and Batyrs of the Lesser Horde against 
Voluntary Union with Russia" is appears in translation as "Russia and the 
Kazakhs in the 18th Century," Central Asian Review 3, 4 (1955): 269-76. 
10. Ethnographic sources are listed under "Nomadism" in the 
Bibliography. 
11. Orda and zhuz are discussed in Hudson, Kazak Social Structure, 
pp. 14-15; Krader, Peoples of Central Asia, p. 92; and Hambly, ed., 
Central Asia, p. 143; and Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 10-11. 
12. Wheeler, Modern History, pp. 33-4; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, 
p. 143; Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 24. 
13. Hambly, ed., Central Asia, pp. 145-46; George J. Demko, The 
Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916, Uralic and Altaic Series, 
No. 96 (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1969), p. 37; 
Edward Allworth, "Encounter," in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A 
Century of Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 
p. 48; Olcott, Kazakhs, 26-7, 45; I. Zlatkin, "The History of the 
Khanate offfzhungaria," Central Asian Review 13, 1 (1965): 17-30. 
14. E. B. Bekhmakhanov, "The Annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia," 
Central Asian Review 6, 4 (1958): 408-14; N. V. Gorban, "From the History 
of the Construction of Forts in the South of Western Siberia: The New 
Ishim Fortified Line," Soviet Geography 25, 3 (March 1984): 177-94; 
Ihor Stebelsky, "The Frontier in Central Asia," Russian Historical 
Geography I (1983): 151. 
15. Lattimore, High Tartary, p. 113; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, 
p. 144. The Dzhungar population, perhaps 600,000, was literally 
slaughtered by the Manchus, in 1759; only a few escaped. (Zlatkin, 
Dzhungaria, 29-30. 
16. The best accounts of the Russian conquest are in Allworth, 
"Encounter," pp. 1-59; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, pp. 187-226; Olcott, 
Kazakhs, 28-53; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 17-45, 147. 
17. A. Chuloshnikov, "The Kazakh-Kirgiz Nomadic Hordes and Pugachevfs 
Rebellion, 1773-1774," trans, as "The Kazakhs and Pugachev's Revolt," 
Central Asian Review 8, 3 (1960): 256-63; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, p. 
189; Allworth, "Encounter," 10, 49-50. 
14 1 
18. Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 97-100; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, 
p. 148. 
19. Allworth, "Encounter," p. 50; Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 36, 100, 
125-26; Krader, Soc ial Organizat ion, pp. 192, 237-8, 253; Michael Rywkin, 
Russia in Central Asia (New York: Collier, 1963). p. 18; Wheeler, Modern 
History, p. 12. 
20. Allworth, "Encounter," pp. 10-14; Olcott, Kazakhs, 62-67; Caroe, 
Soviet Empire, pp. 74-5, 181, 224, 236; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, p. 199; 
Krader, Peoples, 101, 107, 162; Wheeler, Modern History, pp. 53-5, 90, 94, 
210, 240-1. 
21. Major sources for the tsarist administration of the Kazakhs are 
Allworth, ed., Central Asia, chapters by Allworth ("Encounter"), pp. 47-
57, and Helene Carrere d!Encausse ("Systematic Conquest, 1865-1884" and 
"Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories"), pp. 13 1-7 1; Bacon, 
Central Asians, 92-103, Krader, Peoples, pp. 97-108; Olcott, Kazakhs, 
pp. 57-99; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 46-91, 141-52; Wheeler, Modern 
History, 65-96. 
22. Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 92-102; Hudson, Kazak, p. 16. 
Chapter Three: Russification as Modernization 
1. Stephen Graham, Through Russian Central Asia (New York: Macmillan, 
1916), pp. 183-4. 
2. Hudson, Kazak, p. 16; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, pp. 221-2; Demko, 
Colonization, pp. 199-205; Rywkin, Russia, pp. 18, 77-81; Pierce, Russian 
Central Asia, pp. 153-62; Caroe, Soviet Empire, pp. 162-72; Bacon, Central 
Asians, pp. 92-102; Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: 
Communism and Nationalism 19 17-1923, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), pp. 6-7; Thomas G. Winner, The Oral Art and 
Literature of the Kazakhs, pp. 19-24. 
3. The most detailed account of Russian colonization is Demko1s 
Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-19 16 (1969); see also "Russian 
Military and Civilian Settlements, 1824-1917," Central Asian Review 6, 2: 
(1958): 143-5 1; V. I. Shunkov, "Geographical Distribution of Siberian 
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4. Demko, Colonization, p. 121. 
5. Detailed discussion of tsarist industrialization in Kazakhstan is 
in Violet Connolly, Beyond the Urals: Economic Development in Soviet 
Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Ian M. Matley, 
"Industrialization," in Allworth, ed., Central Asia, pp. 309-48. 
6. Demko, Colonization, pp. 145-9. 
7. Statistics from Demko, Colonizat ion, 14 1. 
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civilizations around them is the theme of William H. McNeill's Europe1s 
Steppe Frontier (1500-1800) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
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14. Soviet scholars attributed the change in land tenure to the 
usurpation by the "feudal nobility" of the land for their own gain; 
however, land ownership among the Kazakhs was a sympton of modernization 
and Russian economics, not of Marxist feudalism. 
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